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Much of traditional modeling, simulation and analysis (MS&A) is supported by 
engineering models - deterministic, Newtonian physics-based representations of closed 
systems.  Such approaches are not well-suited to represent the intricacies of human 
behavior.  This research advocates and seeks to articulate the concept of a more human-
centric approach to MS& A, one that better represents decision-making and other 
cognitive aspects of human behavior as well as it does physical activity. 
It starts with a view of individuals and groups as complex adaptive systems, which 
are best represented using agent-based modeling.  Representation of human behavior 
through intelligent agents incorporates models of decision-making, knowledge 
engineering and knowledge representation, as well as the whole gamut of the 
psychological and physiological interactions of humans with each other and their 
environment.  This representation is exemplified by consideration of situation 
awareness/situation understanding (SA/SU) as a core element.  
This leads to the development of a proof-of-concept simulation of a specific, easily 
understood, and quantifiable example of human behavior: intelligent agents being 
spatially “lost” while trying to navigate in a simulation world.  This model is named 
MOdeling Being Intelligent and Lost (MOBIL), noting the ability to be in both of these 
states is central to the simulation. MOBIL uses a blend of object oriented software 




centric approach to analysis. 
Applying that simulation in a number of virtual experiments illustrates how it 






This dissertation is the result of long years of study and learning, both in academia 
and in my professional life.  Throughout that time I have benefited from the advice, 
counsel, and friendship of mentors, colleagues, and family. I owe to all of them a debt I 
cannot possibly ever pay.  
I begin with my two foremost academic mentors.  My first advisor was Gene Ortner 
at Michigan Tech, who started me on the path of scholarship and research.  My Ph.D. 
advisor, Frank Ciarallo was truly the perfect fit for me at this time in my life.  I would 
never have come close to completing this dissertation without his encouragement, 
patience, and perseverance.  Most importantly, meeting with him to discuss this 
research was always a joy, his enthusiasm and willingness to put up with my tendency to 
prolixity never flagged.  His only fault is a sad lack of judgment with respect to NHL 
allegiance; a fault much overshadowed by his many virtues. 
I owe special debts to a number of people for whom or with whom I have worked 
over the years.  Ellen van Son of the TNO and George Mastroianni of the Air Force 
Academy have contributed significantly to the ideas contained in this work.    John 
D’Errico, Chris Christenson, and Arthur (Dub) Garrett, three distinguished soldiers and 
equally distinguished military analysts, have taught me much and have been a source of 
inspiration both professionally and personally.   My first boss at the University of Dayton 
Research Institute, Nick Engler, taught me the ins and outs of contract research, but 
never lost sight of the fact that doing research should be fun, an attitude I hope to never 
lose.  Matt Herz of the Natick Soldier Center embodied the same spirit.  He was both a 
friend and an advocate for many years; I still miss him. Craig Porter and Bob McIntyre 
kept me fed for many years through their entrepreneurial skills, and Craig’s generosity 
helped pay for much of my Ph.D work.   
I apologize for not singling out the many others with whom I have worked, especially 
all the folks at UDRI, Jaycor, STI, ORSA Corp, the Natick Modeling and Analysis Team, 




appreciative of your friendship and fellowship through the years. 
I must thank the members of my committee: Ray Hill, whose careful and critical 
review of this document greatly improved it; Yan Liu and Matt Rizki whose courses 
helped bridge the 30 year gap in my formal education; Dave Hudak who has been a 
kindred soul from the day I first met him; and Mary Fendley, who boldly (foolishly?) 
stepped in at the last moment when I needed another faculty member physically 
present for my defense.  All of the staff at the graduate school, especially Dr. Grandhi 
and Alysoun Taylor-Hall, greatly facilitated my return to academia after a long hiatus.   
Many thanks to all at Wright State for your professionalism and help. 
Finally, of course, I must acknowledge the continuing and essential support of my 
family.  My mother and father instilled a life-long love of learning, one I believe my wife 
and I have successfully passed on to our children.  Certainly Jennifer, James, and Emily at 
least learned how to exhort me to “Study hard and make them proud!”  I am certainly 
intensely proud of all three of them.  My wife Maris has been the foundation for any 
success I have had in life; her love and support has been and continues to be the true 







Table of Contents 
1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 OBJECTIVES ........................................................................................................................................................... 5 
1.2 BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................................................... 6 
1.3 APPROACH........................................................................................................................................................... 11 
1.4 SCOPE ................................................................................................................................................................... 13 
1.5 RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE ................................................................................................................................. 14 
1.5.1 Articulation of the Human-Centric Approach ................................................................................... 14 
1.5.2 Application of Operations Research Engineering ............................................................................ 15 
1.5.3 Analysis of Simulation Experiments ....................................................................................................... 20 
1.6 DISSERTATION STRUCTURE ............................................................................................................................. 21 
2 THE HUMAN-CENTRIC APPROACH FROM THE MILITARY PERSPECTIVE .......... 22 
2.1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF MILITARY MS&A ........................................................................................................ 22 
2.1.1 War Games From Sun Tzu to World War I ......................................................................................... 22 
2.1.2 Lanchester and the Origins of Quantitative Analysis ..................................................................... 25 
2.1.3 The Birth of Operations Research ........................................................................................................... 27 
2.1.4 The Rise of Technology: Military Operations as Physics ............................................................... 28 
2.1.5 War Gaming in CyberSpace and the Virtual Human ...................................................................... 31 
2.2 BEYOND ATTRITION MODELING ..................................................................................................................... 32 
2.2.1 Network Centric Warfare ........................................................................................................................... 32 
2.2.2 Maneuver Warfare vs. Attrition Warfare ............................................................................................ 33 
2.2.3 Effects Based Operations ............................................................................................................................. 34 
2.3 THE EVOLUTION OF THE WARRIOR SYSTEM ................................................................................................ 35 
2.3.1 The Soldier as a System ................................................................................................................................ 36 
2.3.2 Modeling the Soldier as a System and the Tactical Small Unit ................................................. 37 
2.3.3 Human Performance Moderators ........................................................................................................... 40 
2.3.4 The Warrior System ....................................................................................................................................... 41 
2.3.5 Warrior System MS&A Requirements ................................................................................................... 42 




2.4.1 Engineering Models ....................................................................................................................................... 43 
2.4.2 Replacing the Soldier System Hierarchy with the Warrior Systems Architecture ........... 45 
2.4.3 The Human-Centric Paradigm: A Marriage between the Physical Sciences, 
Psychology and the Social Sciences? ............................................................................................................................ 47 
2.4.4 From Closed Systems to Open Systems .................................................................................................. 49 
2.5 MOPS AND MOES ............................................................................................................................................. 51 
2.5.1 The Role of MOPs and MOEs ...................................................................................................................... 51 
2.5.2 Current State of the Art ................................................................................................................................ 53 
2.5.3 Potential for New MOEs ............................................................................................................................... 57 
3 HUMAN-CENTRIC MODELING TOOLS: AGENT BASED MODELS AND COMPLEX 
ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS ............................................................................................................................ 61 
3.1 AGENT-BASED MODELS.................................................................................................................................... 62 
3.1.1 The Role of Autonomy ................................................................................................................................... 63 
3.1.2 Implementations of Agent-based Modeling ........................................................................................ 64 
3.1.3 The Role of Error ............................................................................................................................................. 67 
3.1.4 Building Agent-Based Models Reductionism vs. Synthesism ...................................................... 69 
3.1.5 Agent-based Modeling and Analysis ...................................................................................................... 71 
3.1.6 Complex Adaptive Systems ......................................................................................................................... 73 
3.1.7 Military Operations as Complex Adaptive Systems ......................................................................... 74 
3.1.8 Complex Adaptive Systems and Emergent Analysis ........................................................................ 77 
3.2 THE HUMAN-CENTRIC PARADIGM: REVIEW AND RECAPITULATION ....................................................... 83 
3.2.1 Foundational Elements for the Human-Centric Paradigm ......................................................... 83 
3.2.2 Summary ............................................................................................................................................................. 86 
3.2.3 Current Status .................................................................................................................................................. 88 
3.3 APPLYING THE HUMAN-CENTRIC APPROACH: MODELING DECISION-MAKING AND SA/SU............... 92 
4 SITUATION AWARENESS: A KEY CONCEPT ................................................................... 93 
4.1.1 Measuring SA .................................................................................................................................................... 94 
4.1.2 Definitions .......................................................................................................................................................... 97 
4.1.3 The Dynamic Knowledge State .............................................................................................................. 105 
4.1.4 Knowledge State ........................................................................................................................................... 106 
5 COGNITIVE ARCHITECTURES AND THE FUNCTION OF MIND ............................... 113 
5.1.1 Decision making and choice ................................................................................................................... 115 




5.1.3 Execution and Action; ................................................................................................................................ 119 
5.1.4 Interaction and Communication. ......................................................................................................... 119 
5.2 MILITARY DECISION-MAKING ....................................................................................................................... 119 
6 MODELING MOVEMENT UNDER IMPERFERCT SA/SU ............................................. 123 
6.1 MOBILITY BASICS............................................................................................................................................ 124 
6.2 INTELLIGENT AGENTS AND TERRAIN .......................................................................................................... 124 
6.2.1 Terrain Representation for way finding, route planning, and navigation ....................... 125 
6.2.2 Models of Spatial Data .............................................................................................................................. 125 
6.2.3 Route Finding ................................................................................................................................................ 127 
6.2.4 Graph theoretic shortest path approaches ...................................................................................... 128 
6.2.5 Terrain Tiling and Voronoi Diagrams. .............................................................................................. 129 
6.2.6 Potential Field “Attractor/Repulsor” Schemes .............................................................................. 131 
7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................. 133 
7.1 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................................ 133 
7.2 TYPES OF EXPERIMENTS ................................................................................................................................ 133 
7.3 THE SIMULATION SOFTWARE ENVIRONMENT .......................................................................................... 135 
8 THE SIMULATION MODEL ................................................................................................. 138 
8.1 DECISION-MAKING .......................................................................................................................................... 140 
8.2 MODEL ENVIRONMENT .................................................................................................................................. 142 
8.3 ARC/NODE NETWORK MAP STRUCTURE ................................................................................................... 144 
8.4 MAP DISTORTION PROCESS .......................................................................................................................... 146 
8.5 MODEL STRUCTURE ....................................................................................................................................... 153 
8.5.1 GT Agent ........................................................................................................................................................... 153 
8.5.2 VIH Agent ......................................................................................................................................................... 155 
8.6 ROUTE PLANNING AND ROUTE FOLLOWING .............................................................................................. 162 
8.7 NODE RECOGNITION ...................................................................................................................................... 165 
8.7.1 Distance Match ............................................................................................................................................. 167 
8.7.2 Expectation Match ...................................................................................................................................... 168 
8.7.3 Links Match .................................................................................................................................................... 169 
8.7.4 Color Match .................................................................................................................................................... 172 
8.7.5 Candidate Node Selection ........................................................................................................................ 173 




9 EXPLORATION OF VIH MAP DISTORTION EXPERIMENTS ..................................... 175 
9.1 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP .................................................................................................................................. 175 
9.2 RESULTS: ASSESSMENT OF NORMAL VS. ABNORMAL TERMINATION .................................................... 176 
9.2.1 Statistical Significance .............................................................................................................................. 177 
9.2.2 Analysis of Parameter Effects ................................................................................................................ 183 
9.2.3 Normal Termination by Map .................................................................................................................. 186 
9.2.4 Regression Tree Analysis .......................................................................................................................... 188 
9.3 REFINEMENT OF ABNORMAL TERMINATION RESULTS ............................................................................ 193 
9.4 ASSESSMENT OF NORMAL TERMINATION .................................................................................................. 201 
9.5 MEASURING PROGRESS TOWARDS THE GOAL ........................................................................................... 208 
9.6 SUMMARY OF DISTORTION EXPERIMENT FINDINGS ................................................................................. 217 
10 EXPLORATION OF NODE RECOGNITION FACTORS ................................................... 218 
10.2 RESULTS: ASSESSMENT OF  BINARY TERMINATION CONDITIONS ......................................................... 219 
10.3 REFINEMENT OF ABNORMAL TERMINATION RESULTS ............................................................................ 228 
10.4 ASSESSMENT OF NORMAL TERMINATION .................................................................................................. 232 
10.5 MEASURING PROGRESS TOWARDS THE GOAL ........................................................................................... 236 
10.6 SUMMARY OF NODE RECOGNITION EXPERIMENT FINDINGS .................................................................. 238 
11 FACTOR INTERACTION EXPERIMENTS ........................................................................ 239 
11.1 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP .................................................................................................................................. 239 
11.2 RESULTS: ASSESSMENT OF BINARY TERMINATION OUTCOMES ............................................................. 240 
11.3 REFINEMENT OF ABNORMAL AND NORMAL TERMINATION RESULTS .................................................. 247 
11.4 SUMMARY OF FACTOR INTERACTION EXPERIMENTS ............................................................................... 248 
12 META-ROUTE EXPERIMENTS ........................................................................................... 250 
12.1 META-ROUTES ................................................................................................................................................ 250 
12.2 SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS USING LANDMARKS ....................................................................................... 253 
12.3 RESULTS: BINARY TERMINATION OUTCOMES ........................................................................................... 254 
12.4 SUMMARY OF META-ROUTE EXPERIMENTS .............................................................................................. 257 
13 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................ 258 
APPENDIX  A:  MOBILE OVERVIEW ....................................................................................... 264 









Table of Figures 
Figure 1-1 Refinement of the Problem Space ..................................................................... 4 
Figure 1-2 10-Step VFT Hierarchy Process (Weir 2009) .................................................... 16 
Figure 1-3 MOBIL VFT Hierarchy ....................................................................................... 17 
Figure 1-4 Simulation-Based Analysis ............................................................................... 18 
Figure 1-5 Progress Rules Suggested by Analysis of MOBIL Results ................................. 20 
Figure 2-1 Representative Lanchester Equations ............................................................. 26 
Figure 2-2 Soldier System Hierarchy circa 1991 ............................................................... 37 
Figure 2-3 Task Performance Evaluation Cycle ................................................................. 38 
Figure 2-4 The Tactical Small Unit System ........................................................................ 39 
Figure 2-5 The Warrior Systems Architecture as a Synergistic “illity” Octopus (Middleton 
1999) ......................................................................................................................... 45 
Figure 2-6 Types of Control. .............................................................................................. 59 
Figure 3-1 Characteristics of Complex Systems ................................................................ 73 
Figure 3-2 Emergent Analysis ........................................................................................... 78 
Figure 3-3 Year 2000 View of State of the Art for Individual Combatant Modeling ........ 90 
Figure 4-1 Endsley’s Three Levels of SA ............................................................................ 99 
Figure 4-2 John Boyd’s OODA Loop .................................................................................. 99 
Figure 4-3 The JDL Data Fusion Model ........................................................................... 100 
Figure 4-4 Miller and Shattuck’s Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition  ....................... 101 
Figure 4-5 Modified Stage Model for Human Information Processing (NATO/RTO/HFM 
2009) ....................................................................................................................... 104 




Figure 5-1 The Military Decision-Making Process (from FM 44-100) ............................. 121 
Figure 6-1 “Shortest” Path Determination with an Arc/Node Network ......................... 129 
Figure 6-2 Voronoi Diagram Avoiding Obstacles  from (Kim and Bhattacharya 2007) .. 131 
Figure 7-1 Principal Methods of Simulation ................................................................... 136 
Figure 8-1 The attention/situation awareness model .................................................... 140 
Figure 8-2 Square Grid Map ............................................................................................ 146 
Figure 8-3 Polygon Map .................................................................................................. 146 
Figure 8-4 Multiple Feature Map .................................................................................... 146 
Figure 8-5 Distorted Square Map ................................................................................... 150 
Figure 8-6 Distorted Polygon Map .................................................................................. 151 
Figure 8-7  Distorted Multi-Feature Map ....................................................................... 152 
Figure 8-8 GT Agent State Chart ..................................................................................... 154 
Figure 8-9 Initialization of the VIH Agent........................................................................ 156 
Figure 8-10 VIH Decision Processes ................................................................................ 158 
Figure 8-11 VIH Movement Selection Logic .................................................................... 162 
Figure 8-12 GT and VIH Dijkstra Routes .......................................................................... 163 
Figure 8-13 Arc Link Options at Node AR ........................................................................ 164 
Figure 8-14 Candidate Nodes.......................................................................................... 165 
Figure 8-15 Node Recognition Value Hierarchy.............................................................. 167 
Figure 8-16 S-Shaped Value Curve .................................................................................. 168 
Figure 8-17 Binary Expectation Measure ........................................................................ 169 
Figure 8-18 Calcuation of Bearing and Quadrant Membership Angles on the AnyLogic 
Coordinate System .................................................................................................. 170 
Figure 8-19 Quadrant Membership Calculation ............................................................. 171 




Figure 9-1 Frequency of Normal and Abnormal Termination Over All Trials ................. 176 
Figure 9-2 Relationship of Statistical Tables ................................................................... 178 
Figure 9-3 Logistic Fit Model ROC Curve ......................................................................... 181 
Figure 9-4 Probability of Normal Termination ................................................................ 184 
Figure 9-5 Separate Logistic Fit of Y by X for Binary Termination by Pr(NE), X and Y Error 
Limit, and Pr(MN) .................................................................................................... 184 
Figure 9-6 Normal Termination by GT-VIH Correspondence Thresholds ....................... 185 
Figure 9-7 Termination Condition by Map ..................................................................... 186 
Figure 9-8 Contingency Analysis of Binary Termination by Map .................................... 187 
Figure 9-9 First Steps in the Regression Tree Partition Process ..................................... 189 
Figure 9-10 Regression Tree after Ten Splits .................................................................. 191 
Figure 9-11 Regression Tree Partition Graph (Ten Splits) .............................................. 192 
Figure 9-12 Frequencies of Abnormal Termination........................................................ 193 
Figure 9-13 Frequency of Intra-Path Decisions by Normal and Abnormal Termination 
Conditions ............................................................................................................... 196 
Figure 9-14 Logistic Fit of Abnormal Termination Categories by number of Intra-Path 
Decisions ................................................................................................................. 196 
Figure 9-15 Abnormal Termination Categories JMP Logistic Fit Lack of Fit ................... 198 
Figure 9-16 Abnormal Termination Categories JMP Logistic Fit Partition Tree ............. 199 
Figure 9-17 Abnormal Termination Categories Partition Tree Leaf Report & Column 
Contributions .......................................................................................................... 200 
Figure 9-18 Frequency of Normal Termination Optimality Categories .......................... 201 
Figure 9-19 Number of Nodes of Path Count for Normal Termination Outcomes. ....... 202 
Figure 9-20 Comparison of Node Off Path Counts by GT-VIH Path Match Criterion ..... 203 
Figure 9-21 Graph of Partition for Termination Optimums after 25 Splits .................... 204 




Figure 9-23 Breakdown by Map of Off-Route Node Counts vs Normal Terminations ... 207 
Figure 9-24 Interactive Model Data Outputs .................................................................. 209 
Figure 9-25 Logistic Fit Binary Termination by Average Recognition Confidence .......... 211 
Figure 9-26 Partition Tree Graph on Potential Progress Metrics ................................... 214 
Figure 9-27 Partition Tree of Potential Progress Metrics ............................................... 215 
Figure 9-28 If-Then-Else Rules Suggested by Partition Tree Analysis ............................. 216 
Figure 10-1 Normal vs. Abnormal Termination All Trials ............................................... 219 
Figure 10-2 Termination Results for All Node Recognition Coefficients Equal .............. 221 
Figure 10-3 Termination Results Excluding the All Coefficients Zero Trials ................... 221 
Figure 10-4 Fit of Binary Termination by Node Recognition Match Coefficients ........... 222 
Figure 10-5 Regression Tree Graph: Partition of Binary Termination by Node Recognition 
Match Coefficients .................................................................................................. 226 
Figure 10-6 Regression Tree: Partition of Binary Termination by Node Recognition Match 
Coefficients ............................................................................................................. 227 
Figure 10-7 Node Recognition Match Coefficients: Abnormal Termination Breakdown
................................................................................................................................. 228 
Figure 10-8 Chapter 9 Distortion Experiments: Fit Abnormal Termination Conditions by 
Pr(MN) ..................................................................................................................... 230 
Figure 10-9 Chapter  10 Experiments: Fit Abnormal Termination Conditions by Pr(NE) 230 
Figure 10-10 Node Recognition Experiments: Frequency of Normal Termination 
Optimality Categories ............................................................................................. 232 
Figure 10-11  Fit of Normal Termination Categories by Node Recognition Coefficients 233 
Figure 10-12   Node Recognition Experiments:  Partition of Normal Termination 
Categories by Node Recognition Match Coefficients ............................................. 234 
Figure 10-13 Percent Optimal Performance as a Function Nodes Off Path Count and 




Figure 10-14 Contingency Analysis of Normal Termination Alternatives ...................... 236 
Figure 11-1 Factor Inter-Action DOE ............................................................................... 239 
Figure 11-2 Factor Inter-Action Experiments: Binary Termination ................................ 240 
Figure 11-3 Fit of Binary Termination by Node Recognition VFT Coefficients ............... 242 
Figure 11-4 Regression Tree Graph: Partition of Binary Termination Factor Interaction 
Experiments by All Case Factors ............................................................................. 245 
Figure 11-5 Regression Tree Small Leaf Node Graph: Partition of Binary Termination 
Factor Interaction Experiments by All Case Factors ............................................... 246 
Figure 11-6 Factor Interaction Experiments: Abnormal Termination Breakdown ......... 247 
Figure 11-7 Factor Interaction Experiments: Contingency Analysis of Normal Termination 
Alternatives ............................................................................................................. 248 
Figure 12-1Example Landmarks for the Multi-Feature Map .......................................... 251 
Figure 12-2 Landmarks Connected as Polygonal Endpoints ........................................... 253 
Figure 12-3 Binary Termination Results for the Meta-Routes Experiments .................. 254 
Figure 12-4 Meta-Route Results as a Function of Landmark Link Cases ........................ 255 
Figure 12-5 Normal Termination Results as a Function of Input Parameter Levels ....... 255 
Figure 13-1 Partitioning the Problem Space ................................................................... 261 









Table of Tables 
Table 8-1 Candidate Node Comparison .......................................................................... 173 
Table 9-1 Experiment 1 Parameter Values ..................................................................... 176 
Table 9-2 Whole Model Test ........................................................................................... 179 
Table 9-3 Confusion Matrix ............................................................................................. 181 
Table 9-4 Lack Of Fit ........................................................................................................ 182 
Table 9-5 Effect Likelihood Tests .................................................................................... 183 
Table 9-6 Leaf Report and Leaf Contributions to the Regression Tree .......................... 190 
Table 9-7 Abnormal Termination Categories JMP Nominal Logistic Fit ......................... 197 
Table 9-8 Abnormal Termination Categories Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests ................... 197 
Table 9-9 Abnormal Termination Categories Fit Lack of Fit ........................................... 197 
Table 9-10 Abnormal Termination Categories Logistic Fit Confusion Matrix ................. 198 
Table 9-11 Contingency Analysis of Normal Termination Alternatives .......................... 206 
Table 10-1 Experiment Parameter Values ...................................................................... 218 
Table 10-2 Whole Model Test: Binary Termination of Node Recognition Match 
Coefficient Experiments .......................................................................................... 223 
Table 10-3 Nominal Logistic Model Confusion Matrix: Binary Termination of Node 
Recognition Match Coefficient Experiments .......................................................... 223 
Table 10-4 Lack of Fit Test: Binary Termination of Node Recognition Match Coefficient 
Experiments ............................................................................................................ 224 
Table 10-5 Chapter  Experiments Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests ..................................... 224 
Table 10-6 Abnormal Output Comparison...................................................................... 229 




Table 10-8 Nominal Logistic Fit: Binary Termination Outcomes by Information Available 
to the VIH Agent...................................................................................................... 237 
Table 10-9 Effect Likelihood Ratio Test for Table 10-8 Results ...................................... 237 
Table 11-1 Probability of Normal Termination as a Function of VIH Map Distortion .... 241 
Table 11-2 Probability of Normal Termination as a Function of Node Recognition Factors
................................................................................................................................. 241 
Table 11-3  Whole Model Test: Binary Termination of Factor Interaction Experiments by 
All Case Factors ....................................................................................................... 242 
Table 11-4 Nominal Logistic Model Confusion Matrix: Binary Termination Factor 
Interaction Experiments by All Case Factors .......................................................... 243 
Table 11-5 Nominal Logistic Model Significant Factor Interactions: Binary Termination 
Factor Interaction Experiments by All Case Factors ............................................... 244 
Table 11-6 Three Chapter Comparison of Abnormal Termination Conditions .............. 249 
Table 11-7 Three Chapter Comparison of Normal Termination Conditions .................. 249 










Two roads diverged in a yellow wood, 
And sorry I could not travel both 
And be one traveler, long I stood 
And looked down one as far as I could 
To where it bent in the undergrowth; 
 
Then took the other, as just as fair, 
And having perhaps the better claim, 
Because it was grassy and wanted wear; 
Though as for that the passing there 
Had worn them really about the same, 
 
And both that morning equally lay 
In leaves no step had trodden black. 
Oh, I kept the first for another day! 
Yet knowing how way leads on to way, 
I doubted if I should ever come back. 
 
I shall be telling this with a sigh 
Somewhere ages and ages hence: 
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I— 
I took the one less traveled by, 
And that has made all the difference. 
                                                 Robert Frost 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation represents ideas and aspirations gleaned from more than a quarter 
of a century in the practice of modeling, simulation and analysis (MS&A) in a number of 
different fields, but primarily in support of military research and development (R&D).  It 
is in pursuit of a long-held desire to more fully address a critical element in the 
representation of human behavior in modeling and analysis, and especially with regard 
to representation of dismounted infantry.   
Over the past 25 years, my work as an operations research analyst has increasingly 




emphasizes human information processing and decision-making.   
Fundamental to this approach is the belief that it is no longer sufficient to 
concentrate principally on the physics-based aspects of military operations, to no longer 
represent the individual soldier as just a “slow, unarmored tank” (Middleton 2010b). 
While the role of physics remains important, it needs to be augmented by a more 
“human-centric” view that distinguishes between the man and machine, one that 
explicitly represents the role of human performance moderators on operational 
capability, e.g.,(Pew and Mavor 1998; Ritter 2000; Mastroianni and Middleton 2001; 
Hudlicka 2002; Hudlicka 2004; Silverman 2004; van Lent, McAlinden et al. 2004). 
   In today’s “information age”, there is a need to explicitly represent the role of 
human perception and decision-making in the physical behaviors that comprise both 
war and peace, e.g.,(Pew and Mavor 1998; Hill 1999; Deitz 2006; Warwick 2006; 
Middleton 2010a). This view is further emphasized by the current need to consider non-
kinetic as well as kinetic aspects of military operations or other human activities, e.g., 
(Perumalla and Bhaduri 2006; Hurley, Bucher et al. 2009; Moffat 2011). 
Later chapters of this dissertation explain the human centric approach more fully, 
and describe how it addresses shortcomings in many current models and simulations.   
The dissertation consists of five major elements: 
1. The articulation of the human-centric approach to modeling, simulation 
and analysis; 
2. The adaption and integration of a multi-disciplinary mix of theoretical 
concepts into an over-arching conceptual model of intelligent agent 
decision making; 
3. A methodological framework for selective integration of different 
aspects of these theories; 
4. The implementation of that framework into a computer simulation that 





5. A series of simulation experiments that demonstrate the viability of the 
framework as an applied research tool. 
The research explores the issues involved in the development and application of that 
approach.  As a proof-of-concept, the research led to the development and application 
of a representation of incomplete and/or erroneous Situation Awareness/Situation 
Understanding (SA/SU) in computer simulation.   The goal is not to add materially to the 
theory of SA/SU or other similar concepts, but rather to apply engineering methods to 
improve representation of these concepts in models and simulations. 
The perspective of this dissertation is very much that of Industrial and Systems 
Engineering (ISE), the application of engineering principles to improve processes and 
products through an integrated systems approach; one that melds mathematical, 
physical and social sciences with the engineering design to optimize complex processes.   
Widely available and used tools: Microsoft Excel; JMP; AnyLogic; and OpenStreetMap, 
have been combined to produce and apply a new analytical methodology.  
This dissertation is directed to the development and application of MS&A tools in 
support of operations research with respect to human conduct, and it requires the 
integration of a number of diverse fields of study.  Implementing a more human-centric 
approach to MS&A is an ambitious undertaking; this dissertation focuses on a small part 





Figure 1-1 Refinement of the Problem Space 
The starting point is viewing individuals and groups as complex adaptive systems, 
which are best represented using agent-based modeling.  Representation of human 
behavior through intelligent agents incorporates models of decision-making, knowledge 
engineering and knowledge representation, as well as the whole gamut of the 
psychological and physiological interactions of humans with each other and their 
environment.  This representation is exemplified by consideration of situation 
awareness/situation understanding (SA/SU) 1 as a core element.  This leads to 
development of a proof-of-concept simulation. Applying that simulation in a number of 
virtual experiments illustrates how it supports analysis of individual’s SA/SU and 
associated decision-making processes. 
                                                     
 
1 Throughout most of this dissertation I choose to blur the distinctions between SA and SU into a single over-arching concept 
following the pragmatic definition of (Adam 1993) “knowing what is going on so I can figure out what to do."  Chapter 4   below 























































This dissertation begins by describing the human-centric approach to MS&A. This 
approach is essential to meeting the analytic needs of today’s military community, but it 
has application far outside of that community.  The human-centric paradigm has been 
evolving for some years; dating at least to the seminal work by the Military Operations 
Research Society mini-symposia in the early 90’s, e.g.,(Murtaugh 1994), and the 
comprehensive overview by Pew and Mavor (Pew and Mavor 1998).  One of the core 
objectives of this dissertation is to articulate my view of that paradigm, as developed 
over a career spanning virtually the entire period of its evolution. 
 This research develops and demonstrates a methodological framework for the 
representation of imperfect SA/SU and its effects on mission/task performance. This 
framework begins with a conceptual model following the dictates of the human-centric 
approach, one that supports multi-disciplinary investigation of different hypotheses 
with respect to the nature of, and inter-relationships between, the physical, 
information, and cognitive domains2  of military operations in particular and of human 
endeavors in general.   Heretofore, approaching such hypotheses through conventional 
models has focused on the performance of tasks, performance that can usually be 
measured in terms of time and resources. Modeling SA/SU will also allow testing 
hypotheses related to the potential to act, or react, based on changing operational 
conditions and the contents of the individual’s knowledge state. 
I instantiate this methodological framework in a simulation model with “plug and 
play” modules that can support exploration of different schemes for knowledge 
representation, inference, and decision-making.  As appropriate for such different 
schemes, the model’s design allows the integration of functional modules and data 
structures to:  
                                                     
 




 reflect the uncertainty and error in what individuals know;  
 represent how they act on that knowledge, and  
 capture metrics that correlate levels of SA/SU with operational outcomes. 
The model’s intent is to provide a tool that can aid researchers in better 
understanding of this problem space human behavioral representation in general or in 
the representation of SA/SU and decision-making in particular.  There is an extensive 
body of research on decision-making under uncertainty3; this research provides a 
methodology for applying elements of that research to improve the representation of 
decision-making in MS&A.  This methodology is an engineering solution to a set of 
practical problems in the R&D community and the operational world:  
 developing information system requirements; 
 designing and implementing technological solutions to meet such 
requirements, and  
 evaluating the potential costs and benefits of proposed solutions. 
Finally, this research employs the methodology and simulation model to investigate 
decision-making under uncertainty and error, using that model in a set of constructive 
simulation4 experiments to examine how an intelligent agent’s behavior is affected by 
information of varying levels and quality.  
1.2 Background 
Military analyses have traditionally assumed that the desired effect of military 
operations is the attrition of materiel and personnel resources (conventional combat 
power) of the enemy.  The attrition-based view of combat modeling is supported by 
engineering models - deterministic, Newtonian physics-based representations of closed 
systems.  These models typically express combat outcomes through direct measures of 
                                                     
 
3 See for example: (Bellman and Zadeh 1970; Safavian and Landgrebe 1995; Lipshitz and Strauss 1997; Klein 1999; Alex 2000; 
Holmquist and Goldberg 2007; Howard 2007; Middlebrooks and Stankiewicz 2007; Cohen 2008) 




attrition warfare, such as the “killer/victim” scoreboard, as expressed by such measures 
as Loss Exchange Ratios (LERs) and Force Exchange Ratios (FERs). , e.g.,(Shlapak and 
Davis 1991; Olwell 1997; O’Hanlon 2003; Bowley, Castles et al. 2004; Artelli and Deckro 
2008). 
Much current thinking, however, emphasizes that the attrition of conventional 
combat power is simply the means by which some other intended effect is achieved. For 
example, senior decision makers have suggested that achieving “behavioral” or 
“cognitive” effects in opposing leaders or combatants is often a goal of military 
operations in addition to, or at least in conjunction with, force attrition objectives, 
e.g.,(Alberts and Garstka 2001; Deptula 2001; Roske Jr 2002; Smith 2002).  
This is neither a new or revolutionary way of thinking about war, military theorists 
from Sun Tzu to von Clausewitz have expressed similar ideas.   In the focus on the 
attrition of conventional combat power, however, other effects (cognitive, behavioral) 
have too often been largely ignored.  (Pew and Mavor 1998; Zimm 1999; Horne 2001; 
Goerger 2002; Lauren 2006; Middleton 2008; NATO/RTO/HFM 2009) 
 As discussed in Roske5 and others, attrition modeling approaches provide necessary, 
but not sufficient tools for analysis of military operations. In addition, the military 
operations research community needs models and methodologies that reflect the fact 
that conflict represents an open system, one in which energy, materiel, and information 
flow across conflict boundaries.  
Operational analysis (and analysts) must adapt to encounter and engage the data 
and methods of the human sciences, and of other disciplines such as history, political 
science, and economics, in order to make effective use both of the insights these 
disciplines have to offer. They need to augment application of the physical sciences with 
                                                     
 
5 Vincent Roske serving under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the Deputy Director, J8 (Wargaming, Simulation & Analysis)  




other, more human-centric disciplines such as psychology and the social sciences. They 
need to  complement and supplement the focus on physical incapacitation of the enemy 
with consideration of the so-called  that are critical to an individual’s behavior: will; 
morale; leadership; training, and values related to ethnic background and national 
makeup.  These concepts relate to virtually all forms of human endeavor, extending far 
beyond military operations research, e.g., (Wooldridge and Ciancarini 2001; Bonabeau 
2002; Macy and Willer 2002; Sanchez and Lucas 2002). 
These “soft factors” emphasize the psychological or cognitive components of 
warfare, recognizing that the will to fight can be as important a consideration as the 
capability to fight. Analytical paradigms that incorporate these factors must be 
supported by the ability to measure success against mission objectives such as the 
disruption of enemy operations without destruction of critical infrastructure, the 
containment of insurgency, and more generally, the positive projection of force to 
achieve political, rather than strictly military objectives, e.g.,(Heeringa and Cohen 2000; 
Lampe, Schwarz et al. 2006; Middleton 2008) 
One might think the “human” should have already been the focus of representing 
the behavior of the warfighter, but to date there has been far more emphasis on the 
physical actions of that individual and far too little attention to his/her psycho-
physiological state and cognitive behaviors.  Furthermore, it is one thing to conclude 
that human factors such as morale, leadership, national identity, and combat 
experience, play an important role in conflict, and quite another to contend that such 
factors can and should be taken out of the “too hard to do” box, and represented in 
military models and simulations.  Such simulations are now relied on for a spectrum of 
applications from operational planning and force employment, to the development and 
fielding of materiel for those forces; getting it “right” in modeling and simulation is now 
more important than ever before. 
Including these factors in MS&A requires merging elements of engineering, 




are relevant to modeling and simulation of modern conflict.  These disciplines, however, 
operate under very different epistemologies. In order to derive the most benefit from 
the new capabilities in analytic tools, model developers and users are confronted with 
the challenge of understanding, and sometimes reconciling, these various approaches to 
acquiring and evaluating knowledge, e.g., (Westbury, Wilensky et al. 1998; Alberts, 
Garstka et al. 2001; Bryant, Johnson et al. 2008).  
Meeting this challenge is integral to the human-centric approach, and a good 
starting point is to begin with experimental psychology and human factors engineering.  
These disciplines occupy a sort of middle ground between the physical sciences and the 
more theoretical social sciences, being versed in the empirical scientific methodologies 
of the laboratory while seeking insight into those aspects of human thought and 
behavior that have as yet resisted the comfortable certainty found in the “laws” of 
physics. Topics that inhabit this middle ground appear to be amenable to both 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies and thus provide a reasonable opening bid 
for initial forays into human-centric analysis. One such topic is SA/SU.  Bringing SA/SU 
into the methodological framework of models and simulations introduces an essential 
psychological dimension of human military performance into MS&A. 
Furthermore, improving SA/SU is a current emphasis in the development of 
information systems technologies for both military and civilian applications.  MS&A can 
play a significant role in understanding SA/SU issues: in exploring problems and 
inadequacies with respect to current capabilities; in assessing the efficacy of new or 
proposed information technologies and in determining how best to employ these 
technologies. At present, however, military MS&A suffers from inadequate 
representation of SA/SU and decision-making, and thus lacks the tools to assess current 
SA/SU systems or potential improvements from new technologies.  In particular, robust 
representation of SA/SU must address its antithesis, the so-called “fog of war”, which is 
manifested as imperfect SA/SU - information that is uncertain, incomplete, and/or just 




(Cain and Belyavin 2008). 
As evidenced by such programs as the Land Warrior and its successor Nett Warrior, 
much of the technology being applied to improve SA/SU for the solider is designed to 
address incomplete SA/SU to support decision-making and risk assessment with respect 
to missing data. This drive to provide more data to the soldier is accompanied by the 
need to assist in filtering relevant information from large data streams (Hahn and Jezior 
1999; Matthews, Shattuck et al. 2001; Smith 2011; Bailey 2012).  The focus in this 
dissertation is to provide the ability to investigate and assess the consequences of 
indeterminate, incorrect and inconsistent SA/SU, which requires exploring how to 
recognize and correct SA/SU based on information that is uncertain, imprecise, or just 
plain wrong.   
Incomplete SA/SU is generally easier to address than the other varieties.  It appeals 
to those who would like to provide hardware solutions to SA/SU problems by increasing 
the amount of information available, the rate at which it can be delivered, and the 
extent to which it can be more widely disseminated to warfighters. Although it is hard to 
argue against giving decision-makers more information, there are significant problems 
with respect to the potential for data overload. Furthermore, simply addressing 
problems of incomplete SA/SU and missing data discounts equally pertinent issues with 
respect to the capabilities and fallibilities of the human operator.  Humans can (and 
frequently do) function well with information that is incomplete or imprecise.  On the 
other hand, making decisions based on incorrect or flawed information is almost always 
a recipe for less than desirable outcomes.  Plans based on known data gaps and 
uncertainties are generally more robust, if only to account for unknown factors.  Plans 
based on wrong information may rely too heavily on fallacious assumptions to optimize 
outcomes, with potentially catastrophic results.  In addition, an incorrect understanding 
of an operational situation may bias subsequent information processing, and lead to 
flawed decision-making based on persistent problems with SA/SU.  In any dynamic 




are both internally consistent and continue to be supported by new data; failure to 
abandon or at least adapt incorrect assumptions is an almost certain recipe for disaster. 
In ABM, agents (simulated entities) make decisions according to their own individual 
(and probably imperfect) SA/SU.  Each entity has a “perceived truth” knowledge base – 
an idiosyncratic view of the operational situation, as seen by that individual and 
obscured by the agent’s local “fog of war”.   This research proposes that monitoring the 
divergence between this idiosyncratic view and simulation “ground truth” can provide a 
measure, in quantitative terms, of the degree to which each agent’s SA/SU may be 
imperfect. Furthermore, subjecting each agent to the consequences of acting on its 
imperfect worldview supports evaluation of the operational costs of uncertain, 
incomplete and/or incorrect information.  It also supports explicit modeling of leader 
decision-making processes based on such data, of imperfect command and control, 
and/or imperfect subordinate receipt of and subsequent execution of orders.  This kind 
of modeling is critical for estimation of the benefits of proposed new or modified 
systems, and/or associated adjustments to tactics, techniques and procedures. 
1.3 Approach 
This research demonstrates the application of the human-centric paradigm through 
the use of agent-based modeling (ABM) to explore phenomena associated with SA/SU in 
a series of simulation experiments. This approach requires translating those phenomena 
into abstract modeling constructs: systems and entities, with associated behaviors, state 
descriptors, and static and dynamic features or characteristics.  Events, terrain and 
environmental factors, and any other important elements of the phenomena must be 
represented as conceptual simulation objects, attributes, and processes, which must 
then be instantiated in computer code and executed according to an experimental 
design. 
This research explores imperfect SA/SU by modeling a specific, easily understood, 
and quantifiable example of human behavior: intelligent agents being spatially “lost” 




have a unique “mental map” – its idiosyncratic view of its geo-spatial environment.  The 
simulation model  is named MOdeling Being Intelligent and Lost (MOBIL), noting that 
the ability to be in both of these states simultaneously is central to the simulation. 
An entity’s decisions are based on its idiosyncratic view, but behavior outcomes are 
based on ground truth.  For example, an entity may “think” the distance between two 
waypoints on its route of travel may be either shorter or longer than it is in reality; if the 
entity moves between those waypoints its distance traveled will be determined by the 
actual value.  Thus, as the simulation progresses, the entity’s time required for travel, 
and its use of resources such as fuel, will be at some divergence from its planned values 
for these quantities, with possible significant effects on task performance.  The rate and 
degree to which an entity’s expectations diverge from ground truth are measures of 
that entity’s SA/SU, and quantify the effects of imperfect SA/SU on task performance by 
measuring the entity’s ability to navigate its environment given various levels of SA/SU. 
Current military simulations provide a robust and technologically mature 
representation of terrain and geo-spatial relationships.  In addition, there are now 
powerful simulation packages that support development and implementation of agent-
based models.  Integrating such representations into an agent-based model software 
package provides sound foundation for developing an agent-based model of movement.  
AnyLogic is such a package and was used to develop the simulation.   
In military operations, just as in real life, being “lost” may also be a metaphor for 
uncertainty as to how one fits into a larger context or world view, not knowing exactly 
what to do, or worse, where one wants to go and what one wants to accomplish.  Using 
agent-based modeling to represent aspects of the “being lost” in a strictly spatial sense 
provides a template for dealing being “lost” in the “metaphorical” sense - dealing with 
imperfect SA/SU in more generic contexts.  Thus by studying a concrete example, one 
can gain insight into the nature of imperfect SA/SU, how individual decision-makers 
might recognize problems in their SA/SU, how they might seek to correct those 






This dissertation addresses the human-centric paradigm through an engineering 
level modeling approach that blends just enough theory with an understanding of the 
practical constraints required to address significant real-world questions.  Taking such 
an approach requires recognizing design and implementation trade-offs that must be 
made in developing and applying simulation tools.  Inherent in any model or simulation 
development is the critical tension between a desire for generality and universality on 
the one hand, and the benefits of focus and efficiency of specificity on the other hand.  
This tension is closely associated with tradeoffs between two well-accepted modeling 
principles: 
 correspondence – the closer model features actually correspond to the details 
of the phenomena being represented, the easier it is to both validate the 
model based on first principles and to subsequently modify the model to 
account for new features, and 
 parsimony – only include those factors/details that are really needed, models 
are a simplification of reality precisely because it is easier and generally more 
useful to consider only those aspects of phenomena that are germane to the 
specific question being addressed by the model application at hand. 
As described above, the approach seeks insights into more complicated problems of 
human decision-making by exploring a restricted decision space, and focusing on a 
single but highly representative type of decision: the fundamental question at each 
stage in a simulated agent’s movement: “where to go next?” The question can be at a 
global or local level depending on the degree of precision needed in selection of the 
agent’s “next position”, whether that position represents a “nearest neighbor” point on 
a regular grid, the degree of advancement along a specific route segment or path, or 
simply movement in a given direction.  The decision elements that must be represented 
include: 





 the geo-spatial environment and the agent’s interaction with that environment 
- environmental feature characteristics – landmarks, identifying 
qualitative and quantitative attributes;  
- the agent’s perception of the  environment – its view of those 
factors in its world that might influence its movement; 
- ground truth constraints – those factors in the world that restrict 
or otherwise affect the agent’s physical movement; 
 inference procedures – the algorithms and/or heuristic methods by which the 
agent selects that next position, given its goal, its understanding of the 
environment and its capabilities to move within that environment 
 uncertainty and errors – the sources and extent of the agent’s potentially 
imperfect understanding of its environment.  
1.5 Research Significance  
The Department of Defense has mandated that modeling and simulation play a 
significant role in research and development of virtually all military technologies, 
including those for SA/SU, e.g., (Bernstein 1998; Johnson 1998; Davis 1999; Page 2001; 
Ford and Dillard 2008).  Providing better SA/SU for the warfighter is a big driver for the 
development and application of military information technologies, and the research 
proposed herein addresses significant gaps in current M&S capabilities to support RD&A 
of SA/SU capabilities.  
1.5.1 Articulation of the Human-Centric Approach 
This research focuses on SA/SU as a critical element of the human-centric approach 
to MS&A.  SA/SU is central to the idea that the cognitive state of an individual may help 
determine success or failure on the battlefield. As such, representation of SA/SU can 
provide a blueprint for other aspects of human-centric modeling.  In showing how 
aspects of SA/SU can be sufficiently defined in operational terms, and brought into the 
methodological framework of models and simulations, this approach captures an 




human-centric approach is one of the most fruitful areas for near-term enhancements 
to models and simulations.  
Clearly, the  “soft factors” mentioned in Chapter1.2, are critical factors determining 
not just the outcome of the battle, but of over-all conflict. It is still, however, an 
important question as to whether it is necessary, possible, or even desirable to include 
such factors in combat models, and if so, at what levels of detail, aggregation, and 
analysis.  This research addresses this question by seeking to articulate the human-
centric paradigm and by demonstrating its potential. This research provides an in-depth 
explication of the concept of human-centric modeling.   
1.5.2 Application of Operations Research Engineering 
It employs the novel application of a number of current modeling and simulation 
methodologies to provide an engineering approach to a complex problem in integrated 
systems design and assessment.   
For example, Value-Focused Thinking (VFT) is a multi-criteria decision-making 
methodology, primarily applied to help human decision-makers.  Typically VFT is applied 
through a process such as that outlined in Figure 1-1.  The process has two major 
elements, model development and model application.  In the first of these, individuals in 
the problem domain, i.e., people with a stake in solving the problem, are consulted to 





Figure 1-2 10-Step VFT Hierarchy Process (Weir 2009) 
 A value hierarchy is developed to represent the relative importance of each of these 
criteria, and measures are defined to quantify the contributions of potential solution 
alternatives.  This process is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.7 below, where the 
value hierarchy shown in Figure 1-3 is developed. 
As used herein the VFT process is noteworthy on two levels.  First, the value 
hierarchy of Figure 1-3 is embedded in MOBIL code, giving the entity simulated in 
MOBIL the ability correlate elements of its view of ground truth with its idiosyncratic 





Figure 1-3 MOBIL VFT Hierarchy 
As discussed in Chapter 8.7, representing decision processes with VFT is compatible 
with theories of SA/SU, including: Endsley’s three stages of Situation Awareness  
(Endsley 1995a; Endsley 1995b) and John Boyd’s Observe, Orient, Decide and Act 
(OODA) loop6 (Boyd 1986; Boyd 1987).  
 The VFT process, however, is more than just a mechanism for comparing 
alternatives. The model development part of VFT is a deliberative process that iterates 
between customer/user interviews and definition of model elements. As described by 
Keeney, the deliberative process is simple in concept: 
“You begin with the fundamental objectives that indicate what you really care 
about in the problem.  Then you follow simple logical reasoning processes to 
identify the mechanisms by which the fundamental objectives can be achieved.  
Finally, for each mechanism, you create alternatives or classes or alternatives by 
asking what control you have over that mechanism.”  (Keeney 1996), 
Not coincidentally, this deliberative process, and the model application process that 
                                                     
 
6 Strictly speaking, Boyd’s OODA loop is not a model of SA/SU, but a dynamic decision-making process in which the objective is 
defeat to an adversary by operating at a higher tempo, cycling through one’s own OODA loop processes more rapidly than the 
adversary’s update rate.  The OODA loop concept, however, does share considerable commonality with more theoretical views of 
SA/SU. 
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follows it, together defines an approach very similar to that used in simulation-based 
analysis.  Figure 1-4, which is taken from (Middleton 2008),  
 
Figure 1-4 Simulation-Based Analysis  
depicts simulation based analysis as a five step process: 
 Definition of the Problem Statement – Just as in the VFT process, an explicit 
problem statement captures the analysis goal, placing objectives in the context 
of key constraints, limitations, and assumptions, with a scope bounded within 
the resources and time and time available, and most important of all, clear 
establishment of desired content and form of the answer.   
 Operational Narrative/Context - The problem statement provides a skeletal 
structure for the analysis; the substance or “flesh” is found in operational 
narratives – use cases expressed through scenarios or vignettes to frame 
specific elements of the problem in a relevant context.  This step basically 
corresponds to the definition of values in the VFT process; it captures the 
factors that are important to the individuals seeking to solve the problem.  
Construction of appropriate narratives requires subject matter experts (SMEs) 
to provide an experiential understanding of operational situation, and to 
ensure that the narrative is expressed in “operator-speak” instead of analytical 
Factor Name Low Level High Level Description
Blue_Speed 1.2 4.15 Ground speed of blue forces (km/hr)
Mask_Obedience 0.2 0.9 How well soldiers follow orders after they mask
Number_of_UAV 0 2 Number of UAVs available in the scenario
Number_of_ARV 0 4 Number of armed robotic vehicles
JCAD_Sensitivity 2 14 Time until JCAD detects (sec)
Mask_Marksmanship 0.4 0.8 Marksmanship of blue forces after they mask
SWFR_Effect 0.5 1 Internal communications effectiveness
ExternalComm_Effect 0.5 1 External communications effectiveness





 Conceptual/Ontological View - In the VFT process, one constructs the value 
hierarchy, which is in essence a model of the value relationships and a formal 
description of the elements that must be quantified. In simulation-based 
analysis the operational narrative(s) must be instantiated in models and 
simulations, which requires translating the narratives into abstract modeling 
constructs: systems and entities, with associated behaviors, state descriptors, 
and static and dynamic features or characteristics.  
 Representational Model/ Simulation – Both VFT and simulation-based analysis 
require the adroit choice of measures that translate characteristics of the 
alternatives being studied into aggregate assessments of their potential to 
solve the problem under consideration7.    
 Experimental Instantiation – In both VFT and simulation-based analysis, once 
the model structure has been defined, the alternatives to be studied must be 
identified and characterized in terms of input data.  Typically the model is 
executed iteratively for sensitivity analysis and insight into the nature and 
potential of those alternatives.  Frequently additional alternatives are 
developed and studied based on preliminary results. 
While both VFT and simulation-based analysis have been defined as multi-step 
processes, they rarely, if ever, are carried out as a strict sequence of these steps.  In 
general there is considerable interaction and refinement of the model and the 
alternatives as one works through the processes involved.  Both VFT and simulation-
based analysis provide a framework for evolving from a usually imprecise and 
ambiguous problem concept to explicit analytical assessment of potential problem 
solutions.   
The essence of both VFT and simulation-based analysis capture the engineering 
approach to operations research that is the core of this dissertation.  
                                                     
 




1.5.3 Analysis of Simulation Experiments 
This dissertation blends object oriented software design and development principles 
with agent based modeling to establish the utility of applying the human-centric 
approach to analysis, as evidenced by the results of a series of simulation experiments.  
For example, as seen in Figure 1-5,  a JMP regression tree analysis of MOBIL output 
shows how one might develop a set of rules for changing goal-seeking strategies based 
on incremental progress measures. 
 
Figure 1-5 Progress Rules Suggested by Analysis of MOBIL Results 
If ANRC => 0.54
then Pr(NT) = 0.80
If 0.5423 < ANRC< 0.9780
then Pr(NT) = 0.6740
If ANRC < 0.54
then Pr(NT) = 0.11
If ANRC=> 0.98
then Pr(NT) = 0.996
If 0.5423 < ANRC < 0.98
and NIPD < 2
then Pr(NT) = 0.79
If 0.5423 < ANRC < 0.9780
and NIPD => 2
then Pr(NT) = 0.3339
If 0.7438 < ANRC< 0. 0.9780
and NIPD < 2  then PR(NT) = 0.8609
     ……
ANRC: Ave Node Recognition Confidence 





1.6 Dissertation Structure 
This dissertation has two primary components, the first being the articulation of the 
human-centric paradigm, with a focus on the roles agent-based modeling, SA/SU, and 
decision-making have in that paradigm.  Chapters 2 through 6 address this component. 
Chapter 2 begins by describing the world that led me to this research, the world of 
military operations research.  Chapter 3 discusses agent-based modeling and complex 
adaptive systems, Chapter 4 goes into the details of SA/SU, Chapter 5 examines 
cognitive architectures and the decision-making process, and Chapter 6 discusses the 
issues of modeling mobility, route planning, and related issues. 
The second main component of the dissertation begins with a brief discussion of the 
research methodology and the use of simulation experiments in Chapter 7, with a 
description of the model, MOBIL, itself, in Chapter 8.  The next four chapters are 
devoted to four separate experiments that examine the role of distorting a simulated 
entity’s available information, the entity’s ability to reconcile that distorted information 
with ground truth, an in-depth look at interactions between those two factors, and 
finally a look at an on-going modification of the model and its application.  The 





2 THE HUMAN-CENTRIC APPROACH FROM THE MILITARY PERSPECTIVE 
This chapter discusses the concept of the human centric approach from the 
perspective of military MS&A.  It provides a brief history of military MS&A, looks at 
current trends in military operational philosophy, relates those trends to the concept of 
the individual dismounted combatant as a weapon system, and addresses the need for 
an engineering model of that weapon system.   
2.1 A Brief History of Military MS&A 
This history traces military MS&A from sand tables and board games to the birth of 
operations research (OR) and to the development and application of today’s 
sophisticated computer codes. 
2.1.1 War Games From Sun Tzu to World War I 
Military M&S traces its origins to war games, which are essentially simulations of 
military operations. (St Clair 2003; Little 2006) relate that Sun Tzu (circa 500 BCE) is said 
to have written about the game known to the Chinese as Wei Hai (or Weiqi), a game 
that may date back as far as 2000 or 3000 BCE.  It is still popular today, having migrated 
sometime around the 7th century A.D. to Japan, where it is known as Igo (giving rise to 
the English name Go) and from there (albeit much more recently) to the US and other 
Western countries.  “We Hai” literally means “encirclement” and victory is gained by 
outflanking one’s opponent and controlling more territory.   It is interesting to note that 
such strategy is in keeping with Sun Tzu’s philosophy of war, as expressed in his treatise 




attack whenever possible, and even counsels that any form of direct combat should be 
used only as a last resort to achieve military and political objectives8. 
Go player pieces are white and black stones that are alternatively placed at the 
interchapter of a rectangular grid, and pieces have no intrinsic value of their own but 
derive their value from their position vis-à-vis other pieces on the board9.  While the 
game’s rules seem simple, it has as yet resisted attempts to develop the Go-equivalent 
of the IBM’s chess-playing Deep Blue, a computer program that can defeat human 
experts. (Stern, Graepel et al. 2004; van der Werf 2004) attribute this difficulty in large 
part to the lack of good evalution functions for different Go positions and the large 
number of branching opportunities at each turn in the game.  These problems are 
certainly inter-related, and both are endemic in real world military operations.  Aspects 
of them will crop up in later discussions on the need for appropriate measures of 
performance and effectivess, and in the desirability of modeling military operations as 
complex adaptive systems.  From a game theory point of view, both Go and chess are 
strictly determined games; at each turn there are a finite number of discrete and known 
possible move choices.  Thus, there exists an optimal strategy for playing these games 
that guarantees at least a draw, and possibly outright victory to the individual with the 
first move.  Of course, the problem is that the number of possible moves is too great for 
practical computation of that strategy, at least given current technology.   So, while in 
theory at least, players have perfect perception of the current situation, what they lack 
(at least until the end becomes inevitable) is perfect understanding of the outcomes 
that may be projected from that situation.  This difference between perception and 
understanding is at the core of the current argument over the need to distinguish 
between SA and SU, and will be addressed further in Chapter 4.  
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(Young 1957; Lee 1990) state that chess is believed to be the oldest form of war 
game, (which may be true from a Western perspective).  Its origin is usually ascribed to 
India in around the 7th century, where it appeared as a Hindu battle game called 
Chaturanga (meaning four divisions, or Chaturaji, meaning "four kings or rajahs").   
Young describes the game as “played on a board, with a highly conventionalised map 
using various pieces to represent the arm of the service then in existence: elephants, 
horses, chariots, and foot soldiers.”  In today’s terms, it would be called a human-in-the-
loop (HITL) Monte Carlo simulation, one in which multiple players take turns with 
outcomes described by the throw of a form of dice.   
One of the earliest European board games aimed exploring strategies of warfare was 
Koengspiel (German for King’s game) developed in 1664.   As described by Young and 
others (Lee 1990; Perla 1990; St Clair 2003; Little 2006), it was followed by the 
development of various other forms of “War Chess” throughout the 18th and 19th 
centuries.  These games provided increasing levels of resolution and detail with respect 
to the forces represented by player “pieces” and the battlefield environment 
represented by “board” characteristics. These games included von Reisswitz’s 1811 
Kriegsspiel (literally War Game, usually referred to in English as Kriegspiel), which 
replaced gridded game boards with a sand table.  While von Reisswitz is not the first to 
use a sand table10, this change allowed the representation of terrain in three 
dimensions, and permitted the free movement of multiple types of forces, represented 
by colored and labeled blocks, i.e. not constrained to board squares.  His son continued 
development of Kreigspiel, replacing the sand table with large-scale, detailed 
topographic maps, and revising the rules of the game11 to calculate combat outcomes, 
as opposed to his father’s approach of determining them through discussion. The 
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younger von Reisswitz also added umpires to determine casualties and settle disputes, 
and introduced the red and blue color-coding for opposing sides that is still used today.  
His changes were the forerunners of the various modern concepts of a “battle calculus” 
to define rules for modeling force interactions, estimating casualties, and measuring 
force effectiveness, and again speak to the need for appropriate “evaluation” functions 
in military operational analysis. 
US Army Major James Livermore’s The American Kriegspiel: A Game For Practicing 
The Art Of War Upon A Topographical Map (Livermore 1879) is credited with bringing 
war gaming to the U.S. He introduced logistics and made the first attempt to include 
such factors as fatigue to the game. He was followed by US Army Lieutenant Charles A. 
L. Totten, whose Strategos : A Series of American Games of War Based Upon Military 
Principles and Designed for the Assistance Both of Beginners and Advanced Students in 
Prosecuting the Whole study of Tactics, Grand Tactics, Strategy, Military History, and the 
Various Operations of War (Totten 1880) proposed adding layers to the game depicting 
the different facets or levels of war: tactical, operational, and strategic, which according 
to Little (op cit.) is the first time a ‘hierarchy’ in modeling is seen.  The U.S. Naval War 
College codified U.S. Kriegspiel in 1884 and in 1887 fully integrated war- gaming into the 
curriculum for all attending officers.  
In a 1914 article written in cooperation with the US Army, Scientific American 
reported that “gaming was by then used in the instruction of every army in the world”, 
although these games were used “not to see who won, but to get results and experience, 
and to profit by mistakes made.” (Perla 1990) 
2.1.2 Lanchester and the Origins of Quantitative Analysis 
During World War I Frederick Lanchester took a more mathematical approach to 
analysis of military operations and began the modern trend towards trying to predict 
combat outcomes through aggregation of a small number of measurable factors.  As 
discussed in detail by (Taylor 1983), Lanchester quantified the combat attrition process 




dependent on the relative size of forces and firepower effectiveness parameters (such 
as the "a"s and "b"s shown Figure 2-1).  
 
Figure 2-1 Representative Lanchester Equations 
These parameters are called attrition rate coefficients and are defined by individual 
weapon system kill rates. Used in concert with equations that appropriately reflect 
assumptions in the type(s) of combat under study, they allow examination of the 
advantages of force concentration and the relative contribution of different 
weapons/units, including the value of indirect fires. 
For example, the “modern” view of warfare shown in Figure 2-1 assumes attrition by 
concentration of forces, where the rate of attrition of each side is due only to the 
number and weapons’ firepower of the enemy, i.e. the rate of change of side x is a 
function of y and vice versa.   This view can be differentiated from “ancient” combat, 
which is characterized as basically a series of individual duels in which the attrition rate 
of each side is a function not only of the killing power of the enemy, but also of the 
number of individuals that enemy faces.  In this view, ancient combat is similar to 
modern area fire in that the attrition rate of one side is due not only to the number and 
efficiency of the enemy, but also to the density of forces facing that enemy. As a result, 
in “modern” combat, the concept of defense shifts from parrying the thrust of contact 
weapons (or shielding oneself against area weapons) to the idea of killing your enemy 




The Lanchester equations (and variants thereon, developed by numerous 
researchers up to the current day) have been modified to incorporate, among other 
factors, time-variant attrition rate coefficients, troop movement, and stochastic factors.    
(Taylor, Yildirim et al. 2000); (Schaffer 1968); (Deitchman 1962);They are an example of 
modeling of the performance military systems through the systems’ “effects” (implicit 
representation of systems’ functions by substitution of expected outcomes) as opposed 
to modeling the "processes" (explicit representation of those functions) involved in the 
interactions between different weapons systems and/or force structures.  Although the 
current emphasis in modeling and simulation is to provide explicit representation (and 
visualization) of such combat interactions, the Lanchester equations are still valuable 
tools for the military analyst.  (Bowley, Castles et al. 2003); (MacKay 2008) (Artelli and 
Deckro 2008) They have, however, been justifiably criticized for not handling the non-
linear nature of combat well, and for ignoring many of key factors in battle outcomes, 
most especially the human element. (Ilachinski 2004); (Ipekci 2002)  
2.1.3 The Birth of Operations Research 
World War II saw the accepted beginning of Operations Research (OR, also 
Operational Research as the British first called it) in the need to optimize resources of 
men and materiel for maximum military effect.  Manchester (UK) physicist Patrick 
Blackett, who is generally heralded as the father of operations research, headed up an 
OR group attached to the British Anti-Aircraft Command whose principal charge was the 
improvement in deployment and use of Britain’s new radar network.  According to 
(Rider 1994), Blackett distinguished between two general methods of optimization, the 
a priori method that applied differential equations to selected important variables, and 
variational methods that used experimental and analytical methods to test the results of 
variation in such factors as the properties of the weapons or the tactics used. 
Both of these approaches are still very much in use today, and Blackett’s variational 
method can be seen as the precursor of the current trend towards virtual experiments 




2.1.4 The Rise of Technology: Military Operations as Physics 
In the years since the end of World War II, computers have taken an ever-increasing 
role in military operations, as they have in every day life. DARPA and the Internet, to DIS 
and HLA following the trend to network centric warfare. Little’s History and Basics of 
M&S sums up the progress of the computer era: 
While the first 50 years of the 20th Century overshadowed a preponderance of 
design constructs and analysis, the Cold War was still what we now consider 
manual … analogue … primitive. By 1950, it is still large boards, playing pieces 
and push pins. While still a novelty for many in the military community, the 
research industry continually improved their methods of quantitative analysis, 
bringing the two ever closer into a discipline. 
Three significant occurrences changed the status quo: the transistor, integrated 
circuitry and commercially obtainable computers. Once this (sic) became 
available to the analysis community, M&S increased exponentially. Imagine if 
you will the notebook computer or personal computer that allows you to read 
this. Your operating system was only dreamed of in the 1950s. While the large 
wargaming rooms had mock terrain and push pieces, an equal amount of room 
was needed for our early models. The logic behind this impetus of modernization 
was simply one of global political-military competition. In 1958, the Cold War 
took on a new twist when Russia launched Sputnik. In response, President 
Eisenhower created a host of organizations in response. One of them is the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which played a role in our field as 
well as the precursor of the internet.  
The Naval War College by this time has a computer-assisted wargame taking up 
three floors of an academic building. Built to accommodate a single wargame, it 
is torn down completely and reassembled from the very beginning for a 
subsequent effort. This capability was the natural progression of the wargames 
developed there by William McCarty-Little in the 1880’s. In spite of its obvious 
drawbacks, this gets the attention of U.S. Navy fleet commanders, who send 
their staffs to train on it.   
During the 1960’s, IBM roles its mainframe computer called the ‘7070.’ This is 
the first computer capable of supporting simulations; again a far cry from what 
you are using now. By 1964, the Naval War College replaces analogue 
technologies with digital and conducts its first remote wargaming. This is what 
we in the U.S. call the ‘McNamara Era’2. During Vietnam, the overemphasis of 




for some years afterwards12.  (Little 2006) 
In this era, attempts to quantify military operations focused on ways to “keep 
score”, from the body counts of Viet Nam to the “killer/victim” scorecards of various 
force-on-force computer models. The analytical tools of the first four post-WWII 
decades supported military thinking dominated by the oppressive reality of the Cold 
War. The overriding focus of operational analysis was on a relatively stable, large-scale, 
heavily armored, largely symmetrical confrontation across the former inner-German-
border.   
The Cold War was on. The military knew where the next war would be fought - 
in the Fulda Gap, along the Elbe, between East Germany and West Germany. So, 
all of the West's military planning was focused on preventing this specific next 
war, or on winning it. It would be hard to overestimate the amount of time and 
resources that were devoted to analyzing this single scenario. (Walker 2000) 
  This kind of military analysis was well served by a generation of models and 
simulations that considered materiel systems, and their destruction or incapacitation, as 
the primary determinants of combat outcomes. The human combatant, when 
considered at all, was viewed as an intrinsic element of weapons systems/platforms, or 
as a constituent element of an aggregate force, important mainly as a contributor to 
force numbers. 
In consonance with this view of warfare, this same time period saw a continually 
increasing emphasis on the role of technology in solving military problems.  That role 
was (and still is) an integral part in the growth of what President Eisenhower referred to 
as the U.S. military-industrial complex (Eisenhower 1961). The growth of the military-
industrial complex was accompanied the application of industrial forms of systems 
analysis to military affairs. Organizational management cost accounting methods and 
quantifiable measures of merit are now an essential part of virtually all Department of 
Defense programs. 
                                                     
 




The integration of these practices from civilian industry to the military has, however, 
often been uneasy.  This unease is perhaps best typified by the experience of Robert 
McNamara and his  “Whiz Kids”13 in the early sixties.  As explained by Air Force Colonel 
R. Philip Deavel: 
The dominance of systems analysis in the early 1960s flowed not from the 
intellectual brilliance of McNamara and the Whiz Kids, though in their hubris 
they believed so.  Their ideas only appeared to shine brightly when compared 
with the utter inability of the military services to quantify their own objectives, 
or credibly dissect the methodology of the Whiz Kids.   As one of McNamara’s 
analysts succinctly explained their ideological dominance, “Other people had 
objectives, we had arithmetic.”  
Rather than deal effectively with McNamara on his own terms, the uniformed 
military tended to dismiss all systems analysts and their civilian advocates, as 
the proverbial “pencil-necked geeks” who knew nothing of the equally proverbial 
“real world.”   
... 
The struggle between McNamara and the officer corps, … is often cast as a 
contest between military and civilian values.  While superficially true, this 
analysis misses the mark.  A long historical view indicates the partisans of both 
groups represent two separate but equally honorable military philosophies.  
McNamara and his proteges are the modern disciples of Jomini14.  Like this great 
Napoleonic strategist, they view warfare as a cold and precise science.  To 
McNamara, and to Jomini, success goes to the leader with the greatest 
organizational skill in building and wielding a massed military force.  It is 
warfare as the science of physics15; the ability to concentrate energy and 
unleash it on an opponent.  
… 
At the other end of the philosophical spectrum, the American officer corps are, in 
the aggregate, disciples of Clausewitz.  As such, they view warfare as ultimately 
a human attribute, an art that can never be completely quantified in a 
mathematical equation.  The firm political support of the nation, flowing 
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McNamara belonged and who are credited with bringing the company to renewed profitability through modern management 
methods.  McNamara was serving as President of Ford when Kennedy appointed him Secretary of Defense and his new Whiz kids 
were a group of young primarily Ivy League analysts with relatively little military experience.  
14 Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini (1779-1869) one of Napoleon’s best generals, author in 1838 of Precis de l’Art de Guerre later 
printed in English as The Art of War (not to be confused with the similarly titled works of Sun Tzu) 




through the iron will of the commander energizes the force and cuts through the 
fog and friction of war.  It is a philosophy that gives little credibility to those who 
would predict success or failure based upon the laws of physics or calculations of 
economic efficiency. (Deavel 1998) 
 The concept of warfare “as the science of physics” was heavily reflected in the 
analytical models of this era, which saw enhanced representation of the physics of the 
battlefield through the addition of more and more detail to describe the accuracy and 
lethality of weapon systems, and the mobility of large weapon platforms.  Models of 
these systems and their operating environment became the basis for weapon simulators 
- training devices where individuals could practice their interface with the system.  Ever 
increasing computer technology was applied to providing the level of resolution needed 
to adequately represent the battlefield physical environment in simulating the 
interaction of the large, fast moving platforms.   
2.1.5 War Gaming in CyberSpace and the Virtual Human 
As the technology supporting weapon system simulators advanced, it was natural to 
try and link them together, and to promote a heterogeneous battlefield for joint service 
interaction.  In 1985 DARPA started development of SIMNET, a standard for distributed 
interactive simulations(Brock, Montana et al. 1992; Cosby 1995), and a decade later the 
Department of Defense began requiring that new simulations and simulators be 
compatible with High-Level Architecture (HLA) a newer, evolving standard to ensure 
compatibility and interoperability (Page 1998; Straßburger, Schulze et al. 1998; Davis 
and Anderson 2004). Human operators being an integral part of weapon system 
simulators, distributed simulations have also embraced the human-in-the-loop (HITL) as 
a key participant in the world of distributed simulation.  By the turn of the century the 
concept of war gaming had substituted cyberspace for the game board and sand table 
(Belanich, Sibley et al. 2004; Pellegrino and Scott 2004).  Such gaming is not, of course, 
not limited to the Department of Defense, multi-player first-person-shooter games are 
immensely popular on the Internet. The commercial gaming industry is a multi-billion 




capabilities, in an effort to make simulated game entities competitive with their human 
adversaries.   
As a final note, it is somewhat ironic that the Department of Defense’s embrace of 
computer technology for virtual war gaming has re-emphasized the role of the human 
decision-maker and thus supports the view of “warfare as ultimately a human attribute, 
an art that can never be completely quantified in a mathematical equation”(Deavel 
1998). 
2.2 Beyond Attrition Modeling 
The attrition-based view of combat modeling that dominated the last century is not, 
of course, the only approach to understanding of the nature of armed conflict. Network-
Centric Warfare (Money 2001), the “maneuverist approach” (Zimm 1999; Zimm 2001) 
and “Effects Based Operations - EBO” (Deptula 2001; Batschelet 2002; Roske Jr 2002; 
Smith 2002; Wagenhals and Levis 2002; James and Daniels 2005; Phister Jr, Fayette et al. 
2005) are other conceptual viewpoints that have been advanced to help frame 
discussion about the most effective ways to plan and conduct military operations, as 
well as to assess the success of such operations.  
2.2.1 Network Centric Warfare 
The Network Centric Warfare concept holds: 
Warfare takes place simultaneously in and among the physical, the information, 
and the cognitive domains.   
Physical Domain: The physical domain is the traditional domain of warfare.   It is 
domain where strike, protect, and maneuver take place across the environments 
of ground, sea, air, and space. It is the domain where physical platforms and the 
communications networks that connect them reside.  Comparatively, the 
elements of this domain are the easiest to measure, and consequently, combat 
power has traditionally been measured primarily in this domain.  Two important 
metrics for measuring combat power in this domain, lethality and survivability, 
have been and continue to be benchmarks for measuring the effectiveness of 
combat operations.  
Information Domain: The information domain is the domain where information 
lives.  It is the domain where information is created, manipulated, and shared.  It 




warfighters.  It is the domain where the command and control of modern 
military forces is communicated, where commander’s intent is conveyed.  
Consequently, it is increasingly the information domain that must be protected 
and defended to enable a force to generate combat power in the face of 
offensive actions taken by an adversary.  And, in the all-important battle for 
information superiority, the information domain is ground zero.   
Cognitive Domain: The cognitive domain is the domain of the mind of the 
warfighter and the supporting populous.  This is the domain where many battles 
and wars are won and lost.  This is the domain of intangibles: leadership, 
morale, unit cohesion, level of training and experience, situational awareness, 
and public opinion.  This is the domain where commander’s intent, doctrine, 
tactics, techniques, and procedures reside.  Much has been written about this 
domain, and key attributes of this domain have remained relatively constant 
since Sun Tzu wrote The Art of War.  The attributes of this domain are extremely 
difficult to measure, and each sub-domain (each individual mind) is unique. 
(Money 2001) 
By recognizing that information and cognitive domains complement and supplement 
the focus on physical incapacitation of the enemy, NCW incorporates the psychological 
and/or cognitive components of warfare, and acknowledges the key that information 
technologies and decision support tools play in today’s military operations.  
2.2.2 Maneuver Warfare vs. Attrition Warfare 
Military operational concepts today accept that disruption of an opponent’s 
operational tempo, and especially the ability to interfere with his Observation, 
Orientation, Decision, Action (OODA) loop16 (Boyd 1986; Boyd 1987), may be a key 
operational objective. Accordingly, analysis of such operations requires the ability to 
measure success in achieving such mission objectives as the interruption or forced 
cessation of enemy operations, without destruction of critical infrastructure, the 
containment of insurgency, and more generally, the positive projection of force to 
achieve political, rather than strictly military objectives17.   
Alan Zimm’s essay “A Causal Model of Warfare” in (Horne 2001)  states:  
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Ever since Sun Tzu set brush to paper in the sixth century B.C. thoughtful people 
have struggled to discover the key to victory in armed conflict.  At various times 
victory was supposed to be reached through the death of the enemy’s leaders, 
capture of their capitol, occupation of territory, or defeat of the enemy’s army.  
At various times each of these paths was accomplished but failed to achieve 
victory.  
Since the middle 1800’s – roughly corresponding to the dissemination of 
Clausewitz’s On War – most military organizations have assumed that victory 
comes through the defeat of the enemy’s army, a defeat accomplished by the 
destruction of soldiers and equipment.  However, the Marine Corps, particularly 
since the 1989 issue of FMF1, Warfighting, and the subsequent development of 
Operational Maneuver… from the Sea18, has advanced a different approach.  
Marine Corps doctrine targets destruction of “the cohesion of the enemy 
system,” and identifies the mechanism of victory as “panic and paralysis, (Zimm 
1999)an] enemy who has lost the ability to resist.”19 This has been presented as 
a contrast between “Maneuver Warfare” and “Attrition Warfare.” " (Horne 
2001) 
 (Zimm 1999) (Lind 1985; Zimm 2001) further frame the “maneuverist vs. attrition 
approach as one in which the concepts of “will” , “morale,” the “moral dimension of 
combat,” and related ideas complement and supplement the focus on physical 
incapacitation of the enemy. These concepts recognize that the will to fight can be as 
important a consideration as the capability to fight.  Addressing them analytically 
requires quantifying their effects, measuring success according to mission objectives 
that combine the disruption of enemy operations with avoidance of the destruction of 
critical infrastructure, that strive for the containment of insurgency without requiring 
the annihilation of the insurgents, and more generally, that posit the positive projection 
of force to achieve political, rather than strictly military objectives.   
2.2.3 Effects Based Operations 
The EBO concept similarly supports the view of the importance of the “soft factors” 
as critical factors in the outcome of military operations. 
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There are a variety of modeling techniques that are used to relate actions to 
effects.  With respect to effects on physical systems, engineering or physics 
based models have been developed that can predict the impact of various 
actions on systems and assess their vulnerabilities.  When it comes to the belief 
and reasoning domain, engineering models are less appropriate.  The purpose of 
affecting the physical systems is to convince the leadership of an adversary to 
change its behavior, that is, to make decisions that it would not otherwise make.  
Thus, the effects on the physical systems influence the beliefs and the decision 
making of the adversary.  Because of the subjective nature of belief and 
reasoning, probabilistic modeling techniques such as Bayesian Nets and their 
influence net cousin have been applied to these types of problems.  Models 
created using these techniques can relate actions to effects through probabilistic 
cause and effect relationships.  Such probabilistic modeling techniques can be 
used to analyze how the actions affect the beliefs and thus the decisions of the 
adversary.    
Thus the EBO concept results in a shift in focus. Instead of focusing on the 
servicing of a well defined a priori target list, we focus on the effects that we 
wish to achieve. The target list still exists and includes both hard and soft 
targets: from weapons systems, to C2 nodes, to leadership nodes, to 
infrastructure nodes, to the contents of communications. But the target list is 
only an intermediate construct, a means to an end, which can change rapidly as 
the effects we wish on the adversary are being achieved or not. Indeed, the list 
of possible actions we can take is now much larger as it includes all instruments 
of national (or coalition) power: political, military, or humanitarian; physical or 
ideological. The availability of all instruments gives us much flexibility in trying 
to achieve the desired effects and to avoid undesirable ones. But it also makes 
the Course of Action (COA) problem and the subsequent planning problem much 
harder. There are now many alternatives, many choices.  The choice of a set of 
actions, their sequencing, and their time phasing become a problem in their own 
right. (Wagenhals and Levis 2002) 
2.3 The Evolution of The Warrior System 
The 20th century was characterized by an explosion of technology, much of it driven 
for or applied to war.  From the Wright Brothers to the stealth bomber, from WWI tanks 
to the M1 Abrams, and from the early days of radio to current C4ISR20 systems, military 
applications of 20th century technology produced increasing more capable and more 
complex mobile weapon systems.  The costs of large weapon platforms are now 
measured in the billions of dollars.  By comparison the individual soldier received 
                                                     
 




relatively short shrift.  Research, development, acquisition and application of materiel 
for the Infantryman were at far lower levels of expenditures than for “war machines”.  
Such expenditures as were made for the Infantryman focused on individual pieces of 
equipment.  These so-called equipment “eaches” tended to follow a stove-piped 
process; with largely separate development efforts, each primarily aimed at providing 
the individual soldier/marine with either better weapons or better body armor.  
Materiel solutions for the individual dismounted combatant were not viewed as 
integrated parts of larger weapon systems in the way that equipment provided to crews 
of planes, tanks, ships and submarines was.  
2.3.1 The Soldier as a System 
 In the late 80's and early 90's, however, the Department of Defense sought to 
correct this oversight with the development of a new approach, the concept of the 
“soldier as a system”.   
Just as Desert Storm ended, the 1991 Army Science Board (ASB) conducted a 
summer study regarding how much Soldiers should carry and, most important, 
who should decide what and how much.  This study, entitled “Soldier as a 
System” (SaaS), came to the following five conclusions: (1) The requirement to 
properly equip the Solder for combat is as complex as those of other programs 
such as the Abrams tank, Bradley fighting vehicle, Patriot missile system, and 
Black Hawk helicopter programs; (2) Existing Soldier equipment mismatches due 
to lack of integration are reducing combat efficiency and endangering Soldiers; 
(3) The planned “Block Change” concept of equipping the force (no new 
equipment is fielded until enough is procured for the entire Army) is an outdated 
concept; (4) Promising new technological capabilities should be exploited to 
ensure battlefield overmatch for the American Soldier; (5) The Army should 
develop and employ experimentation (wargaming and simulations) with 
emphasis on future Solder system threats21.(Lockhart 2006) 
This concept was driven both by the Army’s desire to obtain levels of Congressional 
funding for soldier equipment more on par with that expended for other weapons 
“systems”, and the growing realization that the equipment for the individual had 
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reached the point where the “eaches” needed to function in concert.  The Soldier as a 
System sought to integrate individual components into a synergistic weapon system, 
making sure that sensors, comms and weapons were compatible in terms of such 
interoperability considerations as power requirements and ergonomics. (Haley 1991; 
O'Keefe, MIddleton et al. 1992; Wojcik 1996; Middleton, Sutton et al. 2000; Lockhart 
2006) 
2.3.2 Modeling the Soldier as a System and the Tactical Small Unit 
One of the first steps in defining an integrated soldier system was identifying its 
individual components, the so-called soldier “illities”: lethality, survivability, mobility, 
command and control, and sustainability.  These are shown are often described as 
members of a hierarchy or branches of a tree, as shown in Figure 2-2.  
 
Figure 2-2 Soldier System Hierarchy circa 1991 
Modeling the Soldier as a System therefore meant modeling these components and 
the interplay between them. The US Army’s Natick Research Development and 
Engineering Center (NRDEC) developed Integrated Unit Simulation System (IUSS) for this 




measure trade-offs between operability and survivability, which required modeling 
soldiers’ psycho-physiological states and their ability to perform discrete mission tasks. 
The IUSS was a task-network model, i.e., one in which entities were constrained to 
follow a specific sequence of tasks as part of each mission.  
As shown in Figure 2-3, tasks were defined as scripted sets of behaviors for a given 
entity. These entities in the IUSS were usually tactical small units (TSUs): platoons, 
squads or fire teams, reflecting the fact that individual soldiers virtually never function 
in isolation, but as coordinated elements of larger forces.  Accordingly, mission 
capability needs to be examined in the context of individuals operating within the 
context of their unit; their functionality augments and is augmented by other 
individuals, each providing additional capabilities (and technology).   
 
Figure 2-3 Task Performance Evaluation Cycle 
Figure 2-4 shows the systems that compose the TSU.  A typical TSU is structured 
around a base tactical element of 7 to 18 fighters organized to perform a fundamental 
tactical mission or task in a definable area of responsibility (ADR). The TSU can and does 




defined infantry and special forces units, ad hoc reaction teams involved in rear and vital 
area security, irregular forces, police units and loosely organized street gangs.  It is the 
smallest element that can be assigned to perform basic infantry tasks: patrol; defend or 
attack a specific tactical objective: provide local security, or perform area or point 
surveillance.   
The IUSS incorporated the Soldier System Hierarchy as part of its breakdown of tasks 
into different behavioral components. Task progress was largely determined by 
stochastic draws from performance distributions that were a function of entity 
capability and the nature of those task behavior components. 
 
Figure 2-4 The Tactical Small Unit System 
In theory, as shown in Figure 2-3, dynamic event response possibilities included 
aborting the task, adjusting either the completion criteria or the way the task is 
performed (by adjusting task parameters) or both, or changing, enhancing or renewing 
entity status to improve performance.  In practice changing task completion criteria, in 
effect changing the task goals, required implementation of a new task sequence 




ability to react to the behaviors of other entities was primarily limited to the conditions 
under which those entities could be engaged and the methods of engagement that 
could be employed.  
While the IUSS task structure was limited as a software construct, it did illustrate a 
core capability that would eventually be more fully realized by its agent-based successor 
IWARS. Entities in agent-based models must continually assess progress towards 
currently active goal(s), and respond appropriately whenever that progress appears 
unsatisfactory.   
2.3.3 Human Performance Moderators 
Representation of the individual combatant’s psycho-physiological state was a key 
aspect of the IUSS. Factors used to represent behavioral outcomes include task 
performance time(s), a probability of “successful” task performance, and task accuracy 
or other measures of “goodness” - how well the task was performed. Human 
performance moderators were used to reflect computable effects of dynamic entity 
states on measures of task accomplishment, thus allowing individuals to become 
adversely affected by fatigue, heat stress, injury or encumbrance of body armor or other 
protective gear.  These moderators can be represented in task network models by 
adding additional factors to performance distributions and/or modifying the results of 
draws from those distributions. It is, of course, also possible to use moderators to 
represent performance enhancers such as rest, rehydration and other recuperative 
activities. The assumptions implicit in this approach are those of most task network 
models, that military operations can be modeled as a series of interconnected tasks, 
that these tasks can in some sense reflect an atomic decomposition of mission 
performance, and most importantly, that there is adequate definition of the key factors 
that impact task performance and some reasonable characterization of the distribution 
of task measure outcomes in terms of these factors.   
The use of task networks with moderators is very attractive approach in a server-




effects of human behavior on simulation outcomes to a relatively small set of numerical 
adjustments to simulation performance parameters. 
At some levels of aggregation this approach is acceptable, but it does not adequately 
represent many facets of human behavior such as the “soft factors” discussed above.  In 
particular, it does not represent the highly dynamic reaction of human decisions and 
behavioral responses to a complex, rapidly changing, battlespace.  Task networks and 
aggregate performance measures are not well suited to situations with multiple 
competing mission objectives, which can require constant goal conflict resolution and 
complex behavioral trade-offs.   In general aggregate task performance approaches are 
increasingly contra-indicated in situations where tasks must be viewed less as atomic 
mission chunks and more as complex feedback loops of human interaction with weapon 
systems, equipment platforms, other individuals/units, and/or a myriad of other 
battlefield elements.   
2.3.4 The Warrior System  
As the Department of Defense began development of an increasing series of new 
capabilities for the individual dismounted combatant, the Soldier as a System morphed 
into the more encompassing “Warrior System” 22, which seeks to take advantage of the 
“digitization of the battlefield” by equipping the individual infantryman with the same 
kind of information technologies already taken for granted by pilots and tankers.  These 
technologies include heads-up-displays that show the position of friendly forces, 
militarily relevant aspects of terrain, as well as the best available intelligence on the 
location of suspected threats and adversaries. 
All told, these capabilities have significantly increased the ability of the individual to 
perceive the environment, to share this perception with others, and to act in concert 
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within the TSU to potentially control the battle space far more than ever before. 
The warrior system concept has been widely accepted internationally23, and has 
been through a number of iterations in the US, starting with the Soldier Integrated 
Protective Ensemble (SIPE), a three year program begun in 1990 and culminating in an 
Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) (Middleton, Sutton et al. 2000).   SIPE was 
followed by several competing and complementary efforts: The Enhanced Integrated 
Soldier System (TEISS), the 21st Century Land Warrior (21CLW), the Generation II Soldier 
(GEN II), all of which contributed in some way to the currently fielded Land Warrior 
(LW), and the current program for the Future Force Warrior (FFW), now known as the 
Ground Soldier System (GSS).  These systems differed far less in concept than in cost 
and bureaucratic programmatic issues.   All of them sought (or still seek) to end the 
stove-piping of different systems and sub-systems for individual, providing far more 
integrated functionality, and, as mentioned above, recognizing the need to treat the 
individual soldier as a complex weapon system in his/her own right. 
2.3.5 Warrior System MS&A Requirements 
The warrior system represents the classic “paradigm shift” in the operational view of 
the individual dismounted combatant, and this paradigm shift calls for a similar shift in 
modeling and simulation with respect to that individual.  The analytical paradigm shift 
has two large underlying requirements.  First, models of individual and small unit 
behaviors can no longer be satisfied with the “small tank” approach. Models for 
dismounted soldiers have to represent the world in far greater detail, with higher 
fidelity than do models of large weapons platforms.  The dismounted individual has a far 
more intimate view of the battlefield than the tanker or pilot: one that cares about 
terrain at meter resolutions and below; one that cares about threats that can hide 
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behind trees and bushes; one that cares about adversaries that can blend into crowds or 
the local landscape, and so forth.  To support an adequate picture of today’s digital 
battlefield for the dismounted soldier or marine, information technologies need to 
provide an accurate picture of the battlefield a level of resolution commensurate with 
the environmental factors of interest to that individual.  As a consequent, the models 
and simulations used to evaluate these technologies have to support algorithms and 
data structures at associated levels of resolution and fidelity.  Furthermore, they have to 
generate the data needed to populate those data structures and drive those algorithms, 
making them far more data “hungry” than the aggregate models of the Cold War era.  
Second, models and simulations must represent how individuals and their units use 
this mass of data.  To adequately explore the operational value of information 
technologies, analytic tools must now represent the individual combatant not as 
characterized solely by more or less scripted actions (move, shoot, communicate), but 
as a decision-making entity, continually evaluating the battlefield dynamic to decide 
when, where, and how to move, shoot, and communicate.  The raw materials for 
decision-making are data and information; adequate analysis of warrior systems thus 
requires representing the acquisition, filtration, and fusion of data at levels of detail and 
significance relevant to the individual dismounted combatant.  
2.4 Towards an Engineering Model of the Warrior System? 
The decision to treat the individual dismounted combatant as a weapon system also 
implies a concomitant desire to employ the same kinds of engineering and analytical 
tools and procedures for the warrior system as for larger, more mechanical weapon 
systems.  Good engineering models exist for large weapons systems, and these models 
support trade-offs in the design and development of the functional capabilities for these 
systems.  
2.4.1 Engineering Models 




subsystems are essential to the development and fielding of today’s complex military 
machines.  As mentioned above, such models are generally deterministic and based on 
Newtonian physics, i.e., systems whose exchanges of mass and/or energy with their 
environment are constrained to a relatively few, well-known, factors. These models may 
incorporate stochastic treatment of systems performance, as based on statistical data 
from measurement of well-defined systems’ functions. Their model parameters span 
the analytically relevant/interesting areas of the problem space, and there is essentially 
a one-to-one mapping between model features and systems’ functions.  These features 
support model verification and validation based on theoretical concepts, and are 
supported by empirical data on operators/systems’ performance. 
A design approach that looks to develop materiel for the dismounted combatant by 
applying the same systems analysis techniques used for tanks, planes and ships faces a 
fundamental problem: “There is no engineering model of the warrior system”. 
Certainly, there have been attempts to apply the reductionist modeling approach to 
break down system capabilities into separate and distinct modules, as evidenced by the 
Soldier System hierarchy incorporated into the IUSS.  The problem with such an 
approach, however, is that it ignores the complex interactions and inter-dependencies 
of the hierarchy elements.  Exploration of these interactions, and indeed, of the 
capability areas themselves, has been the subject of considerable research over the last 
two decades. Much of this research has been focused on cognitive functions, 
information processing, and psychological aspects of personnel interactions (Haley 
1991; Zachary 1998; Banks and Stytz 1999; Heinze 1999; Hill 1999; Curtis 2000; Heeringa 
and Cohen 2000; Forsythe 2002; Ghazal, Morley et al. 2003; Gratch and Marsella 2003; 
Pfitzner, Hobbs et al. 2003; Petty, McKenzie et al. 2004; Silverman 2004; Dyer, Wampler 
et al. 2005; Gluck and Pew 2005; Boylan and Goerger 2006; Betz 2007; Dyer 2009; 
Underhill 2009) and in fact has led to expanding the C2 illity, the command and control 
capability, into C4ISR: Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 




to be a sixth “illity”, albeit one closely aligned with C4ISR (Middleton 1999).  
2.4.2 Replacing the Soldier System Hierarchy with the Warrior Systems Architecture 
The Technology Base Steering Committee’s24 Warrior Systems Modeling and 
Simulation Working Group came up with a less structured Warrior Systems Architecture 
as a replacement for the Soldier Systems Hierarchy.  As shown in Figure 2-5, the 
capability relationship is depicted as a sort of “yin and yang synergistic octopus” to 
better represent the nature of the interplay between the “illities”.   
 
Figure 2-5 The Warrior Systems Architectur        y          “     y” O       
(Middleton 1999) 
The Working Group was attempting to capture the natural dualities of complementary 
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opposites within a greater whole.  For example, there is always tension between 
mobility and protection – do I want to try to avoid the enemy bullet, or defeat it when it 
hits me?  Ideally I’d like to do both, but the more effective my armor, the more it weighs 
me down and slows me down, making me easier to hit.  C4ISR gear can warn me and 
allow me to outmaneuver my adversary; does this mean I can afford to reduce my 
armor?  Is the best protection under some circumstances no protection? The version 
shown here has been updated25 with the additional factors of basic soldier attributes 
(psychological factors such as training, leadership, morale, cultural identity; and physical 
state factors such as fatigue and heat stress), and mission demands (e.g.; combat 
intensity, criticality of tasks, and rules of engagement).  
The Warrior Systems architecture cross-walks warrior functions to system 
capabilities and, ultimately, to quantifiable measures of performance and effectiveness 
(MOPs&MOEs).  It can be used to apply the principles of multi-criteria decision analysis 
and explore the integration of these measures into meaningful tools to assess Warrior 
System alternatives, culminating in a draft weighted, multi-criteria utility function (or 
decision aid) to quantify warrior system benefits.  It provides a frame of reference and 
common terminology for warrior systems RD&A. It and the doctrinal publications from 
which it is derived: the US Army Field Manuals, the Marine Corps Warfighting 
Publications, and the Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications26 provide the orthodox 
definition of the “move, shoot, and communicate” capabilities and behaviors inherent in 
basic military tasks, and which must be incorporated in any M&S paradigm for Warrior 
Systems analysis. 
As the illity octopus demonstrates, however, the complexities of the warrior system 
cannot be entirely captured by the strict reductionist approach of orthodox systems 
analysis.   Accounting for the dynamic and highly non-linear interactions of the cognitive 
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and physiological elements that constitute the warrior system requires a more open 
systems approach, as is discussed in detail below.  These complexities are exacerbated 
further by the nature of current conflicts, especially with regard to irregular warfare and 
asymmetric combat, in which the interactions between friendly forces, adversaries, and 
neutrals form a seemingly chaotic dynamic landscape.  
How, then, does one develop an engineering model of such a system? An answer lies 
in upgrading the concept of “engineering” models to include models that allow 
exploration of virtual systems whose behaviors emerge from general rules of operation, 
and are not limited to functional capabilities that can be reduced to physics-based 
algorithms. This concept means incorporating principles from psychology and the social 
sciences into orthodox physics-based model. It does not mean eliminating the use of 
physics or the other “hard” sciences, it simply means extending the reductionist 
approach to support a wider variety of system decompositions.  It means, for example, 
decomposing warrior systems operations into sets of entity or object interactions as is in 
done in agent based models, and modeling these operations as elements of complex 
adaptive systems. 
2.4.3 The Human-Centric Paradigm: A Marriage between the Physical Sciences, 
Psychology and the Social Sciences? 
The military OR community is increasingly looking to the social sciences to provide 
answers in the world of insurgencies and asymmetric warfare. (Lucas, Sanchez et al. 
2007; Seitz 2008; Alt, Jackson et al. 2009; Pfautz and Toman 2010) The United States Air 
Force commissioned a study on individual, organizational, and societal (IOS) modeling 
research programs (Zacharias, MacMillan et al. 2008), which emphasized the multi-
disciplinary nature of such models.    Sciences from economics to environmental studies 
(Davis 2007), (Hare and Deadman 2004), have come to view agent-based modeling as an 
important tool; one which has been widely embraced by the social sciences as way to 
come to grips with the complexities of human and social behavior. (Axtell 2000), (Macy 




Major acquisition programs within the defense community have increased the use of 
experimental psychology and human factors engineering and this increase has 
facilitated and accelerated the incorporation of these factors in some models and 
simulations (Ramirez 1997; Pew and Mavor 1998; Mastroianni and Middleton 2001; 
Martin 2005; Warwick 2006).  
Aspects of psychology such as human factors that have been accepted in the 
engineering realm are, however, considerably different from factors such as “will to 
fight”.  The “soft factors” are very different from the rigorous methodologies of most 
combat models and simulations. Many of these factors are not discussed in the 
language of science and engineering, as are experimental psychology and human factors 
engineering, but instead in the vocabulary of history, political science, and even 
philosophy.  In addition, they lack the first principles models of cause and effect that are 
the foundation of “validated”, physics-based models and simulations.  Using agent-
based models to address these factors does not mean doing away with the concept of 
scientific rigor, but there is a need to extend that concept to incorporate a “soft”, 
incremental focus, where increasing levels of correlation correspond to increased 
acceptance of predictive validity, and where inconsistency can be accepted as evidence 
of uncertainty rather than outright error.27 
Incorporating such factors in combat models and simulations will require 
contributions from many fields. As former Secretary of the Air Force James Roche states: 
“The original ops researchers understood that to be effective they needed teams of 
mathematicians, historians, military theorists, psychologists and economists, among others… 
Somewhere along the line, this was lost as a fundamental concept of military operations 
analysis…There is a real and significant role for ops research and systems analysis in the 
campaign in which we are engaged. This campaign also requires knowledge of history, 
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economics, religion, finance, psychology, technology, game theory and decision analysis, among 
many other disciplines.” (Roche, 2002) 
In particular the human-centric paradigm encompasses the need to assess the 
human as an information-processing and decision-making entity.  This entity is encased 
in a psycho-physiological substrate, which is shaped by the stressors and other 
conditions of the battlefield environment, and in turn shapes that environment, or at 
least aspects thereof.  
The human-centric paradigm is motivated by warrior system concepts where 
effective operations are dependent on efficient command and control functions, 
including communication, individual and shared SA/SU, and coordinated action. The 
need to assess current and evolving information technologies, and their application to 
the acquisition, flow, and use of data and information at the small unit level, drives the 
need to model the mental state of individuals, and to represent individuals’ (and 
especially commanders’) decision processes.   Aspects of “behavior” that must be 
represented include the processing of sensory inputs and the interpretation and 
integration of sense data into meaningful information about the environment and the 
operational situation.  Such representation encompasses much more than physical 
behaviors: internal knowledge states and cognitive processes (or their effects); decisions 
such as target selection and route adjustment, and even non-deliberative processes 
such as modification of speed and/or posture in response to environmental cues and 
one’s own psycho-physiological state. 
2.4.4 From Closed Systems to Open Systems 
I suggest that to take development of an engineering model of the warrior system 
out of the “too hard to do” box, closed systems modeling approaches need to 
augmented with an open systems modeling methodology that incorporates the “soft” 
sciences.  Such a methodology reflects the fact that human behavior in general and 
military conflict in particular represent open systems, ones in which energy, materiel, 





The shortcomings of the more orthodox closed system methods have been long 
recognized.  In 1994, the Military Operations Research Society (MORS) had a mini 
symposium, MORIMOC III, to address “Human Behavior and Performance as Essential 
Ingredients in Realistic Modeling of Combat”.  In that workshop, they charged a working 
group to:  
Develop a conceptual approach to incorporating higher level behavioral factors 
in modeling/analysis to support decision issues.  These might include leadership, 
unit cohesion, communication, battle experience and morale. 
Consider: 
Combat models in which opposing forces are composed of multiple units and 
group phenomena are dominant. 
Combat models driven by military intention and capabilities rather than by force 
ratios or attrition. 
Development of the needed group performance data bases. (Murtaugh 1994) 
The Military Operations Research Society, among others continued to pursue this 
thread. As alluded to above, in writing for the Society’s Phalanx magazine in 2002 
Vincent Roske spoke of the need for new tools to address the class of “open systems” 
not accessible using traditional operations research tools:   
“It is as much convenience as perhaps unfortunate fate for us analysts that the 
industrial revolution bequeathed us an arrogant sense that the world can be 
thought of as assemblies of closed systems and that we can discern, define, 
predict behavior, and control those systems. From steam engines to assembly 
lines to electric power grids we have come to believe that we are in control of 
our world; that if we push in "here" we can predict what will bulge out over 
"there."  To the extent that we are in control of a system's configuration and 
behavior, closed system analysis methodologies work well.  But what happens 
when the problems we are analyzing are processes and environments we do not 
control? 
 …. 
The presence of the human being introduces energy across the systems 
boundary and produces emergent and adaptive behaviors from the system.  This 
is characteristic of open systems, particularly of complex adaptive systems.” 




2.5 MOPs and MOEs 
Operations research depends on the use of metrics to assess fitness and /or degrees 
to which goals may be attained.   At the individual and small unit level of simulation 
these metrics all into two primary categories: Measures of Performance (MOPs) that are 
used to assess the functioning of individual system elements, and Measures of 
Effectiveness (MOEs) that are used to determine the way those elements affect 
behavioral and/or operational outcomes for the total system.    
The US Army in DA PAM 5-11 defines: 
 Measure of Effectiveness (MOE): A quantitative expression which 
compares the effectiveness of alternatives in meeting an operational 
objective or need.   
 Measure of Performance (MOP): A defined metric of a component which 
contributes to basic system effectiveness as described by an MOE. MOPs 
relate to specific performance characteristics from which data can 
actually be collected.  
From the point of view of this research, MOPs are basically simulation inputs, MOEs 
simulation outputs - models turn MOPs into MOEs. 
2.5.1 The Role of MOPs and MOEs 
Picking the “right” MOPs and MOEs is critical to sound analysis, but it is not always 
straightforward or easy. 
An old story tells of interviewing the football coach whose team was dominated by 
their opponent throughout most of the game, but who manages to win regardless:  
“Coach, how do you feel?  Your team had less than half the yardage gained of your 
opponents, only four first downs to their 23, was dominated in time of possession, and 
drew twice as many penalties.”   
The coach replied, “The way we play the game today, you win by scoring more 




or the most yardage or fewest penalties the winner, then we’ll play for those stats. Until 
then, I’m going to keep trying to win on the scoreboard.” 
This story has a couple of implications for the practice of MS&A. First, the measures 
that models use to quantify performance and operational effectiveness both reflect and 
shape how operations are viewed.  How the military (and the model) “keeps score” has 
significant influence on both strategy and tactics.  It provides the basis for acquisition 
decisions and R&D investment strategy in addition to shaping policy, plans and tactics.  
Next, as in the above anecdote, the measures of performance analysts think are 
important turn out not to be, at least in some instances28.  So too in military affairs, the 
things that conventional wisdom says should determine the outcome aren’t always the 
ones that do.  At the end of the movie Midway, which portrays the US Navy’s victory in a 
pivotal battle of World War II, one American remarks "It doesn't make any sense …  
Yamamoto had everything going for him, power, experience, confidence... Were we 
better than the Japanese, or just luckier?"  
In the world of military analysis, just as in sports, prediction is a chancy business.  
Why is it that the factors that “ought” to predict outcomes, all too frequently don’t?  In 
the first place, of course, in any one battle, such as Midway, the answer might be luck.  
Luck may also contribute to the start of “genetic drift”, to the complex vagaries of any 
individual battle where any one of a myriad of factors can be the deciding element.  
For want of a nail the shoe was lost.  
For want of a shoe the horse was lost.  
For want of a horse the rider was lost.  
For want of a rider the battle was lost. 
For want of a battle the kingdom was lost. 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And all for the want of a horseshoe nail.29 
Analysts (and sports writers) can take some solace in the thought that while 
individual outcomes are hard to predict, averages of aggregate outcomes and long-term 
trends are far more amenable to assessment and forecasting.   As Damon Runyon30 once 
remarked, “the race goes not always to the swift, nor the contest to the strong, but 
that’s the way to bet”. 
The function of MOPs and MOEs is to quantify important problem inputs and 
outputs.  They can support analysis to both find the isolated elements that can lead to 
critical failure, and to discover the “way to bet” - to find the optimal appropriation of 
resources for the development and application of technological solutions where such 
solutions are appropriate. 
2.5.2 Current State of the Art 
Unfortunately, the things that can be measured easily with orthodox MOPs and 
MOEs don’t capture critical intangibles: morale, leadership, unit cohesiveness and the 
like.  Furthermore, the derivation of MOEs from pertinent MOPs is not generally a 
straightforward, linear process; the whole is not just a simple sum of the parts.  As with 
the nail, a single critical failure can overwhelm a multitude of successful contributions. 
On the other hand, the ability of individuals to compensate for faults and problems can 
counterbalance a multitude of deficiencies.  Collective synergy is a key aspect of viewing 
military operations as complex adaptive systems, and adequate measurement of 
component contributions and subsequent estimation of overall systems performance 
are keys to an agent-based modeling approach.  
The preferred source of data for MOPs is physical measurements in a laboratory or 
field setting that describe the engineering level assessment of individual system 
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components or subsystems.  Of course, even under laboratory conditions, there are 
factors that contribute both random noise and systemic sources of variation; 
summarizing results as statistical distributions allows us to capture this variation.  
Incorporating these distributions as simulation input parameters then further allows us 
to account that variation it in the prediction of system performance; the use of such 
distributions is the basis for Monte Carlo simulation.   
Simulation provides assessments of systems performance through representation of 
system-on-system engagements and larger force-on-force encounters, evaluating 
mission and battle outcomes, or even theater level concerns, as appropriate.  To 
proceed from MOPs to operational-level measures of effectiveness it is almost always 
necessary to resort to simulation, whether done in the field with troops engaged in 
simulated combat, or in a computer, where mathematical models predict the outcomes 
of mission tasks. While system or component evaluators may prefer the results of field 
trials, economic realities constrain them to fight the majority of their test battles in the 
computer.   
Just as it makes no sense to speak of experimental data without reference to the 
tools and metrics used to collect them, MOEs cannot reasonably be separated from 
their derivative models and simulations.  These M&S tools determine the context, 
resolution, reliability, and applicability of their associated MOEs. As an obvious corollary, 
M&S tools that do not incorporate the explicit application of information technologies in 
the representation of SA/SU and decision-making must at the very least be suspect 
measurement of operational outcomes that depend on these factors. 
Of particular significance to the warrior system community and other advocates of 
the individual dismounted combatant, is the use of MOEs to assess the result of small 
unit operations.  These typically involve force-on-force encounters at the squad and 
platoon level, and provide the greatest insight into the combat worth of soldier system 
components or concepts.  




the results of experiments or field tests.  For example, a field test may produce start and 
stop times for an individual corresponding to distance covered while equipped with 
some set of soldier system component alternatives.  This translates directly into an 
MOP, speed.  If measurements can be obtained relating the individual’s physiological 
state to speed and other measures of terrain trafficability, mathematical models can be 
constructed to predict the individual’s level of fatigue and percent effectiveness at 
various mission tasks.   
 In the case where experimental and field trial data are not available, the analyst can 
usually obtain subject matter expert (SME) estimates of appropriate MOP values for 
performance of specific task elements under given conditions.  Such values, in 
combination with whatever empirical data as may be available are often applied in one 
of the analyst’s key tools, parametric variation simulation experiments.  Fortunately 
parametric variation is well suited to the emergent analysis paradigm, and there is in 
fact a growing body of research on appropriate experimental designs that support 
efficient exploration of the parameter space through data farming and data mining with 
computer simulation. (Ipekci 2002; Kleijnen, Sanchez et al. 2005; Liang 2005; Alt 2006; 
Lucas, Sanchez et al. 2007; Foo 2008; Pearman, Middleton et al. 2009) 
There are a number of historical measures that address casualties and other attrition 
combat outcomes: measures of accuracy and lethality to quantify the contribution of 
weapon systems to those outcomes; measures of sensitivity and associated probabilities 
of detection, recognition, and identification to represent the contribution of sensors and 
target acquisition technologies; measures of durability, fit, protective camouflage, and 
survivability to represent the contribution of clothing and body armor; and so forth.   
Current human factors engineering measures address aspects of human interaction 
with information systems and subsystems, e.g.; rate of signal processing and other 
perceptual interface questions; what is lacking is metrics to address the usability of data 
and information.  Needed are measures of item/system performance to quantify the 




understanding them to provide actionable information.   
MOPs exist for: 
 sensor performance; 
 communication network efficiency; 
 Human factors engineering of display technologies;  
 SAGAT31-type quantification of the deltas between perception and 
ground truth. 
Measures as yet don’t exist for: 
 measures of the “goodness” of data - “quanta” of information32; 
 Time-dependent measures of the utility and fragility of data. 
Extant MOEs for conventional combat outcomes include: 
 Combat outcomes, e.g; killer victim scoreboard; 
 Fire power, e.g; rounds on target; 
 Mobility, e.g.; speed attainable, risk of encountering hazards; 
 Mission/goal achievement, e.g.; time, %complete. 
These metrics don’t provide: 
 Measures of lost opportunity costs; 
 MOEs to quantify the effectiveness of close contact instead of close 
combat;   
 measures of the contributions of situation awareness to greater ability to 
react to dynamic conditions; 
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 Time-dependent measures of the utility and fragility of information. 
As may be inferred from this latter list, established metrics of attrition combat 
effectiveness do not adequately address many aspects of today’s extended military 
operations and especially the effects of information technologies that are the underlying 
motivation for this dissertation. 
As a final note about the current state of the art, while there is certainly need for 
new MOPs and MOEs, this need does not preclude the usefulness of the older, more 
orthodox ones, even if they may not support prediction of the outcome of a given 
battle.  In many cases, these older, limited measures remain the best (and/or only) way 
to assess and improve capabilities and readiness.  Then too, it may be the case that the 
right measures are chosen, but the wrong connections are made between them.  The 
number of first downs the team got may not reflect the outcome of the game; the fact 
that they couldn’t get a first down on their last possession and run out the clock did, 
because it allowed their opponent the opportunity to make the winning score.   
2.5.3  Potential for New MOEs33  
In traditional attrition-based metrics, the direction and magnitude of desired 
outcomes is usually unambiguous. It is always better to reduce friendly casualties and 
increase adversary casualties and destroy more of the adversary’s materiel.  In current 
asymmetric conflicts however, it is entirely possible that the direction of change in an 
MOE may be meaningful only when contextualized by other information or other 
metrics. For example, a numerical measure of the number of contraband items 
confiscated in a certain area may not be especially useful when considered alone. A 
decreasing trend in the number of confiscated items may be indicative of an improving 
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security climate (a positive outcome) or of more effective concealment and evasion (a 
negative outcome). Correlated measures, perhaps including assessment of confiscation 
rates in other areas, or of other metrics, may be needed to fully assess the meaning of 
such measures. Developing metrics that will be useful under such conditions is an 
immense challenge. 
Established attrition metrics are not well suited to missions where combatant status 
is ambiguous and it may be desirable to avoid casualties to potential adversaries as well 
as one’s own troops.  Close “contact” operations such as stability and peacekeeping, for 
example, share many characteristics with civilian police activities where the use of 
deadly force is a last resort, and often indicates a failure to keep a situation under 
adequate control. One potentially fruitful approach might include expanding measures 
of physical destruction such as lethality and incapacitation to encompass a more 
comprehensive concept, that of a hierarchy of control.  Clearly, the physical destruction 
of objects, personnel, or places is the most emphatic kind of control, and this is 
generally the objective of straightforward combat operations.  There are, however, 
other contexts for the application of military power. These include the application of 
combat (or the threat of the application of that power) to neutralize a real or potential 
enemy threat, or simply to influence the behavior or potential of adversaries or other 
participants in the operational environment, may serve as well or better to accomplish 
the mission.  Several qualitative designations of decreasing levels of “control” are shown 
in Figure 2-6.  
These levels can be used to capture such factors as a commander’s intent, and to 
define “close contact” MOEs by relating them to such factors as: size, proximity, 
maneuverability, and mobility of forces; ability for force projection; situation awareness; 
force readiness and reaction time. They still, however, boil down to the common sense 
concept of the ability to have the right force, in the right place, at the right time.  To this 
end, the ability to employ information to optimize movement is a critical contributor to 




data to movement behaviors is a good starting place to begin exploration of the 
potential for such metrics. 
  
Figure 2-6 Types of Control. 
 Furthermore, these levels of control now provide greater resolution in addressing 
the application of that force; success may be defined as much through adroit 
management of force and force projection as through simply overwhelming an 
adversary.  Here again appropriate adjustment of one’s understanding of the dynamic 
situation is a key. 
I believe it is also important to incorporate the concept of opportunity cost into 
these metrics.  The phenomenon of “If I knew then what I know now” is a key to 
assessment of SA/SU; extinguishing matches requires a good deal less effort than 
putting out forest fires. 
The human-centric paradigm supports assessment of intermediate levels of 
operational effectiveness in terms these levels of control, using them to characterize the 
commander’s intent with respect to specific mission tasks, evaluating task performance 
in terms of objective task measures and the extent to which that intent is met. This kind 




 “Standard” task performance - behavior according the “script”, e.g.; 
execution of practiced tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) in 
accordance with commanders’ operational plans. 
 Reactive behavior - the ability to flexibly react to operational events. 
 Pro-active behavior - the ability to anticipate and effect changes in the 
operational environment.  
  Mission achievement - the extent to which mission objectives and higher 
commanders' intents are met. 
Finally Figure 2-6 almost certainly needs to be expanded to consider the beneficial 
use of forces, adding a column or columns to address aid and comfort, support and 





3 HUMAN-CENTRIC MODELING TOOLS: AGENT BASED MODELS AND COMPLEX 
ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS 
This chapter provides a brief overview of complex adaptive systems (CAS) and agent-
based modeling (ABM) as the tools to implement the human-centric approach, and 
concludes with the concept of using data farming and data mining with simulation 
experiments to perform “emergent” analysis, as a way to apply the that approach to the 
solution of relevant problems.  Chapter 3.1 discusses the need for new measures to 
quantify the key elements of human centric approach and in Chapter 3.2, all of these 
elements are merged into a synopsis of the human-centric approach to analysis.  
The MORIMOC III working group discussed in the last chapter suggested an Object-
Oriented Design in which objects (military forces) are possessed of physical and 
cognitive states, which they change, based on interaction with each other.  The working 
group was primarily concerned with objects that would represent higher echelon forces 
(battalions, companies and divisions), but the same approach can be applied to 
represent sub-units, individual weapon platforms or individual dismounted combatants.  
Furthermore, these recommendations look a lot like suggesting adopting agent-based 
modeling as an approach that supports exploration of human factors in general and 
decision-making in particular.  
The theory of complex adaptive systems (CAS) provides the philosophical foundation 
for ABM.  It supports augmenting deterministic engineering models, in which “buttons 
are pushed” and predictable results follow, with models in which autonomous entities 




that are frequently characterized by unexpected ‘emergent” behavior.  
3.1 Agent-Based Models  
Agent-based models have their foundation in the theory of CAS, and focus on 
relatively simple interaction rules to achieve complexity.  These rules direct how 
simulation agents deal with each other and their environment.  They need only be 
internally consistent; they do not require a single unified theory of human behavior.  In 
fact, this approach can embrace multiple rule sets, some of which may be based on 
competing, and even contradictory, social science theories and data34. This multi-
disciplinary approach also supports representation of individuals with widely diverging 
belief systems and standards of behavior, a virtual necessity in accommodating the clash 
of cultures that characterizes the human dimension in much of today’s military 
operations.   
This dissertation is concerned with the specific agent species Agent Sapiens,  
“intelligent” agents, entities that perceive the condition of their environment and select 
their behaviors to effect changes to that environment.  Intelligent agents are35: 
 goal-oriented - able to build courses of action by taking the initiative to change 
elements of the world state to desired objectives 
 perceptive - able to receive data from their environment, including knowledge 
of their own state and that of other entities of interest to them,  
 active - able to perform actions affecting their environment, and  
 autonomous - able to initiate behavior sequences based on internal logic to 
determine what is appropriate given the perceived environment.  
Agents representing combat forces must also generally be: 
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35 See for example (Wooldridge and Jennings 1995a; Wooldridge and Jennings 1995b; Turner 1998; Ioerger 2000; Wooldridge 




 mobile - able to move around in their simulated environment, 
 capable of inferring the intentions of others, the desires and plans of other 
agents, and 
 social - able to share goals, cooperate with or coerce other agents. 
A key distinction between agents that are “intelligent” and those that are merely 
reactive is the concept of maintaining a perceived view of the environment, having 
“knowledge” of the world based on current and historical data from the agent’s sensory 
input capabilities. Intelligent agents are not omniscient, they do not share the 
simulation “god’s eye” view of the world, rather they gather and interpret data 
according to their own capabilities36. One can characterize the degree of an agent’s 
intelligence based on the extent of its historical sensory database, as well as its 
capability to use inference to supplement incomplete input data, and/or to resolve 
uncertain or inconsistent data. 
It is important, however, to not over state the “intelligent” element of these 
software constructs. In fact, part of the rationale for using intelligent agents is their 
capability to represent such “unintelligent“ behaviors as bad decisions, failure to 
correctly interpret conditions and/or events (poor situation awareness), poor navigation 
(getting lost), and other cognitively related performance problems.   
3.1.1 The Role of Autonomy 
 The “intelligence” of an agent also speaks to its degree of autonomy.  Andrew 
Ilachinski, one of the pioneers of agent-based modeling and its use in representing CAS,  
defines autonomous software agents as: 
The fundamental building block of most models of complex adaptive systems is 
the so-called adaptive autonomous agent. Adaptive autonomous agents try to 
satisfy a set of goals (which may be either fixed or time-dependent) in an 
unpredictable and changing environment. These agents are “adaptive” in the 
                                                     
 




sense that they can use their experience to continually improve their ability to 
deal with shifting goals and motivations. They are “autonomous” in that they 
operate completely autonomously, and do not need to obey instructions issued 
by a God-like oracle (Ilachinski 1997). p.13 
The most attractive feature of autonomous intelligent agents is not how “smart” 
they are, but rather that their behavior is controlled internally rather than externally.  
Instead of being driven by some simulation “god” or master event scheduler, intelligent 
agents act according to their own perception of the simulation environment.  This shift 
of control from global to local means that simulation setup and execution need not be 
quite as prescient as before.  By providing an autonomous entity a set of stock behaviors 
and internal selection/decision logic, more scenario contingencies, and a far larger 
number of contingency combinations, can be addressed, without the need to explicitly 
account for each one.   
In ABM, autonomy is gauged by the degree to which behaviors are not pre-scripted 
by simulation designers37, by the number of options available to the agent in response 
to the perceived environment and by the flexibility the agent has in choosing those 
options.   Current ABM software constructs have to a large extent freed the simulation 
scenario developer from the need write the scenario as a scripted set of events and 
turned it more into stage wherein the scenario actors can to some extent ad lib their 
parts. 
3.1.2 Implementations of Agent-based Modeling 
Ilanchinski developed several agent-based simulation tools.  They include the 
Irreducible Semi-Autonomous Adaptive Combat (ISAAC) model and its successor 
EINSTein, Enhanced ISAAC Neural Simulation Tool. (Ilachinski 1997)  EINSTein and ISAAC 
were among  the first agent-based models of combat, and were the forerunners of the 
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Marine Corps’ Warfighting Laboratory’s Project Albert, whose suite of models grew to 
include  Socrates, Pythagoras, and the New Zealand Defense Technology Agency’s Map-
Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA).  
These models have been referred to as distillation models, “a type of computer 
simulation which attempt to model the critical factors of interest in combat without 
explicitly modeling all of the physical details.” (Horne 2008) 38  
Because these models are small and abstract, “they can “easily be run many times to 
test a variety of parameter values and get an idea of the landscape of possibilities.  The 
term distillation is added, because the intent is to distill the question at hand down into 
as simple a representation as possible.”  (Horne 2008) 
In addition: 
    By virtue of their being much easier to run and understand (think: SimCity 
adapted to a combat situation), they are proving to be effective tools that help 
capture and scientifically reproduce the ideas of Subject Matter Experts, such as 
those thinking about tomorrow's concepts, doctrine, and requirements. This 
suite of entity-based models allow for rapid and highly tailorable changes in 
entity characteristics and behaviors, quite amenable to, and intentionally 
designed for rapid, repeatable concept exploration. Project Albert develops a 
suite, vice a single model, to allow for the testing of robustness of observations 
across modeling platforms, and because each model has inherent strengths and 
unique capabilities with regard to each aspect of modeling how entities think, 
decide, shoot, move, and communicate. (from http://www.projectalbert.org/) 
Agent-based modeling is not a major divergence from popular simulation 
approaches such as discrete event simulations and systems dynamics. Rather it builds 
on top of these tools, and any comprehensive combat simulation will incorporate 
elements of multiple approaches. One must still, of course, deal with questions of 
fidelity and resolution – what are the key features of those elements represented and 
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what level of detail is appropriate. There are a myriad of different functional elements 
that must be considered in a combat simulation.  They range from the combatants 
themselves, to their weapons and other equipment, to significant features of their 
environment such as terrain, weather, physical threats, and cultural milieus.  There are a 
multitude of simulation methodologies for representation of any and all of these 
elements, choosing the one(s) most suitable for a given application can be a significant 
challenge.  When that application is representation of decision-making, the selection 
problem can be even more daunting.  It is often hard to predict a priori which elements 
of a given scenario will be critical a given decision, or even what and when decisions will 
have to be made. 
For example, the current agent-based models IWARS39, Pythagoras40 and the 
OneSAF Objective System (OOS) 41 are clock driven simulations that maintain lists of 
scheduled events.  All of them use Monte Carlo draws to determine the outcome of 
stochastic processes, while also using closed form equations and/or algorithms based on 
these equations to calculate deterministic results. Military operations are characterized 
more in terms of a series of goals that must be achieved than as the sequence of tasks 
required to achieve those goals; driven by the commander’s intent interpreted and 
realized by subordinates42.  Mission and task performance can incorporate unexpected 
events and multifaceted simulation object interfaces.  These features highlight the 
difference between task network modeling and the agent-based approach.  The 
successor to the IUSS, IWARS, changes the analytical focus from modeling operations as 
a sequence of by-the-book tasks to modeling them as the interaction between various 
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entities and the environment.(Middleton 2002; Middleton 2010b) This change did not 
mean abandoning the representation of Army standard tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTPs) but rather providing a greater degree of autonomy to simulation 
entities as to when and where to employ these TTPs.  
3.1.3 The Role of Error  
As stated above, consideration of the individual as an imperfect decision-making 
entity is at the core of the human-centric approach.  
One of the most important aspects of human performance, which has often 
been overlooked in models of behavior and problem solving, is errors (although 
see, for example, Cacciabue et, al.; Freed & Remington, Freedet. al)43.  There is a 
consensus building about the definition of errors -- for most people an error is 
something done that was not intended by the actor, that was not desired, and 
that placed the task/system beyond acceptable limits (e.g., Senders & Moray )44.  
Part of the reason for omitting errors from models of behavior is the fallacy that 
they are produced by some special error-generating mechanism that can be 
bolted on to models once they are producing correct behavior on the task at 
hand.  Often, however, the actions that precede errors would have been judged 
to be correct if the circumstances had been slightly different.  In other words, as 
Mach45 observed, knowledge and error both stem from the same source.  
Evidence shows that novices and experienced personnel will often make the 
same errors when exposed to the same circumstances.  The difference lies in the 
ability to notice and recover from these errors.  Experienced personnel are more 
successful at mitigating errors before the full consequences arise.  In other 
words, it is the management of errors that is important and needs to be trained 
(Frese & Altmann)46, rather than vainly trying to teach people how to prevent 
the inevitable. (Ritter 2001) 
Mica Endsley, whose three stage view of situation awareness is discussed in detail 
below, developed a taxonomy of SA related errors: 
  SA Error Taxonomy 
Level 1:  Failure to correctly perceive information  
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                Data not available  
                Data hard to discriminate or detect  
                Failure to monitor or observe data  
                Misperception of data  
                Memory Loss  
Level 2:  Failure to correctly integrate or comprehend information  
                Lack of or poor mental model  
                Use of incorrect mental model  
                Over-reliance on default values  
                Other  
Level 3:  Failure to project future actions or state of the system  
               Lack of or poor mental model  
               Over-projection of current trends  
               Other  
General  
Failure to maintain multiple goals  
Habitual schema (Endsley 1999) 
 
All of the above are desirable features to capture in Agent Sapiens. 
Miler and Shattuck, whose Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition (DMSC) is also 
discussed below, found it necessary to consider how ground truth, which in their model 
is completely accurate, constantly updated, and identical for all entities involved, is 
subject to a series of distorting lenses that can propagate error and inaccuracy at any 
and all stages of individual and unit information processing.  (Miller and Shattuck 2006) 
Henricksen and Indulska explore the role of error in background context with 
respect to human perception and information processing: 
Context-aware applications typically assume that the context information upon 
which they rely is complete and accurate. However, this assumption is usually 
unjustified, as sensed context information is often inaccurate or unavailable as a 
result of noise or sensor failures, while user-supplied information is subject to 
problems such as human error and staleness.  
Consequently, usability problems arising from reliance on imperfect context 
information are sometimes observed in context-aware applications. For 
example, Benford et al. recently presented an interesting discussion of the 
implications of using imperfect location data in an mixed-reality game47. They 
                                                     
 




noted that errors in location information often led to confusion when game 
players were observed to jump around unpredictably in the virtual environment, 
but were also exploited by sophisticated users for tactical advantage.  
Clearly, context-aware applications must be developed with an understanding of 
the problems inherent in gathering reliable context information, and also of the 
attendant design issues. In this paper, we explore these challenges. We 
characterise various types and sources of imperfect context information, present 
a set of novel context modelling constructs that accommodate these, outline a 
software infrastructure that supports the management and use of imperfect 
context information, and describe our experiences with using the context 
modelling approach and infrastructure. (Henricksen and Indulska 2004) 
3.1.4  Building Agent-Based Models Reductionism vs. Synthesism 
The correspondence vs. parsimony dynamic described in Chapter 1.4 is perhaps 
even more acute with respect to ABM. Standard methods of decomposing the entity 
functions and behaviors into independent modules require ignoring or understating 
dynamic interactions between the modules, which runs counter to the ABM approach.  
In general, it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate the function of equipment such as 
sensors and weapons from the functioning of the human equipment operator. 
Furthermore, human behaviors themselves typically have both cognitive and 
physiological components and again, it is not generally easy to delineate between mind 
and body.  Physiological stressors such as fatigue can certainly affect cognitive 
capability, and conversely mental states and attitude can affect physical performance.  
In the world of conventional modeling and simulation life is made simpler by assuming 
things like independence and sequential causality48; unfortunately human behavior 
seems to resist these assumptions. The problems of trying to separate effects into neat 
little pieces or functional/behavioral models are further exacerbated by the problem of 
supporting data. Experimentally, one can measure performance outcomes for 
equipment/operator pairings, generalizing these results to other equipment 
configurations and/or operators with different skill sets and varying psycho-
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physiological states is problematic at best. Similarly, for most human behaviors 
physiological state variables can be measured more or less directly; cognitive state(s) 
and decision processes must generally be inferred from such observables, somewhat 
confounding the development of independent effects mechanisms.   
One approach to representation of human behaviors is a compromise achieved by 
combining top-down, reductionist approaches, with bottom-up synthesis. The 
reductionist approach decomposes well-understood phenomena into component pieces 
until an appropriate level of fidelity is reached.  For example, the typical “two-person 
duel” engagement process can be broken down to target acquisition, weapon 
operation, and damage assessment.  These functions can be further decomposed into 
detection, recognition, and identification, weapon aim and operation, projectile fly-out, 
projectile impact, and so on.   
This reductionist approach works best when conditions (expressed as state variables 
for the objects involved) are relatively static.  When conditions become more dynamic, 
the assumption of independence of the functional modules (necessary for the 
reductionist approach) is violated.  For example, if a target is detected, but acquisition is 
lost prior to weapon fire, current models simply restart the acquisition process; they 
ignore the fact that re-acquisition of a previously known target is very different from the 
initial search and detection of that same target.  Under such an approach the “two-
person duel” can take on a “whack-a-mole” aspect, with each individual ducking out of 
sight in turn before his adversary can get off a shot.  Less humorous, but equally 
unrealistic, is the case where an adversary can fire first because of the differential 
between the time required to re-initialize the acquisition/engagement cycle and the 
shorter time to engage given the ability to focus in on that adversary’s last known 
position.  




is perhaps the greatest advantage of synthesist approach49.  Entity interactions are 
based on both action and reaction, and the history of previous interactions has the 
potential to influence current and future behaviors.   Of course, there is no prohibition 
against including such histories in the reductionist functional breakdown, except that 
such a breakdown requires predicting all the possible sequences of such interactions 
and soon runs afoul of the combinatorial explosion of action/interaction possibilities.  
The agent-based synthesist approach avoids this problem (or at least delays it) by not 
assuming that the every sequence of possible interaction states is known a priori, as is 
the case with a strictly reductionist approach.  
3.1.5 Agent-based Modeling and Analysis 
While agent-based models provide a way to address the human dimension of 
combat and its uncertainties through emergent analysis: 
“ABM is a mindset more than a technology. The ABM mindset consists of 
describing a system from the perspective of its constituent units. A number of 
researchers think that the alternative to ABM is traditional differential equation 
modeling; this is wrong, as a set of differential equations, each describing the 
dynamics of one of the system's constituent units, is an agent-based model. A 
synonym of ABM would be microscopic modeling, and an alternative would be 
macroscopic modeling.”…. 
One may want to use ABM when there is potential for emergent phenomena, 
i.e., when:  
1. Individual behavior is nonlinear and can be characterized by thresholds, if-
then rules, or nonlinear coupling. Describing discontinuity in individual 
behavior is difficult with differential equations.  
2. Individual behavior exhibits memory, path-dependence, and hysteresis, 
non-markovian behavior, or temporal correlations, including learning and 
adaptation.  
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3. Agent interactions are heterogeneous and can generate network effects. 
Aggregate flow equations usually assume global homogeneous mixing, 
but the topology of the interaction network can lead to significant 
deviations from predicted aggregate behavior.  
4. Averages will not work. Aggregate differential equations tend to smooth 
out fluctuations, not ABM, which is important because under certain 
conditions, fluctuations can be amplified: the system is linearly stable but 
unstable to larger perturbations.  
Interestingly, because ABM generates emergent phenomena from the bottom 
up, it raises the issue of what constitutes an explanation of such a phenomenon. 
The broader agenda of the ABM community is to advocate a new way of 
approaching social phenomena, not from a traditional modeling perspective but 
from the perspective of redefining the scientific process entirely. According to 
Epstein and Axtell, ABM may change the way we think about explanation in 
the social sciences. What constitutes an explanation of an observed social 
phenomenon? Perhaps one day people will interpret the question, ‘Can you 
explain it?’ as asking ‘Can you grow it’50.”  " (Bonabeau 2002)p.2 
As an example, Macy and Willer discuss the work of Craig Reynolds in modeling 
movement of a population of artificial “boids”. 
"Reynolds’ computational method is called agent-based modeling. Had Reynolds 
chosen instead to write a top-down program for the global behavior of the flock, 
he might still be working on it. By choosing instead to model the flock from the 
bottom up, based on agent-level interaction, he was able to produce highly 
realistic flight formations using very simple rules.51 Note that Reynolds did not 
model the flock, nor did he model isolated birds. He modeled their interaction, at 
the relational level. 
Agent-based models (hereafter ABMs) of human social interaction are based on 
this same theory-building strategy. Sociologists have traditionally understood 
social life as a hierarchical system of institutions and norms that shape 
individual behavior from the top down. Interest in ABMs reflects growing 
interest in the possibility that human groups, like flocks of birds, may be highly 
complex, non-linear, path-dependent, and self-organizing. We may be able to 
understand these dynamics much better by trying to model them, not at the 
global level but instead as emergent properties of local interaction among 
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adaptive agents who influence one another in response to the influence they 
receive." (Macy and Willer 2002)]  p144 
3.1.6 Complex Adaptive Systems 
There is no single accepted definition of a complex adaptive system, although there 
is reasonable agreement as to the general characteristics of such a system. (Holland 
1992), (Holland 2006) (Johnson 2001), (Waldrop 1992)  First, of course, a complex 
adaptive system is a complex system. As shown in Figure 3-1, such systems are most 
often an open system possessed of a high degree of structure, with many components 
having dynamic interactions.   
 
Figure 3-1 Characteristics of Complex Systems52 
System behavior generally depends not only current state variables, but also on the 
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history of the system. System relationships and behaviors are frequently highly non-
linear and chaotic53, meaning they can be highly sensitive to small perturbations in input 
conditions.  The complex and dynamic nature of system component interactions 
frequently leads to emergent behavior, and the system is said to be adaptive when this 
emergent behavior results in the system(s) coevolving with the environment and other 
systems.  Adaptation is a concept taken from the biological view of evolution and 
implies the presence of a “fitness” function or functions that support “selection” of 
those characteristics or behaviors of the system that enable it to best “fit” in its 
environment. 
3.1.7 Military Operations as Complex Adaptive Systems  
Certainly the view of military conflict as a complex system is well supported by these 
attributes. 
"According to practically any definition of the term "complexity," war qualifies 
as a complex phenomenon. In what could qualify as an excellent description of 
complexity theory, Clausewitz wrote: The military machine—the army and 
everything related to it—is basically very simple and therefore seems easy to 
manage. But we should bear in mind that none of its components is of one piece: 
each piece is composed of individuals, every one of whom retains his potential of 
friction...A battalion is made up of individuals, the least important of whom may 
chance to delay things or somehow make them go wrong."  (Schmitt 1997) 
The MOVES54  Institute at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) is a significant 
proponent of applying ABM to represent military operations as CAS.  Joerg Wellbrink, 
Mike Zyda, and John Hiles of MOVES refer to Ilanchinski’s work, (and quote from it) as 
follows:  
... Ilachinski challenged the almost century-old theory of conventional wisdom 
that combat is driven by force-on-force attrition rate] by arguing that land 
combat can (and should) be modeled as a complex adaptive system. He 
transferred complexity theory into the military domain and showed that land 
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combat properties resemble the properties of CAS (in (Ilachinski 1997)).  His 
work has generated a lot of interest in combat modeling, especially because 
tactical behaviors such as flank maneuvers, containment, encirclement, and 
“guerilla-like” assaults emerged out of his implementation.  
 “In ISAAC, the “final outcome” of a battle—as defined, say, by measuring the 
surviving force strengths—takes second stage to exploring how two forces might 
“co-evolve” during combat. A few examples of the profoundly non-equilibrium 
dynamics that characterizes much of real combat include: the sudden “flash of 
insight” of a clever commander that changes the course of a battle; the swift 
flanking maneuver that surprises the enemy; and the serendipitous confluence 
of several far-separated (and unorchestrated) events that lead to victory. These 
are the kinds of behavior that Lanchesterian-based models are in principle 
incapable of even addressing.  ISAAC represents a first step toward being able to 
explore such questions 55. 
They claim: 
 The paradigm for combat modeling has fundamentally changed and improved 
insights into the processes. These types of simulation systems will enhance the 
capabilities exploring policy and concept development as well as force structure 
development. (Wellbrink, Zyda et al. 2004) 
An open systems paradigm that sees modern conflict as CAS supports exploration of 
the potential for emergent phenomena in such systems.  This support includes 
representation of:   
 Emergence - complex patterns of behavior and structural relationships emerge 
from apparently simple rules of interaction;  
 Perception-based entity behaviors – entities that generally react to the 
environment and other entities only as they perceive them, not based on 
ground truth. Entity behaviors are thus a function of the entity’s SA and 
understanding, which incorporate both immediate perception and the entity’s 
history.  With explicit representation of an entity’s observe, orient, decide and 
act (OODA) loop, analysts can explore the contributions disrupting an 
opponent’s OODA loop can make towards conflict outcomes: 
 The effects of history and feedback loops on entity behaviors - effects of an 
entity’s actions are fed back to it and can affect its future behavior.  Fitness 
                                                     
 




functions incorporating both negative (damping) and positive (amplifying) 
feedback determine the development and persistence of emergent behaviors. 
 Network centric behaviors and echelons of command as local entity 
interactions - orders and information are explicitly transmitted and understood 
(or misunderstood), allowing for the introduction of network errors and 
communication problems into simulation experiments.   
 Non-linear entity interactions – reflecting the often chaotic nature of especially 
asymmetric conflict, conflict outcomes may not be attributable to simple cause 
and effect relationships. Small changes in behaviors or seemingly minor 
interactions may cause large effects or no effect at all. 
 Autonomously operating units in highly fluid operations - commanders specify 
their intent and rules of engagement, but do not attempt to rigidly control 
subordinate units leaving them to react and/or adapt.  Adversaries who may 
not have a rigidly defined or enforced command and control structure will still 
have goals and patterns of engagement and/or other behaviors, and thus also 
function as autonomous entities.  
Certainly the use of an open systems approach to combat modeling is not without its 
own problems. The closed system view essentially sees outcomes as deterministic; 
giving up a closed system approach does mean acknowledging at best a limited ability to 
predict those outcomes. There is still a role for closed systems analysis, but it is most 
useful when input conditions and systems operations options are tightly constrained.  
This disclaimer, however, suggests that simply making the case that small unit 
combat operations can be modeled as CAS is not sufficient.  This dissertation is looking 
at only one small aspect of human behavior in military operations, and one that can be 
studied without introducing the myriad of complications due to interaction with 
adversaries.  Is it still reasonable to claim that 1) the behavior at question falls under the 
rubric of CAS, and 2) even if it does, is there sufficient value in doing so to justify having 
to deal with the attendant complications and inherent uncertainties?   
To support the “yes” answer to this question, consider:   




static environment reflects deterministic, closed system behavior; the same 
cannot be said for directed movement guided by uncertain and/or erroneous 
information, and such movement certainly embodies most or all of the above 
CAS characteristics; 
 the value of applying the CAS/ABM paradigm is can be seen in the fact that 
representation of decision-making under imperfect SA/SU is one of the 
quintessential aspects of modeling human behavior that have been in the “too 
hard to do box” until CAS and agent-based modeling came along. By 
supporting representation of the consequences of acting on imperfect SA/SU, 
the CAS/ABM paradigm allows analysts to correlate different levels of that 
phenomenon with accepted measures of mission outcomes.  
Being “lost” in the sense of acting under erroneous or incomplete information, can 
certainly give rise to emergent behavior; perhaps the most obvious example of which 
would be the tendency of someone who is lost to wander in a circle.  In the world of on-
line games, both humans and computer-generated actors (even those with relatively 
sophisticated AI behaviors), fall into detectable patterns of decision-guided behaviors.  
Furthermore, if an individual’s environment is changing in ways that affect movement, 
that individual’s movement behaviors generally adapt to these changes.  The need for 
adaptation is particularly pertinent when changes reflect differences between the 
individual’s pre-conceived notions about the environment, and what that individual 
finds to be ground truth.  Discovery of such differences is a key characteristic of an open 
system; new information is flowing into the system, or at least to that part of the system 
that reflects the individual’s perceived view of the environment.  Finally, the individual’s 
reaction to that discovery often takes on chaotic and non-linear aspects, including 
abrupt discontinuities in the choice of type and/or direction of movement – I come to 
the top of a hill, see a landmark, and realize I’m headed the wrong way entirely. 
3.1.8 Complex Adaptive Systems and Emergent Analysis 
As mentioned in Chapter 2.2.3 and Chapter3.1.4 above, the notion of influence is one 
that occurs frequently in complexity science and agent based modeling.  Studying the 




paradigm, which could be referred to as “emergent analysis”.  This process may produce 
outcomes, conflicts and conflict resolutions, as might not have been a priori identified in 
the analyst’s view of the system. 
Much of traditional analysis consists of testing a specific hypothesis against 
scenarios differing only in the value of an “independent variable”, and iterated to 
provide statistical comparisons. Under the emergent analysis approach, as depicted in 
Figure 3-2, this “comparison test” approach to analysis may be supplemented or 
replaced with research or study for the sake of discovery, the “what if” or “what 
happens when” kind of investigation. Such experimentation can be just as valid (or 
perhaps more importantly, just as useful) as experiments narrowly structured to accept 
or reject a null hypothesis.  
 
Figure 3-2 Emergent Analysis 
 This paradigm addresses the disconnect between deterministic models (i.e., 
individual object/entity behaviors) and the real-world variability due to (the essentially 
infinite) potential factor interactions.  This paradigm is also attractive in that it supports 




of asymmetric warfare.  Under this view, commanders would specify their intent and 
rules of engagement, but not attempt to rigidly control subordinate units form one 
central point of command. 
With respect to the dissertation model MOBIL, this view results in providing a 
moving entity a set heuristics to solve its “function of mind”: to decide where to move 
next. 
Emergent analysis offers the potential for operational analyses to become more like 
operations themselves: when necessary, predictability is traded for unexpected, yet 
valuable insight and adaptation. When real people take part in realistic scenarios, as in 
live exercises or actual combat, unexpected events and outcomes occur frequently, 
often requiring on-the-fly adjustments. The nuances and perturbations in plans and 
operations introduced by human intelligence, and responses to them, are the very 
essence of military art. Representing this aspect of conflict more satisfactorily is an 
important challenge facing operations research. As a Navy modeling and simulation 
review puts it: 
“Running a simulation for one set of fixed conditions is generally not satisfactory 
since there are often large uncertainties throughout the system…An important 
research area, then, is developing ways to use modern computer power to 
explore the space of simulation outcomes and to search for interesting 
regimes...” (Naval Research Board, 1997) 
The emergent analysis paradigm uses multiple simulation experiments to explore 
the behavior of multifaceted phenomena; emergent complex behaviors or properties 
are not a property of any single phenomenological factor, nor can they easily be 
predicted or deduced from isolated examination of individual factors or any single 
simulation replications.  Analysts may need to be alert to the insights and anomalies 
that arise in such simulation runs, in order to capitalize on them, and perhaps move the 
analysis in an unanticipated, but potentially fruitful direction. For those unaccustomed 
to applying rigorous scientific methods to the study of fundamentally unruly 
phenomena such as human behavior, the struggle to identify and balance the subjective 




The paradigm must deal with questions of problem scope that are related to the 
number of interactions between components of a system, which is a function of the 
number of components considered.  The number of interactions can thus increase 
combinatorially with the number of components and can become quite large.  Emergent 
analysis addresses the problem by employing current techniques in data farming and 
data mining to isolate and focus in on “interesting” aspects of the phenomena being 
studied.(Fayyad, Piatetsky-Shapiro et al. 1996; Brady and Starr 2002; Hewawasam, 
Premaratne et al. 2007; Horne 2008; Middleton 2009; Furnas 2012) 
In the June 2008 issue of Wired magazine56, editor-in-chief Chris Anderson describes 
the new "Age of the Petabyte," in which the data used for search and analysis exceed 
terabyte quantities and extend into petabytes. He claims that with the advent of the 
“age of petabyte”, the scientific method is outdated, unsuited to working with petabyte 
magnitudes of data, and that: 
"The new availability of huge amounts of data, along with the statistical tools to 
crunch these numbers, offers a whole new way of understanding the world. 
Correlation supersedes causation, and science can advance even without 
coherent models, unified theories, or really any mechanistic explanation at 
all.." (emphasis mine)  
As evidence of his claim he cites the success of Google, which:  
“conquered the advertising world with nothing more than applied mathematics. 
It didn't pretend to know anything about the culture and conventions of 
advertising — it just assumed that better data, with better analytical tools, 
would win the day. And Google was right. …. 
Google's founding philosophy is that we don't know why this page is better than 
that one: If the statistics of incoming links say it is, that's good enough. No 
semantic or causal analysis is required. … it can match ads to content without 
any knowledge or assumptions about the ads or the content. Speaking at the 
O'Reilly Emerging Technology Conference this past March, Peter Norvig, 
Google's research director, offered an update to George Box's maxim57: "All 
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models are wrong, and increasingly you can succeed without them.” 58 
For military modelers and analysts does this view of the age of petabyte mean 
having to give up cherished (and not so cherished) models and simulations? The vast 
increase in available data certainly has (and should have) significant impact on scientific 
analysis, but just as certainly it isn’t the end of the scientific method or the utility of 
models.  Instead it supports a shift in focus, from scientific experimentation as 
hypothesis and test, towards scientific experimentation as exploration and discovery.  
Note that this is precisely the aim of data farming and data mining, which use simulation 
experiments to generate mass quantities of data, trolling these data for patterns, 
trends, insight and meaning. As in much of science, the process begins with induction 
and correlation, from which one hopes to infer cause and effect, but must sometimes be 
satisfied with increased understanding and some hope of predictive validity. 
Emergent analysis thus begins with looking for patterns, the way in which 
interactions and influence propagate through a simulation scenario, and from these 
patterns seeks to find the causes and effects of emergent behaviors.  Such behaviors 
frequently result from seemingly arbitrary aggregations of influence of some factors 
over that of others, which appear a priori to be equally important.   The nature of 
complex systems frequently manifests itself it such chaotic behavior, where minor 
perturbations of initial conditions have significant effects on ultimate outcomes. Such 
phenomena is seen in instances where behaviors or attributes initially chosen at random 
tend to reinforce themselves in what might be termed the principle of “them what has 
gets”.  For example, in genetic algorithms one can observe the process of genetic drift as  
“eventual convergence around one optimum. … imagine that we have two 
equally fit niches, and a population of 100 individuals equally divided among 
them.  Eventually because of the random effects of selection, it is likely that we 
will obtain a parent population consisting of 49 of one sort and 51 of the other.  
… we are increasingly likely to select individuals from the second niche.  This 
                                                     
 




effect increases as the two subpopulations become unbalanced, until eventually 
we end up with only one niche represented in the population.” (Eiben and Smith 
2003)p155 
Genetic drift is a process where an initially random application of influence shapes 
the nature of an outcome, based on simple rules (e.g., select parents randomly from the 
population), and does so in a way that is not easily reducible to a set of hierarchal 
procedures. 
In a decision-making context this kind of behavior can often be seen in the tendency 
to “double-down” on previous choices.  As a decision-maker has more time and 
resources invested in a particular course of action (COA), there is a natural tendency to 
avoid abandoning or altering that course.  Evidence that may come to light suggesting 
that the COA is ineffective (or even disastrously wrong) can often be ignored or mis-
interpreted to conform to initial assumptions.   
One of the most critical decisions for stochastic simulations is the degree of 
independence one wishes to assume for sequential events.   If, for example, one 
assumes probability of detection of a given target to be independent of previous 
detection attempts, the actual probability of detection can become a function of the 
frequency of Monte Carlo sampling, and thus an artifact of model update rates.  If one 
samples often enough, the assumption of independence and the binomial probability 
distribution make it likely that even an improbable event will occur eventually.  In many 
(most?) cases, however, detection attempts are not independent; the outcomes of 
previous detection attempts do have an effect on successive events.  As a result, one 
may need to adjust the probability distributions for Monte Carlo behaviors based on 
that simulation history. Such is the case in the target engagement process discussed 
above, if one fails to adjust probability of acquisition based on previous history, the 
probability of detection is likely to be understated.  
When there is a fitness function or some other mechanism further influencing the 
outcome of stochastic behavior choices, the overall system being modeled tends to 




use of goal-driven behaviors, i.e., agents “choose” behaviors to achieve specific goals. 
Those combinations of behaviors that succeed in helping to meeting these goals, and 
those agents who select these behaviors, “emerge” as the dominant outcomes in 
simulation experiments.   
3.2 The Human-Centric Paradigm: Review and Recapitulation 
This chapter completes the task of articulating the reasons for and the nature of the 
human-centric paradigm.  It looks at the foundational elements of that paradigm, 
amplifying and summarizing the pertinent points from the discussion above.  Chapter 
3.2.2 summarizes the core aspects and requirements and Chapter 3.2.3 concludes with a 
brief over-view of current analytical practice with respect to the paradigm. 
3.2.1 Foundational Elements for the Human-Centric Paradigm 
The previous chapters have laid out a foundation for the human-centric paradigm:  
 providing the historical evolution of analytical tools leading up to the human-
centric concept;  
 defining the motivation for this concept in terms of changes in military 
philosophy and operations; 
 relating the development of human-centric M&S with the evolution of the 
Warrior System;  
 outlining the need for human-centric M&S with respect to R&D assessment 
requirements for the information technology applications that have 
accompanied those changes;  
 describing the ABM/CAS paradigm that is the enabling methodological 
foundation for human-centric M&S, and 
 discussing the metrics required for performance of human-centric analysis.  
Formulation of the human-centric paradigm requires integrating these points into a 
comprehensive view of human-centric analysis,  
One historical approach to modeling the human has been to adapt methodologies 




This oft-stated view of the human as a slow unarmored tank has some validity for 
modeling the physics-based aspects of movement, target detection, employment of 
ballistic projectiles, message transmission and the like, but it falls woefully short of 
describing the complexity of human behavioral response to the dynamics of the 
battlefield.  In particular, this view gives short shrift to representation of the 
dismounted Infantry combatant.    
The increasingly asymmetric nature of combat brings questions of individual 
behavior to the forefront, as does the current push for a smaller, more agile force 
structure. A the same time, current priorities in the employment of armed forces give 
greater emphasis to crisis and peace support operations, as well as other, less 
exclusively conventional combat oriented, missions. This changing emphasis can be 
referred to as a shift from “close combat” toward “close contact” operations (van Son 
2003). From an RD&A perspective this shift brings with it the need to augment 
traditional models of combat, which focus on the each side’s capabilities for attrition of 
the others forces and resources, with more nuanced analysis of military operations that 
supports goals other than the destruction of an adversary. This shift will bring with it the 
need to augment direct measures of attrition warfare to reflect this much broader range 
of mission concerns.  Development of metrics to quantify these effects, and definition of 
the human factors that contribute to them, are major challenges. 
The multiplicity of human factors that contribute to combat outcomes is a further 
complication. Some of these human factors are quite compatible with the kind of 
quantitative analysis characteristic of existing combat models, for example: aspects of 
human performance related to sensory processing; information processing; and motor 
performance. These topics, in fact, are the ones generally subsumed under the rubric of 
“human factors”, reflecting the more narrow common usage of that term, and many of 
them can already be found in combat models and simulations. To an extent, when 
humans act as sensors, this behavior can be modeled in the same terms used to 




sensors can to some extent be modeled in the same terms used to represent electro-
optical sensors (CERDEC 2005).  
M&S tools to support analysis now need to represent the ways in which individuals 
make decisions, the highly context-sensitive information requirements associated with 
those decisions, the capabilities for, and costs of, meeting those requirements, and the 
consequences for failing to do so. Efficient command and control functions, including 
communication, shared situation awareness, and support for coordinated action, are 
critical to a more agile force, and create an ever-increasing demand for information.   
The need to assess current and evolving information technologies, and their application 
to the acquisition, flow and use of data and information at the small unit level, drives 
the need to model the mental state of individuals, and to represent individuals’ (and 
especially commanders’) decision processes. Internal cognitive states and processes 
must be modeled to support realistic soldier behavior occurring at multiple levels of 
analysis. These include complex planning and high-level strategic or tactical decisions, 
intermediate-level decisions such as target selection and route adjustment, and even 
non-deliberative processes such as modification of speed and/or posture in response to 
environmental cues and one’s own psycho-physiological state.   
Assessment of operations on the digital battlefield, and especially the impact of 
technology on those operations, requires representation of the way the individuals and 
organizations acquire and use information.  This includes the need to represent the 
processing of sensory inputs, and the interpretation and integration of sense data into 
meaningful information about the situation.  It also includes the need to represent the 
effects of the individual’s mental state on behavior, and conversely, the need to 
represent the effects of the individual’s physical state on his or her mental state, and 
thus on his or her behavior and task performance.   
Agent-based modeling techniques appear to be a good fit for representing human 
use of information, including inferences and decisions based on imperfect and even 




complex adaptive systems and a move to an “emergent” analysis paradigm.  In this 
paradigm one specifies the behavioral capabilities of entities and/or groups, defines a 
(hopefully small) number of possible interactions between entities/groups, and then 
sees how the agents react to achieve individual and group goals.  This process may 
produce outcomes, conflicts and conflict resolutions, as might not have been a priori 
identified in the analyst’s view of the system. 
This paradigm is also attractive in that it supports a view of more autonomously 
operating units in the highly fluid situations emblematic of asymmetric warfare.  By 
defining the behaviors of individual, goal-driven entities, ABM provides a manageable 
and understandable way to study military systems of interest: warrior systems; 
adversaries, and associated aggregate force structures. 
3.2.2 Summary 
The human-centric approach to MS&A can be summed up as expanding 
representation of the individual, up to now viewed primarily as an actor - characterized 
by actions (move, shoot, communicate), to include consideration of that individual as a 
decision-making entity - one who continually evaluates the battlefield dynamic to 
decide when, where, and how to move, shoot, and communicate.  
The human-centric paradigm represents the individual as an entity that imperfectly:  
 Perceives its Environment 
 Possesses and Employs Knowledge  
 Makes Decisions  
 Orders Action  
 Takes Action 
 Monitors Mission/Task Progress  
 Regulates/Adjusts Performance  
This view logically leads to a series of requirements that include: 
 The need to distinguish between an individual’s perceived world view and 




data by that individual, modeling the human as a perceiving entity, 
incorporating error and uncertainty in both the processes of perception and 
the resultant world view; 
 The need to support for each individual a knowledge base of relatively static 
information that defines a scenario, the entities within that scenario, and what 
those entities know about themselves and the scenario.  Again, this knowledge 
base should be able to accommodate both error and uncertainty; 
 The need for inference schemes supporting data filtration and fusion to allow 
the individual to correlate perceived data with its knowledge base, and 
interpret all these data with respect to a continually varying experiential frame 
of reference; 
 The need to represent schema used to represent inference59 and/or decision-
making60;  
 The need for data structures that support implementation of decisions into 
actions There are three basic forms: Course of Action (COA) options; Behavior 
parameters - targets and target priority lists, types and rates of fire, shoot/no 
shoot decision thresholds for engagement; routes and waypoints or direction 
vectors for movement, speed and movement formations; and 
Communications – Situation reports (SitReps) to other units, especially 
command units, directives to subordinates, unit coordination, request for fire 
or other support. 
 The need for physical models of behavior, as are already extant in most 
simulations;  
 The need to represent the psycho-physiological state of the individual insofar 
as this state affects both decision-making and physical actions; 
 The need to represent behavior moderators that alter the psycho-physiological 
state of the individual in concert with physical models of behavior and of the 
environment;  
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 The need for metrics to express and assess actions taken in terms of their 
effectiveness towards accomplishing goals; and  
 The need for feedback loops modifying performance parameters as 
appropriate to the individual’s perceived progress towards goals. 
Agent-based modeling is a useful construct to represent military operations, and 
human endeavors in general, as complex adaptive systems.  Any simulation that satisfies 
the above requirements would by definition construe ABM and CAS.   
Finally, the human-centric paradigm also includes the use of emergent analysis and 
the conduct of simulation experiments that are intended more to explore and 
understand the nature of operations than to predict operational outcomes. 
3.2.3 Current Status 
Stating that the human-centric approach “has not as yet been fully defined and 
articulated”, does not mean that it is not a significant aspect of current military 
operational analyses.   While there is not a formal organizationally sanctioned program 
towards human-centric M&S, there has been progress on most, if not all, of the 
foundational elements listed above.  Certainly simulations such as IWARS and 
Pythagoras are designed and implemented following the basic ideas of human-centric 
analysis, and a number of the other Department of Defense efforts mentioned in 
passing above support those ideas.   
As mentioned above, current operational philosophies such as EBO and NCW 
embody much of the human-centric emphasis on the equating the importance of the 
information and cognitive domains of warfare with those of the physical domain.  This 
view continues, now also framed as “kinetic” vs. “non-kinetic” operations61. 
Simulations such as OOS have explicitly designed their actors with both behavioral 
and physical agent components, thus distinguishing between cognitive functions and 
                                                     
 




strictly physical actions.  In OOS, “behavioral agents provide command and control 
capabilities, such as planning, plan execution, and situation assessment”, while “physical agents 
are the “middlemen” between behaviors, the physical world, and physical models.” OOS also 
distinguishes between behavioral and physical models: “behavioral models answer 
behavior agents’ questions and represent the reasoning of agents” whereas “physical models 
provide physical capabilities, such as mobility, weapons, vulnerability, sensing, and 
communications.  They represent the effectors and perceptors of simulated platforms and the 
physics of the simulated world.”(Logsdon 2008) 
This approach is similar to the one used in this research. MOBIL simulates and entity 
through two agents: one that is constrained to act in the ground-truth environment, and 
another that directs the actions of the first based on a perceived (and usually distorted) 
view of that ground-truth environment.  
As with any model, this approach is a simplification of reality.  As discussed above in 
Chapter 2.3.3, the separation between mind and body is not clear-cut, and the 
distinction blurs as fatigue and other stressors degrade both the physical and mental 
capabilities of an individual. 
The human-centric approach is currently manifested in a number of efforts to 
introduce and incorporate behavior moderators such as fatigue and stress into MS&A. 
Tanks and airplanes don't get hot and tired, they don't make decisions influenced by 
their psycho-physiological status, but their operators do.  Several methodologies have 
been proposed for tracking behavior moderators and their effects on task and mission 
performance. See for example:(Gillis and Hursh 1999; Dubois 2000; Ritter 2000; 
Hudlicka 2002; Hudlicka 2002; Jones 2002) 
The “soft” factors can affect both cognitive and physical behaviors. Representing 
them requires moving beyond the physics of the battlefield to an understanding of 
human physiology and psychology. "Good" modeling of the individual must take into 
account the concept of humans as processors of information that accept inputs 




mission performance).  Pew and Mavor state the need for: “an integrative model that 
subsumes all or most of the contributors to human performance capacities and 
limitations” (Pew and Mavor 1998).  Much still needs to be done to achieve such a 
model.  
The chart shown in Figure 3-3 was prepared FY2000 while working as the chief 
scientist on the development of IWARS for the U.S. Army NRDEC (Middleton 2000). The 
chart is divided into the major soldier system capability areas, as then defined for the 
soldier as a system.  The key take-away from this chart is that the physical function of 
separate elements of the soldier system are fairly well represented in models and 
simulations, while the integrated function of multiple systems, especially with respect 
interactions featuring significant cognitive behaviors, are not. 
 
Figure 3-3 Year 2000 View of State of the Art for Individual Combatant Modeling 




evidenced by the proceedings of any of the recent simulation conferences62, all of which 
are replete with papers documenting work being done in current modeling and 
simulation efforts are striving to meet the challenge of adequately representing the 
actions, tactics, techniques, and procedures of Infantrymen and Infantry units at the 
individual, fire team, squad, platoon, and company levels.  In fact, in today’s 
environment some of the challenges are even greater. Irregular warfare and cultural 
geography are two of current hot button topics, both of which require broad 
interdisciplinary efforts, stretching from sociology and cognitive psychology to military 
affairs to geographical information systems (GIS).  Such an interdisciplinary approach is 
a natural fit with the modeling of small unit combat as complex adaptive systems. 
 The “soft factors” are at the core of most of these remaining challenges.  Human 
behavior is different in principle from many of the combat processes modeled in most of 
our simulation systems.  Ballistics and aerodynamics may be complicated, but they are 
also well-understood and based on physical laws. Human behavior may or may not be 
rooted in something more than purely physical processes, but human behavior is simply 
not lawful in the same way that physical events are lawful. Humans are indeed subject 
to certain regularities in both cognition and behavior that arise from the peculiarities of 
our construction, but it seems that they can choose to violate at least some of those 
regularities when it suits them.  To better represent human behavior in models and 
simulations, one must acknowledge that stochastic models, random draws, table look-
ups, simple probabilistic errors, and other techniques commonly used in military models 
and simulations need to be supplemented by new and different methods tailored to the 
special characteristics of distinctly human behavior. 
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3.3 Applying the Human-Centric Approach: Modeling Decision-Making and SA/SU 
At this point the literature review and background material turns from the generic 
view of the human centric approach to MS& A to a more specific aspect of that 
approach.  As described above, the human-centric approach to modeling and simulation 
embraces both philosophy and methodology.  The rest of this dissertation narrows the 
focus from these over-arching issues of “why” and “how” to deal with the still vast 
arena of decision-making and situation awareness.  Subsequent Chapters will further 
constrain the discussion to a concrete example of how SA and decision-making interact, 
complete with a computer model of that interaction. 
SA/SU is a practical next step in the admittedly difficult task of pursuing the goals of 
human-centric modeling.  SA/SU is one of the elements of the intermediate ground 
occupied by human factors that are neither as nebulous as “will to fight” nor as 
rigorously measurable as sensory capabilities and specific task performance 
(Mastroianni 1996; Mastroianni and Middleton 2001; van Son 2003; Middleton 2008). 
This middle ground includes many of the concepts that occupy space in the “red” sector 
of Figure 3-3.  
In order to express any of these concepts in terms concrete enough to be included in 
constructive simulation, one must first define them in terms of quantitative attributes, 
find ways to measure or estimate those quantities, and finally, relate those measures to 
individual and unit behaviors that affect operational outcomes.  This chapter discusses 
this process with respect to SA/SU, exploring SA/SU as a quantifiable aspect of an 
individual’s cognitive state and how that state may be related to success or failure on 
the battlefield. Representation of SA/SU potentially provides a blueprint for other 
aspects of human-centric modeling. Showing how aspects of SA/SU can be sufficiently 
defined in operational terms, and brought into the methodological framework of 
models and simulations captures an essential psychological dimension of human military 
performance. Furthermore, this human-centric “middle ground” is one of the most 




4 SITUATION AWARENESS: A KEY CONCEPT63 
Given the need to focus on the representation of SA/SU in simulation, one must first 
demonstrate that such representation can be done rigorously enough to support the 
analytic integrity of studies with such simulations.  Considering this contention begins by 
confronting the more basic question of exactly what is meant by “situation awareness”, 
including what, if anything, is the distinction between SA and SU, “situation 
understanding”? Definitions of SA abound, and the concept is itself is not without 
detractors.  There is still, for example, debate as to whether SA represents a state of 
knowledge, the processes required to develop that state, or both. 
According to what is probably the most widely accepted view of SA, that of Endsley, 
SA has three components: perception of elements in the environment, integration of 
these elements into a comprehensive situation assessment, and projection of that 
assessment into the future. (Endsley 1995a) She contends that SA is a characteristic of 
the operator that can be measured independently of the level of ongoing performance 
and argues that SA is a concept is distinct from performance. She points out that one 
can have poor SA and still perform well if demands are low; one can also have good SA 
and perform poorly if the task demands are simply too great. Others, such as 
Mastroianni, hold that SA is closely related to performance.  He points out that good 
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performance is generally linked with the notion of having good SA, and, for example, 
when an airplane makes a controlled descent into (instead of onto) the ground, it is 
accepted as prima facie evidence of bad SA (not to mention bad karma). Certainly 
requirements for improved SA are based on the assumption that better SA will lead to 
better performance.   (Mastroianni 1996) 
Representing SA and SU requires explicitly modeling the knowledge state of 
simulated individuals and the dynamic processes by which that knowledge is developed, 
maintained, updated and applied.  This representation must also focus on a critical and 
sometimes overlooked aspect of SA, the need to represent errors and inconsistencies in 
the individual’s knowledge base.  Gauging the incremental benefits of improved SA is 
difficult without comparison to a baseline that may contain “bad” SA.  Representation of 
inaccurate and incorrect data is essential for many aspects of information warfare.  We 
may, for example, want to estimate the effects on operational outcomes of using 
information technologies to ensure that the knowledge base of an enemy is 
contaminated with erroneous and misleading information.  It is equally critical to 
discover the effects of errata in our own knowledge base.  
4.1.1 Measuring SA 
A concept is of heuristic value in proportion to how well it can be measured. 
(Matthews, Pleban et al. 2000)  
The term “situation awareness” (SA) originated in the field of aviation human 
factors, but has been now adapted to the much different contexts, such as infantry 
operations.  Of all the warrior system capability areas, SA is the most hypothetical 
construct. SA is not a “thing” that can be easily measured, like speed, numbers of 
casualties or even temperature, which while it can’t be “seen”, still admits to sensible (if 
arbitrary) ways to measure and express it. Temperature also responds in a reliable and 
predictable way to specific manipulations. SA is more akin to a construct like 
intelligence, which is defined mainly by the instrument used to measure it. There is still 




generalized intelligence. Most people think that what we refer to as intelligence is really 
a complex constellation of traits, abilities, experiences, and knowledge. What one thinks 
about intelligence depends a lot on what one chooses to include in the definition and 
how one decides to measure it. 
The concept of SA has much in common with such a view of intelligence; both are 
probably complex constructs embodying a range of traits and abilities. There is, 
however, much less agreement about how to measure SA, or even how to define it.  
There is no dearth of opinions; a multitude of surveys and SA collections have explored 
the diversity of viewpoints and the considerable body of research performed over the 
last 20 years.  For example: 
 Vidulich, Vogel, Dominguez and McMillan (1994) provide a number of papers 
and annotated bibliography of SA;  
 Graham and Matthews (1998) present the collected papers from the 1998 
Infantry Situation Awareness Workshop held at Fort Benning, Georgia;  
 Endsley et.al (2000) documents the methods and findings of the Infantry 
Situation Awareness (SA) project for the U.S. Army Research Institute for the 
Behavioral and Social Sciences, conducted to develop a model and measures of 
SA for the unique aspects of the Infantry operational environment;   
 Breton and Rousseau (2001) report the results of a literature survey of SA 
made in the context of the Soldier Information Requirements Technology 
Demonstrator (SIREQ-TD) Project for Defence Reseach and Development 
Canada; 
 Banbury and Tremblay (2004) bring together 41 contributors studying and 
applying SA from a cognitive perspective;   
 Breton, Tremblay and Banbury (2007) provide a critical evaluation of the 
psychometric properties of the available individual and team situation 
awareness (SA) measurement tools and techniques and to evaluate the 
applicability of the SA measurement tools found in the literature to C2 
environments. 




From the analysis made on the SA measurement tools, it is interesting to note 
that most of them are used to compare a given SA content (actual SA) with a 
reference point (achievable SA). The measurement focuses on the identification 
of the actual SA content and the missing part of the SA content required to reach 
the achievable content.  The identification of the missing part may have an 
important influence on the development of new support systems and training 
programs.    
They note that Klein64 presents four reasons why SA is important: 
     - SA appears to be linked to performance 
     - Limitation in SA may result in errors  
     - SA may be related to expertise 
     - SA is the basis for decision-making (with respect to Recognition Primed 
Decision-making) 
and go on to state: 
In all cases, the focus is on the extra benefits a hyperproficient agent can get by 
taking advantage of the situation.  As stated before, the SA concept and its 
measurement were initially developed in the context of explaining operator or 
pilot mistakes that were hard to understand otherwise. A relative consensus 
emerged about SA being a helpful concept, namely to explain errors in complex 
and dynamic environments.  It is only recently, on the impulsion of the U.S. 
Army, that research on SA is seen as a major contributor to a strategic 
advantage on the battlefield.  For the infantry, the focus on SA is not so much on 
error reduction but on obtaining the strategic advantage in the field. 
If SA is to be used as a criterion of an individual’s capability, it must be measurable 
SA, or at least one must be able to convincingly argue that changes or additions to the 
Warrior Systems have the desired effect on SA.  However, as Scott Graham of the U.S. 
Army Research Institute notes, actually demonstrating enhanced SA in systems is not 
easy, “in part because of difficulties in operationally defining and measuring SA… in even 
establishing the level of baseline SA for system comparisons.”(Graham, Matthews et al. 1998) 
If one takes the aforementioned “focus on the extra benefits a hyperproficient agent 
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can get”, then SA effects should be measurable in simulation experiments that compare 
such agents to less proficient agents.  Fortunately, a simulation designer can develop 
agents at virtually any level of proficiency, given, of course, a framework and model 
constructs for representing that proficiency. 
4.1.2 Definitions 
 Such a framework begins with an accepted idea of what SA is, and definition of its 
constituent elements. A representative sample of SA definitions from the above, and 
other sources, includes: 
 Adam (1993) “knowing what is going on so I can figure out what to do”.65 
 Endsley (1995a) “...the perception of the elements in the environment within a 
volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the 
projection of their status in the near future”. 
 Adams, Tenney and Pew (1995) “...the up-to-the-minute cognizance required 
to operate or maintain a system”.   
 Flach (1995) “...the congruence between the subjective interpretation of an 
event and objective measures of the actual event”.   
 Smith and Hancock (1995) “adaptive, externally directed consciousness”. 
 US Army TRADOC (1998) “ability to have accurate and real-time information on 
friendly, enemy, neutral, and noncombatant locations; a common, relevant 
picture of the battlefield scaled to specific level of interest and special need”. 
 Klein (2000) “perception of reactions to a set of changing events.” 
 Blackwell and Redden (2000) “the warrior's ability to quickly perceive and then 
discriminate between facets of the tactical environment, to accurately assess 
and reassess the where, when and why of that environment, to then know and 
understand the nature of the tactical situation and to extrapolate near term 
courses of action based on this understanding”. 
                                                     
 




The four best known theories relating to SA/SU are Endsley’s three elements 
(perception, understanding and projection) of SA, (Endsley 1995); John Boyd’s Observe, 
Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) loop (Boyd, 1986, 1987); the Joint Director’s of the Labs 
(JDL) Data Fusion Model (Llinas et.al. 2004), and the  Dynamic Model of Situated 
Cognition (Miller and Shattuck, 2004, 2006). All of these support a view as an iterative 
process of data input, data assessment, decision-making and action.  This view serves as 
a basis for simulation of SA/SU in agent-based modeling.   
Many current SA initiatives employ Endsley’s three elements of SA: data acquisition, 
comprehension of what those data might mean, and projection/prediction of future 
states and consequences.  These three elements, shown in Figure 4-1, are the most 
widely accepted definition of SA, featured prominently role in such network centric 
warfare applications as collection of intelligence data, analysis of information from 
sensors, and the use of network operations for analysis and operational decision aid 
functions. Figure 3.1.2-1 also shows several of the factors that Endsley holds influence 
SA, both in terms of the variation in individual “abilities to acquire SA given the same 
input, and in terms of the degree to which a given system provides the needed 
information and the form in which it provides it”.  
Endsley’s definition can be compared to John Boyd’s concept of the Observe, Orient, 
Decide, and Act (OODA) loop66 as in Figure 4-2; and the Joint Director’s of the Labs (JDL) 
Data Fusion Model as shown in Figure 4-3.   
In all of these figures the role of the processes involved in “assessment”,” 
“orientation” or “understanding” is highlighted, to emphasize the fact that these 
processes are those most in need of development from an ABM point of view. 
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The importance of these processes is reflected by the fact that it is now frequent US 
Army practice to distinguish between situation “awareness” - immediate knowledge of 
the conditions of the operation, constrained geographically and in time, and situation 
“understanding” - the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information 
to determine the relationships among the mission variables to facilitate decision 
making.69.    While this distinction is probably valid, as stated earlier it is more 
convenient to blur the boundaries between SA and SU into Adam’s more practical 
“knowing what is going on so I can figure out what to do”(Adam 1993) . 
 
Figure 4-3 The JDL Data Fusion Model70  
                                                     
 
69 US Army Field Manual 3.0 Operations, February 2008 




The Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition (DMSC), shown in Figure 4-4, was 
developed by Miller and Shattuck as an attempt to represent relationships between 
technology and humans in a system. This model represents the perception of ground 
truth as a function of sensor systems, the capture of those data by command and 
control systems, and the (possibly imperfect or erroneous) processing of these data into 
Endsley’s three levels of SA. 
 
Figure 4-4                   ’   y  m         f                    71 
As described by (Ntuen 2006) DMSC is a model 
  in which data flow from the environment, through sensors and other machine 
agents to the human agents in the system. This approach overcomes the biases 
which are inherent in analytical methods focusing almost exclusively either on 
machine agents or on human agents. The DMSC posits that there are various 
stages of technological and cognitive system performance (as shown in 3.1.2-4). 
On the technological side, all the data in the environment, data detected by 
technological systems (e.g., sensors), and data available on local command and 
control systems (C2; e.g., workstations) are included. Each of these stages 
includes a subset of what was included in the preceding stage. Building upon this 
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technology are the perceptual and cognitive systems offered by the human 
operator.   
Shattuck and Miller themselves describe the other half of the model as; 
Ovals 4, 5 and 6 on the right side of the model represent the perception of data 
elements, the comprehension of the current situation (sometimes called a 
mental model) and the individual’s projection of current events into the future.  
These three ovals correspond to situational awareness Levels 1, 2, and 3 in the 
scientific literature (Endsley, 2000).  When the model was first introduced as a 
tool to assist in understanding laboratory simulations of military scenarios, the 
three lenses (A, B, and C) consisted of only four things: the local situation, the 
military operational order (OPORD), military doctrine, and the experience of the 
operator.   
 There was an acknowledgement that distortions in the lens could result in 
inaccurate perceptions (Oval 4), comprehensions, (Oval 5), or projections (Oval 
6).   It was recognized that once inaccurate data were accepted into any stage of 
the model, this inaccuracy would be propagated throughout the remaining 
ovals, leading to inaccurate conclusions and potentially faulty decisions.  (Miller 
and Shattuck 2006) 
Shattuck’s and Miller’s model is the most appropriate for the purposes of this 
research, although one can certainly see the commonality in Figure 4-1, Figure 4-2, 
Figure 4-3, and Figure 4-4 as reflecting a common view of simulation 
awareness/situational understanding (SA/SU).  I believe Adam’s definition of SA is 
applicable to all four of these models, and this common view of an iterative process of 
data input, data assessment, decision-making and action.  This view serves as the basis 
for simulation of SA/SU in agent-based modeling.  The difficulty for simulation 
programmers is, of course, in the definition of software constructs that describe how 
entities go about “knowing what’s going on” and “figuring out what to do”.  Endsley and 
Boyd, provide a formal theoretical basis to support the model/simulation developer, but 
they don’t really provide much more in the way of practical guidance in how to design 
and build software modules to implement the theory.  The JDL model takes a more 
engineering oriented approach, but is too narrow in focus, reflecting its origins in a 
specific application, which was data fusion and filtering in the processing of incoming 
target tracks.   




C4ISR, information processing and SA/SU.  The Human Factors and Medicine Panel of 
NATO’s Research and Technology Organisation (NATO/RTO/HFM 2009) sought to 
“demonstrate how HF (human factors) models could interface with operational models 
by enumerating the basic, existing models and how they fit into a generic framework.” 
The NATO panel addressed a version of the stage model for information processing as 
shown in Figure 4-5: 
SA capitalizes on the working and long term memories since it uses declarative 
knowledge (reference models stored in long term memory). It also exploits 
reasoning and sense making to understand information in the context of the 
reference model, and perceptual attention is focused to search for confirming 
information. Finally, reasoning is used to infer consequences of possible events, 
evaluating the expected outcome. In the decision making cycles, the metric for 
optimization is established by reasoning and by exploiting episodic memory. 
Obtaining SA thus is using the full range of cognitive functions and can be 
considered a higher order process, while cognitive research attempts to 
attribute steps in this process to distinct mental functions, as depicted in” 
Figure3.3.6-5. (NATO/RTO/HFM 2009) 
Again, as discussed above, for modeling and simulation this discussion comes down 
to the fact that a model requires quantifiable inputs, MOPs, quantifiable outputs, MOEs 
and some sort of functional mapping between the two.  
Much soldier modernization equipment proposed or considered has as either a 
primary or ancillary purpose enhancement of soldier SA. Devices such as head-up 
displays, integrated communication and navigation systems, and sensor suites are often 





Figure 4-5 Modified Stage Model for Human Information Processing (NATO/RTO/HFM 
2009) 
Again, this model bears a strong resemblance those in the four previous figures, and, 
in fact the NATO HFM panel goes on to say: 
Defining SA for military applications as the static spatial awareness of friendly 
and enemy troop positions is too simplistic and ignores many important 
militarily relevant details. …  Activities with high levels of complexity and detail 
such as mission rehearsal, staff and procedural training, SOP and doctrine 
development will require more comprehensive models that capture and use SA 
in a more human-like manner. In other cases where the cognitive processes are 
not central to the problem being addressed, more mechanistic, AI approaches 
may suffice. Prediction of operational outcomes and mission rehearsal will also 
depend on the level of representation resolution, with perception and decision 
making becoming increasingly important as the simulation focuses on 
individuals or small groups. Credible SA will require adequate models of 
perception to explain and predict the effects of the cognitive processes involved 
in each of Endsley’s three stages …. This is different from but overlaps current AI 
approaches to CGF that tend to rely on a complete knowledge of the 
environment and precise extrapolation of events. For example, it has been 
observed in practice that during times of stress and uncertainty, there is 
frequently a failure to consider an adequate number of facts to ensure accurate 
SA, including failure to verify assumptions in making decisions, failure to weight 
information on its quality, failure to interpret information (Level 2) and failure to 
make predictions (Level 3: Fallesen, 199372).  
Perceptual and attention models should reflect human capabilities, limiting HBR 
to information a human operator would have access to rather than providing 
complete knowledge of the environment or allowing precise extrapolation of 
events. Such models may result in missed or misperceived environmental cues, 
with a consequent error in judgment based on correct reasoning with faulty 
data. To make the resulting performance plausible, purely stochastic approaches 
are unlikely to be an adequate representation of such processes for most 
applications, underlying the need for models from the human sciences in the 
relevant domains.  
Beliefs in the state of the world that evolve from the SA process could depend on 
some form of reasoning either about what will happen next or how current 
events evolved. Alternatively, pre-programmed or instance-based memory 
models may come into play to predict future events as representations of expert 
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knowledge or experiential learning in decision making. Planning models and 
exploration (mental simulation) to select appropriate responses should reflect 
human biases as well as capabilities rather than exhaustively searching the 
problem space for an optimal solution  (NATO/RTO/HFM 2009) 
A robust framework for SA/SU will have to support the above mentioned 
techniques, as well as such other decision-making models as neural networks, fuzzy 
cognitive maps, Naturalistic Decision-Making and Recognition Primed Decision-Making.  
Such a framework would also have to incorporate or (or at least accommodate) models 
of perception, search and target acquisition, battle damage assessment, self-awareness 
(psycho-physiological state, available resources, mission goals and tasks) and the like. All 
of these models consist of both processes and state variables, some of which (most of 
which?) are extremely context (i.e., situation) dependent.  While there is considerable 
dissension within the SA community as to whether SA is itself a process/ set of 
processes or a state/set of states, representation of SA/SU and how it affects operations 
will certainly require both.  The argument as process or state comes into play, however, 
in the selection of appropriate MOPs and MOEs. 
One of the major difficulties in working with SA is to avoid confusion between SA 
knowledge and the underlying cognitive processes such as perception, memory, 
attention, categorization, or decision-making.  The difficulty is particularly acute 
when SA has to be measured.  In agreement with Adams, Tenney, & Pew (1995), 
Endsley limited the term "situation awareness to the achieved knowledge (state) 
about a situation.  She proposed the expression "situation assessment" to 
designate the cognitive processes that produce the knowledge (state). 
.... 
In the context of the development of a SA definition, one is then left with a 
double problem.  On the one hand, if SA is a state, it is essential to give a precise 
definition of the knowledge that defines the state.  There should be a certain 
mapping between a situation schema and a knowledge one.  If one is to improve 
SA, the elements of the situation critical for SA should be specified, and the SA 
content definition should follow from these elements.  On the other hand, if SA 
depends on a set of processes that are not an intrinsic part of SA as a state but 
on which SA depends, it becomes important to specify which processes are 
essential to SA. (Breton and Rousseau 2001) 
4.1.3 The Dynamic Knowledge State 




distinguish between an individual’s perceived world view and ground truth as the key to 
augmenting extant representations of SA/SU and decision making. Such representation 
requires design, development, and implementation of three inter-related elements: 
 knowledge structures to characterize each entity’s ego-centric knowledge of 
the operational environment; 
 algorithms and heuristics to populate, maintain, and update those structures; 
and 
 inference schemes creating information from perceptual data and knowledge 
histories and the employment of  this information to make and execute 
operational decisions. 
(Davis, Shrobe et al. 1993) describe knowledge representation as among other 
things: “ a set of ontological commitments, that is, an answer to the question, In what 
terms should I think about the world?” as well as  “ a fragmentary theory of intelligent 
reasoning expressed in terms of three components: (1) the representation’s fundamental 
conception of intelligent reasoning, (2) the set of inferences that the representation 
sanctions, and (3) the set of inferences that it recommends”, and “a medium for 
pragmatically efficient computation… supplied by the guidance that a representation 
provides for organizing information to facilitate making the recommended inferences”.  
The agent-based modeling community as yet lacks an effective ontology for agent 
HBR, and such an ontology is a basic requirement for any integrative view of cognitive 
architectures. 
4.1.4 Knowledge State 
 Maintaining SA/SU in simulations of military operations implies that such 
awareness will result in better informed (and therefore one hopes more positive) 
actions to shape the battle space in order to achieve particular goals. An individual’s 
knowledge state is thus crucial as both a repository for information gleaned from the 
environment, and as the constantly changing raw material from which tactically 




actions taken by the soldier, it affects simulation events, thereby potentially modifying 
the incoming stream of stimuli in subsequent play.  Rules, heuristics, fuzzy modeling 
techniques or other approaches can be used to integrate the contents of the knowledge 
state, and to drive the behavior of the soldier, supported by decision feed back and 
affecting sensory and perceptual processes (by altering scan patterns) and cognitive 
processes (by altering attentional allocation)73.  
For a constructive simulation to represent an individual’s knowledge state (or at 
least the most significant aspects thereof) is ambitious but within reach based on 
existing knowledge about human information processing and available simulation 
technology. The knowledge state is envisioned as a dynamic register in which relevant 
information is maintained and processed by the individual combatant. Sensory events 
are posted to the knowledge state based on the physical characteristics of the sensory 
stimuli, the soldier state, and prevailing environmental conditions. Based on the 
relevance of the stimuli in the scenario, attention and cognitive processing resources 
may be allocated to the newly acquired sensory data to maintain it in the register, or the 
stimulus may simply pass through our senses and not be retained, as most are not. Pew 
and Mavor suggest that to “Include explicitly in human behavior representation a 
perceptual “front end” serving as the interface between the outside world and the 
internal processing of the human behavior representation” is an important short-term 
goal (Pew and Mavor 1998). 
 A wide range of artificial intelligence techniques are available to represent 
extracting relevant knowledge from the events that do flow into the knowledge state, 
thereby enabling the projection of that state into the future, by triggering actions or by 
adding new elements to the knowledge state. Pew and Mavor list many technologies, 
including rule-based expert systems, case-based reasoning, and Bayesian belief 
                                                     
 




networks, which could be employed to support such information processing (Pew and 
Mavor 1998). 
 It is important to note that it is not necessary to develop a general model of 
human cognition to support the representation of situational awareness at a level 
compatible with the analysis of most operational questions. Situation awareness 
requires information processing, but is a far more limited construct than the generalized 
human reasoning systems commonly discussed in the field of artificial intelligence. 
According to Pew and Mavor, “The Panel74 cannot overemphasize how critical it is to 
develop situation-specific models…The situations and tasks faced by humans in military 
domains are highly complex and very specific. Any effective model of human cognition 
and behavior must be tailored to the demands of the particular case.”  (Pew and Mavor 
1998)  
Focusing specifically on representing situation awareness in relevant operational 
contexts will help make these problems tractable. 
 Developing a workable representation of SA/SU in simulations designed to address 
dismounted operations is an important step in improving analytic capabilities in this 
domain. As Pew and Mavor suggest, “Once high priority modeling requirements have 
been established, we recommend sustained support in focused areas for human 
behavior model development.”  (Pew and Mavor 1998, p. 336). The concept of 
situational awareness clearly captures something that many people think is essential 
about warfare; incorporating it into simulations can be the first step toward a new 
generation of human-centric modeling and simulation tools. 
Representing SA/SU and an individual’s dynamic knowledge state in a simulation 
system will require a clearly articulated conceptual model of SA/SU, supporting data, 
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and a strategy for computational representation within the simulation. At least some of 
the information of which SA/Su is composed is already present in many simulation 
systems, or may be easily inserted in them. Representation of the complex 
interrelationships among modulating factors and sensory and perceptual filters, which 
will help determine what information is available in the knowledge state, will require an 
ambitious synthesis of existing representation strategies and scientific knowledge. 
Connecting the knowledge state to the actions of the simulated entity in a way that 
captures the intelligent and autonomous features of human behavior that are missing 
from current approaches presents the most significant challenge. Finally, new metrics, 
especially for information acquisition and information processing, must be identified 
and implemented. 
Building a system that could produce and track the expected knowledge state of an 
individual combatant in a dismounted combat scenario in a manner consistent with 
what is known about human sensory capabilities, information processing and the 
performance of soldiers under operational conditions is no small task. No such system 
yet exists, nor is it clear that such an all-encompassing system is even necessary to 
support analysis of military operations.  It is clear, however, that representation of 
information processing and decision-making is of ever increasing importance to 
operational analysis. 
The simulation developed for this dissertation provides an architecture that 
supports modular inclusion of specific aspects of human information processing and the 
application of that information to decision-making and behavioral response to the 
operational environment.   This architecture does not represents a unique, or even 
particularly novel capability with respect to these aspects of human behavior 
representation, but the modules implemented and the treatment of error and 
uncertainty they incorporate do provide a novel and important addition to the current 
state of the art with respect to representation of human behavior in simulation.  




in many current simulations.  The key to such augmentation is the incorporation of 
model features that further distinguish between an individual’s perceived worldview 
and ground truth. Incorporating these features requires the design, development, and 
implementation of three inter-related elements: 
1. data structures to characterize each entity’s perceived knowledge of the 
operational environment; 
2. algorithms and heuristics to populate, maintain, and update those data 
structures; and 
3. inference schemes employing these data to represent operational 
decisions. 
This modular architecture is consistent with Boyd’s OODA loop (Boyd 1986) as 
shown in Figure 4-6.  
 
Figure 4-6 Modular OODA Loop Approach (Middleton 2010a) 
In this approach, the three elements listed above are encapsulated in modules that 
constitute the “Orient” and “Decide” components of the OODA Loop, the blue boxes of 
the figure. 




extant simulation processes. The sense/perception processes native to host simulation 
entities allow those entities to “observe” their virtual world as before, providing data on 
the simulation environment and the objects in it. The new “orient” modules interpret 
those data though (potentially imperfect) filters to populate and update world view data 
structures unique to each entity.  As an example, an entity may observe another entity 
that it previously would have identified according to its force association and any threat 
value.  New “orient” filters could “translate” entity sightings into levels of evidence for 
associating that entity with a given force or threat intent.  Similarly such filters could add 
imprecision and/or error to the sighting entity’s perception of the sighted entity’s 
location.  Inference routines could evaluate evidence from multiple sources, resulting in 
attributes of the sighted entity described as degrees of membership in fuzzy sets as 
opposed to the generally crisp (e.g., friend or foe, within range, at objective) options 
currently available.   
The “oriented data” is now information that is used by the decision logics of the 
“Decide” module to choose and direct those entity behaviors deemed most likely to 
achieve entity/group goals. The host simulation “Act” capabilities carry out these 
behaviors and determine effects on other entities and the environment. 
 I believe that a simulation system that includes situation awareness (and situation 
understanding) is applicable to a much wider range of mission environments than a 
system that relies more narrowly on measures associated with the lethality of weapons 
systems. Situation awareness could be a useful measure in a conventional dismounted 
combat scenario as a way to provide so-called “one-sided metrics”. These are metrics of 
performance that are of interest even if no contact is made with the enemy, and are 
especially relevant to peace support operations. The availability of such metrics could 
help establish analytic isomorphism with training environments, where one-sided 
metrics are routinely applied, and enable valuable cross-fertilization between the 
training and simulation worlds. SA/SU thus offers an opportunity to link the worlds of 





Collective synergy is particularly important in the world of SA/SU, where information 
fusion and synthesis are key ingredients for comprehension.  SA/SU affects the factors 
that incorporate any cognitively related use of military systems or system components, 
from identification of friend or foe to complex course of action decision-making.  Our 
MOPs and MOEs challenge is figure out how to “keep score” with respect to SA; how to 
quantify  SA in terms of dynamic, measurable attributes of individuals and organizations 
(the things MOPs measure) and to determine its role in behavioral, and ultimately, 
operational outcomes (the things MOEs measure.) 
Representation of the knowledge state can also add sophistication to the tactical 
play and decision-making of simulated entities. Rules, heuristics, fuzzy modeling 
techniques or other approaches can be used to integrate the contents of the knowledge 
state into the behavior of the soldier. As the knowledge state affects the decisions and 
actions taken by the soldier, it affects simulation events, thereby potentially modifying 
the incoming stream of stimuli in subsequent play. The decisions taken may feed back 
and affect sensory and perceptual processes (altering scan patterns) and cognitive 




5  COGNITIVE ARCHITECTURES AND THE FUNCTION OF MIND  
My own views on representation of cognition are heavily influenced by (Franklin 
1995).   He addresses cognitive architectures (among a number of other things) from the 
perspective of exploring what is meant by the concept of “mind”.  He looks at four 
broad approaches to the study of mind: psychology, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, 
and mechanisms of the mind.  This last is his term for “artificial systems that exhibit 
some properties of the mind by virtue of internal mechanisms”, and which he considers 
replacing with the term robotics. He takes a number of positions on the concept of 
mind: 
 Mind is better viewed as a continuous as opposed to a Boolean notion. Since 
Franklin views the principle function of mind as “deciding what to do next”, a 
continuous view of the decision process cannot be limited to the concept of 
totally irreversible one-time choices, but must also incorporate feedback loops 
to regulate behavior.  
 Mind is aggregate rather than monolithic. Cognition includes processes for 
communication between long-term memory and short-term memory, between 
different senses/perceptual processes, and between the different constraints 
of multiple behaviors taking place in parallel.   
 Mind is enabled by a multitude of disparate mechanisms. The research in this 
dissertation is in concert with Franklin’s lack of support for unified theories of 
cognition, a one-size-fits-all cognitive architecture is not a good idea. (Sowa 
2000) refers to the sum of knowledge in people’s heads as “fluid, 
heterogeneous, ever changing, … better characterized as knowledge soup”. 




rules and facts in AI systems; it may also contain large chunks that correspond 
to entire theories.  The theories should be internally consistent, but they may be 
inconsistent with one another”. 
 The overriding task of mind is to produce the next action.  Here Franklin 
cautions not to read too much into the terms “task” and “next”.  “Next” is not 
restricted to single, discrete kinds of action, and task simply means “Producing 
actions is just what minds do.  A consequence is that minds are properties of 
autonomous agents.”   
Cognitive architectures provide the framework or structure for implementing the 
“mind” of an autonomous agent. Desr4  Such a framework must then be “integrated” 
with other aspects of an agent-based model or simulation, an idea discussed at length in 
Pew & Mavor.  Such integration requires a common set of assumptions and consistency 
of scale.  Byrne speaks of the integrative nature of cognitive architectures as meaning 
“they include attention, memory, problem solving, decision making, learning, and so on. 
.... Instead of asking “how can we describe this isolated phenomenon?” people working 
with cognitive architectures can ask “how does this phenomenon fit in with what we 
already know about other aspects of cognition?”(Byrne 2003).  Such thinking is also 
evident in Ritter’s discussion of hybrid architectures, cognitive architectures with more 
than one type of knowledge representation:   
These architectures can be created in three ways.  One way is by adding symbols 
to a connectionist representation.  …  Another way is by adding sub-symbolic 
representations to a symbolic architecture, for example, declarative memory 
strength in ACT-R and reinforcement learning in Soar 9.  Here, the weighting you 
give to the rules and declarative memory elements is essentially a way to create 
a symbolic architecture that has changes that are small and gradual.   Most 
hybrid architectures are realized in these two ways, but there are also examples 
where one of the levels is a genetic algorithm, fuzzy logic, or other 
representation.  Hybrid in this case does not mean symbolic and sub-symbolic, 
but typically symbolic and some higher level or orthogonal representations or 
process is used to supplant the strengths of the base architecture. (Ritter 2008)  
While a popular trend in cognitive architectures has been on symbolic methods (e.g., 
Soar and ACT-R, for this dissertation there is more utility in techniques such as 




networks.   These latter techniques can more easily and more fully capture the 
continuous feed back loops that characterize much of human behavior.  In particular, 
they appear more amenable to representation of the OODA loop and the desire to 
defeat an adversary’s OODA loop. 
The capabilities of cognitive architectures that are most important for addressing 
this research, i.e., those of most immediate concern to developing/enhancing 
autonomous agent simulation of military operations, are defined below.  
5.1.1 Decision making and choice 
 Decision-making is frequently looked at as a discrete event, with alternatives 
considered, a choice made, and that choice acted on.  In the world of discrete event 
simulation this view is certainly justified at some level, even continuous processes are 
broken into atomic chunks of activity, and the scheduling of the next event represents a 
decision of some sort.  It is useful, however,  to consider decisions as falling into three 
broad, albeit overlapping, categories: 
 prescriptive plans, e.g.,  course of action selection, scheduling and 
coordination of entity/unit tasks; 
  reaction to unanticipated events, e.g., detour around obstacle/threat, engage 
an adversary, call for fire; and  
 modification of current behavior parameters, e.g.,  how fast to move, in what 
direction, choose which targets to engage when, adjust aim points and rates of 
fire.  
Of these, the first is best related to capabilities for problem solving and planning, 
which, as far as this dissertation is concerned, is a “bridge too far” with respect to the 
current state of AI for simulation. At present planning is best dealt with at the set-up 
stage of simulation scenarios, where an analyst outlines mission goals, as well as 
commander’s intent and rules of engagement (ROE), which act primarily as constraints 
on agent behaviors as those agents try to achieve their goals while reacting to the 




Langley et. al. states that “to support decision making, a cognitive architecture must 
find some way to represent alternative choices or actions… and some process for 
selecting among those alternatives”. (Langley, Laird et al. 2009) Again, as can be seen 
with respect to NDM, this statement is not precisely true. NDM decision-making can be 
seen as pattern or prototype recognition, with some possibility for adjusting prototype 
features or parameters.  One could refer to these patterns or prototypes as decision 
alternatives, but NDM expressly eschews the analytic assessment of alternative courses 
of action that I see as the core of Langley et.al.  Furthermore, there is little or no 
consideration of making “bad” decisions in Langley, or consideration of the 
imperfections in both SA/SU and/or that may be due to time pressure and/or stress.  
(Zimm 1999) describes a number of problems observed in decision-makers under stress, 
including: 
  changing from deliberative to reactionary modes; 
  relying on a fraction of available information, with a bias towards that which is 
familiar and corresponds to earlier perceptions over that which is relevant 
and/or unexpected; 
 making more mistakes but being less likely to acknowledge them; and  
 increasing micro-management of subordinates. 
Representing these tendencies towards “imperfect” decision-making and even 
irrational decision making (panic) is critical to providing a robust simulation test bed for 
SA/SU technologies.    
5.1.2 Perception and situation assessment;  
Stimuli from the environment impinge on the simulated soldier. In reality, 
individuals are constantly bombarded with stimuli affecting all five traditional senses. In 
the simulation, the only stimuli that need be considered are those that are generated 
within the simulation and tracked by entities as behavioral and decision-making cues.  
These stimuli include visual and acoustic weapons signatures, various kinds of 




 The extent to which stimuli need to be represented is a function of the degree to 
which the operations of various types of sensors and signal processing need to be 
explicitly considered, and such consideration is in turn a function of the types and 
degrees of information processing that are to be considered by the simulation.   Stimuli 
that are present in the environment may or may not be relevant to individual agents 
depending on many factors, including the intensity of the stimulus, the contrast 
between the stimulus and the background, the attentional state of the agent, and many 
others. Measures of effectiveness or metrics associated with sensory and perceptual 
processes will include time and accuracy of detection and acquisition. Sensory and 
perceptual processes may be modulated by such factors as scene clutter, suppression, 
fatigue state, and simultaneous task demands. Stimuli that pass this stage are those that 
are “noticed” and subjected to further processing. 
 Once stimuli have been sensed, they are subjected to further processing. If the 
stimulus is a message with semantic content, it must be comprehended. The delay and 
accuracy of processing such messages is a metric associated with this stage of 
information processing. If attention is required for another task ongoing simultaneously, 
processing may take longer. Other modulators might include such factors as sleep 
deprivation, fatigue, or other environmental factors.  
Any architecture that supports sensor-related perception “must confront issues of 
attention …  and deal with the issues that sensors are often noisy and provide at most 
an inaccurate and partial picture of the agent’s surroundings”. (Langley, Laird et al. 
2009) Imperfect perception and inferences from a history of such perception will 
provide each agent with an individual ego-centric view of the environment, which will 
serve as the basis for that agent’s conscious selection of behaviors.  Since that ego-
centric view differs from both ground truth and the views of other agents, each 
individual agent will make mistakes, and potentially different mistakes from those of 
other agents.   




adversary interactions at he small unit level.  These simulations, however, look at 
perception primarily in terms of the effectiveness of either biological or mechanical 
sensors75.  The contributions of the human operator have not been considered to any 
great extent, target detection and other perception functions are treated as basically 
sensor-driven processes, with human operator effects represented only implicitly 
through empirically derived sensor performance distributions or explicitly through 
human-in-the-loop interaction with a sensor.  Now, however, the need arises to also 
simulate the human as the perceiving entity, to represent explicit operator/sensor 
interaction for autonomous agents using their cognitive capabilities monitor and control 
sensor operation, and in particular the role of perceiver’s dynamic situation awareness 
in facilitating the scan and focus processes.   
In this view the individual functions as an information-processing and decision-
making entity, communicating and coordinating with others, and continually evaluating 
the battlefield dynamic to decide when, where, and how to sense, move, shoot, and 
communicate. Human operators direct and focus sensor functions in response to 
previously known targets, intelligence data, present and past cues, observed or 
projected enemy behaviors, with all of these data fused into “situation awareness”.  The 
individual must correlate signature data with information from other sources, interpret 
all these data in the context of a continually varying experiential frame of reference, and 
fuse them with data inferred from secondary observations and/or projected from past 
sightings rather than overtly perceived from direct continuous surveillance. 
The diverse elements of the individual’s situation awareness impact sensor 
operation by suggesting where and how to “look”, and are often a key as to what is 
actually “seen”.  Thus the history of past observations and projection of anticipated 
events play key roles in both the perception process itself and in the interpretation of 
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Pythagoras, the Map Aware Non-uniform Automata (MANA), COMBAT XXI or references such as (O’Kane 2004; Schumacher 2005; 




what is perceived. The ability to even discern or distinguish perceptual cues is biased by 
past history and current expectations.   
5.1.3 Execution and Action;  
As mentioned above, an integrated cognitive architecture must share common 
assumptions with the behaviors or actions of the autonomous agents it supports. It 
must also share data about the problem space with these behaviors, if only to direct 
which actions to undertake and how to perform them.  Such data structures include 
course of action options and selection as well as behavior parameters, which include 
targets and target priority lists, types and rates of fire, shoot/no shoot decision 
thresholds for engagement; routes and waypoints or direction vectors for movement, 
speed and movement formations.  
5.1.4 Interaction and Communication.    
Effective autonomous agents are often described as needing to be both insightful - 
capable of inferring the intentions of others, determining the desires and plans of other 
agents, and social - able to share goals, cooperate with or coerce other agents.  These 
capabilities could well be subsumed under the immediate proceeding set, as simply 
special type of execution and action.  They also require specialized common data 
structures, such as situation reports (SitReps) to other units, especially command units, 
directives to subordinates, unit coordination communication with verbal, written, visual, 
or tactile, and requests such as call for fire or other support. 
5.2 Military Decision-making 
Commanders continuously combine analytic and intuitive approaches to 
decision-making to exercise battle command. Analytic decision-making 
approaches a problem systematically. The analytic approach aims to produce 
the optimal solution to a problem from among the solutions identified. The 
Army’s analytic approach is the military decision-making process (MDMP). In 
contrast, intuitive decision-making is the act of reaching a conclusion that 
emphasizes pattern recognition based on knowledge, judgment, experience, 
education, intelligence, boldness, perception, and character. This approach 
focuses on assessment of the situation vice comparison of multiple options. It 




recognize the key elements and implications of a particular problem or situation, 
reject the impractical, and select an adequate solution.(TRADOC 2008)  
The TRADOC Field Manual (FM) reflects two basic kinds of decision-making in 
command and control. The first is characterized by the deliberative approach of the 
MDMP, as shown in Figure 5-1. It provides rational, deliberate, time-consuming 
sequential kinds of optimization in which multiple clearly different course of action 
(COA) alternatives are posited, assessed, and the “best” one chosen.  In addition to the 
MDMP, examples of the more deliberative optimizing techniques include Multi-Criteria 
Decision tools, Multi-Attribute Utility Theory and Value-Focused Decision-Making 76.  
Such tools may use influence diagrams, decision trees, and hierarchies of objective to 
capture all of the pertinent factors involved in a decision 
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Figure 5-1 The Military Decision-Making Process (from FM 44-100) 
The alternative is decision-making characterized by rapid, dynamic adjustment of 
behavior following known patterns. It is more reactive than deliberate, emphasizing the 
first usable alternative rather than trying to pick the best one.  It must work with 
uncertain, often rapidly changing data, and supports continual matching of expectations 
against developing outcomes followed by adjustments based on the quality of that 
match.  It is satisficing77 rather than optimizing.   
                                                     
 
77 A term used in economic theory to describe how people make rational choices between options open to them and within 
prevailing constraints. In 1957 Herbert A. Simon argued that decision-makers can rarely obtain and evaluate all the information 
which could be relevant to the making of a decision. Instead, they work with limited and simplified knowledge, to reach 
acceptable, compromise choices (‘satisficing’), rather than pursue ‘maximizing’ or ‘optimizing’ strategies in which one particular 
objective is fully achieved.(Simon 1959) Satisficing is sometimes also referred to as a strategy of disjointed incrementalism.  The 




This alternative is perhaps best typified by Naturalistic Decision Making such as 
Klein’s Recognition Primed Decision Theory78.  In general, the first kind of decision-
making addresses less time critical activities such as planning, consequence 
management through pre-positioning of assets and other logistics considerations, while 
the second is more characteristic of crisis management, tactical response, and rapid 
reaction.  This is reflected, for example, by the greater importance of MOPs and MOEs 
related to the quality, completeness, and confidence of data in the one hand, and the 
emphasis on timeliness and salience of data on the other. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
corporate behaviour. For example, to maximize its profits a firm needs complete information about its costs and revenues, which 
in practice is available only after the event. Satisficing models replace the search for the optimum outcome, which may be 
unattainable, with rules of thumb and compromises which work well enough. from (Marshall 1998). 
78 See for example Naturalistic Decision-Making (NDM) (Lipshitz, Klein et al. 2001 & Salas 2001) and Recognition Primed Decision-





6 MODELING MOVEMENT UNDER IMPERFERCT SA/SU 
This dissertation focuses on mobility as the Warrior Systems capability area in which 
to explore the operational effects of imperfect SA/SU.  The mobility capability area 
combines the physical behaviors of movement, with a rich spectrum of fairly well 
understood decision processes, from route planning and route following to various way 
finding activities.  It features the dynamic use of data as individuals update position data 
and their understanding about their environment as they move about in that 
environment. It allows ample exploration of the ways in which data may be incomplete, 
uncertain and incorrect data.  It supports definitive measures of the cumulative effects 
of imperfectly perceiving data, imperfectly understanding what those data mean, and 
imperfectly estimating course of action outcomes based on them.   Finally it presents a 
significant challenge in trying to simulate an easily understood but difficult to model 
mobility-related phenomenon, that of being spatially “lost” while trying to navigate in a 
simulation world.  
Being “lost” is in fact a very complex phenomenon.  It involves determination of 
where an entity actually is, where it thinks it is, where it is going and where it thinks it is 
going.  The entity can be in one of several states: knowing where it is and where its 
going; being uncertain about one or both of these factors; being actually wrong about 
one or both of the factors; being right about them, but thinking its wrong and vice versa; 
recognizing or not recognizing whether it is wrong (i.e., knowing that it is lost), and 
having some set of potential corrective actions to take in the eventuality of being lost or 




6.1 Mobility Basics 
Mobility reflects the ability to move and control terrain, as measured by speed 
and/or distance.  Current M&S capabilities support definition of individual movement 
speed in response to such as factors terrain grade and trafficability, with limited 
consideration of physiological state (as measured by core temperature, max VO2, heart 
rate, etc.) (Mastroianni and Middleton 1996).  Algorithms exist to support dynamic 
obstacle avoidance and some use of terrain features, and the use of path 
finding/planning tools such as Dijkstra’s algorithm and the A* algorithm are fairly 
common (Reese and Stout 1999; Reece 2000; Reece 2003) . 
 These M&S capabilities make it possible to define intelligent agents that can 
regulate, either through self-pacing or in response to command guidance, their speed, 
their movement formations, the frequency with which they take rest breaks, and other 
aspects of dismounted movement.  Simulations employing such agents can be used to 
optimize the trade-offs between energy expenditure, threat avoidance, and mission 
demands. (Mastroianni and Middleton 2001), (Middleton 1996; Middleton 2002) At 
present, a key concept for the Warrior System mobility area capability is the network 
centric force and its employment of global positioning systems (GPS) and Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) (Murdock 2002), (Mitchell 1999).   Again, in order to assess 
the benefits of these technologies, baselines of imperfect information are required, for 
example, permitting entities to “get lost” as a response to poor situation awareness, bad 
decision-making or combination thereof.   
6.2 Intelligent Agents and Terrain 
Intelligent agents must react to, and make use of, terrain and cultural features in 
decision-making and other simulated behaviors.  This imposes a need for information 
not found in traditional terrain databases and relating to attributes of environmental 
features that impact on decision-making and/or physical interactions with those 
features. Current efforts in IWARS development, for example, are addressing this 




attribute lists of current features and/or creating new terrain artifact objects to 
represent such features as: areas of cover and concealment, areas of tactical 
importance, danger areas, choke points, etc. (Stanzione and Johnson 2006). The 
information provided by such attributes would be typically known to a human observer, 
but not easily inferred by an autonomous agent in a constructive simulation. The 
benefits of augmenting terrain with these data include more robust adversary behaviors 
in training simulators and more robust modeling of intelligent agents on all sides in 
constructive simulations.  In particular, these enhancements support the position object 
concept, which is central to how autonomous agents within IWARS interact with terrain 
(NRDEC 2005). 
6.2.1 Terrain Representation for way finding, route planning, and navigation 
Representation of military mobility and maneuver, or any other kind of directed 
movement, must define a route search space, which needs to be characterized with 
appropriate “cost” functions that relate both static and dynamic aspects of the 
movement space to an underlying representation geo-spatial environment.   
As in virtually any kind of heuristic optimization method, route-planning methods 
may be improved by cycling between global and local approaches to the search space.  
For example, network-based graph-theoretic approaches may be useful for general 
routing of a force or force component, while local use of a free-space approach79 may 
be necessary to adjust that movement in response to dynamically observed conditions. 
6.2.2 Models of Spatial Data 
There are two fundamental data models for the representation of geo-spatial 
information, reflecting two different views of such information.80 The first treats the 
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80 See for example (Duckham, Mason et al. 2000; Worboys and Duckham 2004; Richter and Klippel 2005; Duckham, Lingham et 




information as continuous data defined on an underlying coordinate system, with point-
by-point characterization of phenomena of interest.  The second treats the geo-spatial 
domain as populated by discrete identifiable entities or objects, each of which is 
associated with geo-spatial references.  The first view sees the data as an attribute of 
location, while the second sees location as a function of the data.  There are 
computational advantages and disadvantages associated with each viewpoint.  The first 
viewpoint leads to raster (also called field-based, tessellation-based, or image-based) 
database models, while the second corresponds to vector (also called object-based or 
feature-based) database models. 
Raster-based models tend to be less computationally efficient, requiring large 
amounts of storage to account for point-by-point information.  Vector-based models 
provide for much more compact storage of information, but do not lend themselves as 
easily to high-resolution representation of phenomena.   Vector-based models more 
naturally support geometric, topological and set-oriented mathematical operations 
related to discrete properties such as set membership or discrete object relationships. 
They easily support hierarchies of object oriented model attributes such as inheritance. 
Raster-based models, on the other hand, are the natural province of the description of 
the variation of attributes over a region, and can more easily be adapted for some 
aspects of fuzzy set treatment of natural phenomena.81 
Both raster data and object feature are incorporated in the ArcGIS geodatabase, which 
is the foundation for the Battlespace Terrain and Reasoning Awareness-Battle Command  
(BTRA-BC) framework developed for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Engineer 
Research and Development Center (ERDC). BTRA-BC is a program aimed at increasing 
the effectiveness of the Battle Command and Military Decision Making Process (MDMP).  
According to (Visone 2005): 
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 “BTRA focus is on the development of six (6) information generation 
components and four (4) decision tools addressing terrain and weather effects.  
Each of these components utilizes terrain feature data, digital elevation models, 
current and forecasted weather and information regarding tactics, techniques 
and system performance.  BTRA analytic components generate information 
products addressing:  
 Suite of Line-of Sight capabilities that incorporate weather 
attenuation  
  Cover, Concealment and Obstacles  
  Advanced mobility analysis  
  Spatial Operational Compartment and Positions of Advantage (Key 
Terrain) for specific force types/tasks  
 High fidelity weather/terrain effects of mobility and signature 
physics  
 Digital ground and air Modified Combined Obstacle Overlays 
(MCOOs) supporting interactive route analysis.”  
(Zeiler 2010) describes the ArcGIS geodatabase as having “a data model that is 
implemented as a series of data tables holding feature classes, raster datasets, and 
attributes.” He goes on to describe the fundamental geometrical “shapes” of the 
geodatabase: points, lines and polygons.  Of most interest to this dissertation 
methodology are routes, “a special type of line feature that have measure values … that 
can represent any unit of measurement, you choose, including miles, kilometers… for 
distance, or hours … for time intervals.”  The geodatabase also supports rasters, “a 
sampling of one or many attributes of attributes of continuous phenomena on a 
rectangular array of equally sized cells…. Continuous surfaces modeled with rasters 
include elevation, rainfall, temperature, contaminant level… and population density.”   
6.2.3 Route Finding82 
The ArcGIS geo-database is typical of the description of terrain for route finding 
purposes in a combination of metrical/Euclidean and topological terms.  Euclidean 
                                                     
 




schemes focus on straight-line distances between features of interest, while topological 
schemes describe spatial relationships (e.g., adjacency, connectivity, and containment) 
between such features.  In both cases terrain is often overlaid with covering polygons, 
which can be regular tessellating polygonal tiles (triangles, squares or hexagons), or 
irregular polygon covering schemes such as Voronoi diagrams.  
In strictly Euclidean schemes node-to-node “distance” metrics are based on regular 
grid coordinates, while more generic topological approaches can reflect a myriad of 
relational factors, such as trafficability, the availability of cover/concealment, and/or 
influence ambits based on the proximity of geo-political configurations, static and/or 
dynamic adversary threats, and the like. 
6.2.4 Graph theoretic shortest path approaches  
One of the most popular approaches to route finding uses arc-node graphs and 
shortest path algorithms, e.g., A* or Dijkstra’s algorithm.  Nodes specify waypoints along 
a path, with arcs describing the connections between these nodes. In the simplest case, 
the nodes are only defined for points of interest, with the arcs representing possible 
connections.  Arc costs from one node to another can reflect any and all of the 
“distance” metrics described above, and can be used in “shortest” path algorithms to 
determine the optimal path  
Simple graphs consist of a finite number of vertices (also called nodes) connected by 
edges (also called arcs).  These graphs may be directed, i.e., the edges have direction 
and can be “one-way”, or undirected.  Undirected graphs are referred to as symmetric – 
their matrix representation has the property that ei,j = ej,i whereas directed graphs are 
asymmetric.  Mathematically, these graphs represent only the topological nature of 
underlying network; they are only concerned with which nodes are connected to which 
other nodes.  In order to make them more useful as a search space representation, the 
edges or arcs are usually associated with one or more values, such as symbolic labels or 
a numeric attributes (capacity, distance, etc.).  As shown in Figure 6-1, A* algorithms 




paths with respect to cost-related criteria. 
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6.2.5 Terrain Tiling and Voronoi Diagrams.  
Tiling approaches, also referred to as cell decomposition approaches, model the 
underlying terrain, including free space and obstacles, as a cell grids made up of convex 
polygons. The simplest of these grids use one the regular tessellating polygons (i.e., 
triangles, squares or hexagons), but there are a number of irregular tiling schemes as 
well.  A refinement of such schemes is the use of Quadtrees, where the space is divided 
into squares, with some of these being recursively divided into smaller squares as may 
be necessary to provide adequate resolution for the phenomena under study, i.e., when 
the characteristics of interest are not sufficiently close to being homogeneous within a 
square.  
The grid polygons can be used as the nodes of an arc node network, with arc 
connections based on polygon adjacency relationships. In the case of Euclidean 
tessellation approaches, nodes typically coincide with the polygons or tiles covering the 
space, with arcs for each shared boundary line.  Other examples include skeleton 
approaches, which: 
 “reduce free space to a network of one-dimensional lines.  Common 
representations are visibility graphs and Voronoi diagrams.   A visibility graph is 
a collection of lines that connects the visible vertices of obstacles with each 




objects.  Path planning with these skeletal free space representations involves 
finding a path from the start point to the nearest skeleton line, doing likewise 
with the goal point, and then using a graph search technique to find the lowest 
cost path from start to goal along the skeleton.  The visibility graph solution 
yields a true shortest path, taut-rope solution (at least for the portion of the 
path on the graph), while the Voronoi diagram solution yields a path that stays 
as far as possible away from the obstacles. 
A variation of this planning technique is used to find “short” paths in ModSAF83 
and CCTT, another U.S. Army simulation system84.  In these systems, no 
representation of free space is built.  Instead, candidate free space routes are 
generated and evaluated.  The first candidate route goes directly from the start 
to the goal.  If it intersects an obstacle, it is rejected but two other candidate 
routes are created by computing “skirt” points around the obstacle in each 
direction.  If the skirting paths intersect obstacles, additional routes will be 
generated by skirting those obstacles, and so forth.  The route selected will be 
the candidate that doesn’t intersect obstacles and is the shortest (or best by 
some other criteria).”(Reece 2000) 
The use of Voronoi diagrams to navigate around obstacles is illustrated in Figure 6-2. 
It divides the drawing into regions around each obstacle that are shaped so that the 
borders of the regions are equidistant from the two nearest obstacles.  The paths 
indicated show boundaries of influence from each obstacle.  If one wanted to address 
different levels of influence to each obstacle, one would simply increase obstacle size to 
include a buffer zone. 
In addition: 
The Ordinary Voronoi Diagram or OVD has been suggested as an alternative to 
overcome some of the limitations of conventional geographic data models 
(Gold, 1992a; Okabe et al., 1992). The main strength of this approach is that it 
is, to some extent, an integration of both vector and raster models. It explicitly 
encodes topology (spatial adjacency: in the form of shared vertices)—like the 
vector approach, but also provides a space-filling model—like the raster 
approach. In other words, all space is fully occupied, and fragmented into tiles 
(usually equivalent to zones of influence) around each discrete map object. 
Therefore, every location in the space can be assigned to at least one of the 
members in any underlying point dataset. Another strength of the Voronoi 
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approach is that it permits many operations to be performed in a local fashion, 
rather than global, using the explicit spatial adjacency relationships (Gold, 
1994). As a result, the tessellation can be maintained dynamically using local 
updates following from any changes. Since topology construction is 
computationally expensive, this is an appealing property and is especially useful 
when the objective is to allow users to make reasonable decisions quickly, rather 
than providing a globally optimum solution (Gold, 1993). Finally, Voronoi 
constructions form an integral part of many useful discrete interpolation 
methods (e.g. Watson, 1992). (Gahegan and Leeb 2000) 
 
Figure 6-2 Voronoi Diagram Avoiding Obstacles  from (Kim and Bhattacharya 2007) 
6.2.6 Potential Field “Attractor/Repulsor” Schemes  
Another approach, one that does not require explicit space-filling characterization of 
the terrain, is to attach potential fields to objects/features of interest.  Features that 
must be avoided, such as obstacles, are considered to have repulsive potential fields 
around them, while desirable route features, such as cover and concealment are 




field strength is inversely proportional to the distance from the feature; while there is 
also a uniform attractive force to the goal.  In such cases, entity movement takes on a 
kind of “rubber band” aspect, where a rubber band connecting the entity to the goal 
position is stretched according the sum of the attractive and repulsive vectors 
encountered at any point in time. Such an approach is subject to being trapped in a local 
minimum or sink, but there are various methods for correcting such a problem.  
A popular form of this approach frequently used in the computer gaming world is 
the use of influence maps (IMs). IMs are generally overlaid on a regular tiling scheme 
and describe the relative influence of each tile with respect to one or more operational 
factors. For example, in the case of two competing forces, a positive influence for a 
given with respect to one of the forces indicates some advantage to that force while a 
negative influence indicates an advantage to the other force. Influences are normalized 
to some standard, and color-coding map tiles by influence provides an easy visualization 
of the extent of each force’s control of the tactical situation. The bulk of the problem is 
figuring out how to calculate the influence of any given tile, and how these values may 




7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
7.1 Introduction 
This dissertation documents research designed to establish and illustrate the efficacy 
of an agent-based, “human-centric” approach to modeling simulation and analysis 
(MS&A). The simulation developed to support this research is simply a means to this 
end. The research itself focuses on the investigation of decision-making under imperfect 
SA/SU in experiments performed with that simulation.   A series of simulation 
experiments explore a specific, easily understood, and quantifiable example of the 
impact of imperfect SA/SU on human behavior: intelligent agents being spatially “lost” 
while trying to navigate in a simulation world.   
 These simulation experiments vary aspects of an agent’s perceived worldview to 
study how a mistaken understanding of ground truth affects achievement of the agent’s 
goals.  They provide insight into multiple aspects of decision-making as affected by 
problem complexity, information quality, risk tolerance, and decision strategies.  The 
experimental framework is characterized by multiple, often interacting, elements.  At 
the highest level of organization these elements can be structured into three main 
groups: 
 Type of simulation experiment performed; 
 Characteristics of the arc/node networks explored by the agent; and 
 Nature of the agent decisions explored. 
7.2 Types of experiments 
   Two types of simulation experiment are used to observe and analyze the decisions 
made by the agents and the effects of those decisions on goal achievement.   Interactive 




parametric experiments provide a more thorough basis for statistical assessment of that 
behavior over a wide range of possible input values. Both employ Monte Carlo 
simulations, providing random sampling by selection of numerical draws from known or 
hypothesized statistical distributions. 
When operating in interactive simulation mode, an entity’s movement in ground 
truth can be seen.  That entity’s generally imperfect view of ground truth, i.e., its mental 
map, can also be seen in parallel, as the simulation executes, as can any changes or 
updates to that mental map.  The simulation can be paused at any time and the internal 
values of model variables examined.  This form of simulation execution provides the 
most complete and detailed view of the entity’s behavior.  It is useful for verifying and 
debugging model code, but more importantly it supports intuitive exploration of the 
causes and effects of specific entity decisions. 
When the simulation is executed in parametric mode, specific combinations of 
parameter values define the sets of experimental conditions that comprise different 
experimental cases.  Each of these cases is executed for a number of Monte Carlo trials 
and a wide variety of output data are recorded.  Commercial-off-the –shelf, COTS, 
software such as JMP and Excel are used to analyze these data by: 
 Collating descriptive statistics, which summarize the experimental outcomes; 
 Appling inferential statistics, which identify significant factors within the 
results; and  
 Supporting exploratory data analysis, which seeks to provide insight into the 
behavior of the simulated entity. 
All three of these types of statistical activity are important to scientific investigation 
based on agent-based modeling as is discussed in detail above in Chapter 3.1. All three 
of them will be prominently featured in the experimental results provided below.  The 




experimentation as hypothesis and test, towards scientific experimentation as 
exploration and discovery85.  Such experimentation is precisely the aim of data farming 
and data mining, which use simulation experiments to generate mass quantities of data, 
trolling these data for patterns, trends, insight and meaning.(Fayyad, Piatetsky-Shapiro 
et al. 1996; Horne 2001; Shneiderman 2002; Witten and Frank 2005; Han and Kamber 
2006; Vaughan 2006; Horne 2008; Middleton 2009) As in much of science, exploration 
of the data looks to induction and correlation for help in inferring cause and effect, but 
often results just in increased understanding and direction for further research. 
7.3 The Simulation Software Environment 
The experimental simulation is implemented in the simulation package AnyLogic, 
which supports the principal methods of simulation shown in Figure 7-1: Discrete Event 
(also known as process‐centric), Agent-Based, and System Dynamics modeling. 
Agent-based modeling has been described in detail above.  In this approach to 
simulation, each agent’s behaviors are defined by functions internal to that agent, which 
permits the use of different models for knowledge representation, inference and 
decision-making.   
Discrete event simulation is similar to the agent-based approach in that it seeks to 
approximate the continuous behavior of systems with a series of distinct, separate 
events that drive the evolution of the system over time.   System dynamics models, on 
the other hand, rely primarily on differential equations to describe a system in of terms 
feedback loops and time delays. AnyLogic supports a graphical development approach 
for each of these methods, implemented through the use of state charts in the case of 
agent-based models, stock flow diagrams in the case of systems dynamics models, and 
process flowcharts in the case of discrete event simulation. 
AnyLogic  supports clock driven simulations that maintain lists of scheduled events, 
                                                     
 




and can use Monte Carlo draws to determine the outcome of stochastic processes, 
while also using closed form equations to calculate deterministic results for specific 
types of agent behavior. AnyLogic is a Java platform and model development with 
AnyLogic consists of building the appropriate graphical structures and customizing 
their function with Java code.   
 
 
Figure 7-1 Principal Methods of Simulation86 
Model development in AnyLogic consists of selecting basic program element 
templates from its graphical user interface (GUI) menus and writing Java language code 
to complete the templates with desired model functionality.  There is a menu for 
general model constructs such as parameters, functions, and a variety of data structures 
with which to define model variables.  There is a menu for the specific state chart 
constructs needed in agent-based modeling and another for systems dynamics features.   
The AnyLogic GUI also provides a presentation menu through which the user can 
                                                     
 




define his/her own GUI for the model he/she is developing with AnyLogic. 
1.  FUTURE WORK: EXPANDED USE OF ANYLOGIC CAPABILITIES
87
:  
The agent-based features of AnyLogic are sufficient for the current 
dissertation research.  Eventually, however, integrating the other simulation 
paradigms with the agent-based structures should provide an even more 
powerful mechanism for exploring the problem space.   For example, it would 
be desirable to use systems dynamics methods to represent soldier 
physiological processes, such as fatigue and heat stress, that affect basic 
decision processes.  Similarly, both systems dynamics and discrete event 
modeling are useful to represent changing aspects of the battlefield 
environment and the threats faced by the soldier.    
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8 THE SIMULATION MODEL  
MOBILE represents an entity trying to navigate in a simulated world.  The entity has 
a unique “mental map” – its idiosyncratic view of its geo-spatial environment and makes 
decisions based on this idiosyncratic view, with behavior outcomes based on ground 
truth. The simulated entity attempts to find its way on an arc/node network, moving 
from a given start node in the network to a designated end node.  It can (1) generate a 
route plan, a sequence of nodes and arcs from the start point to the end goal; (2) it can 
employ local search techniques to seek the goal; or (3) it can employ some combination 
of global/local strategies.  Should an agent attempting to follow a route become “lost”, 
i.e., diverge from its chosen route, it can switch to search tactics to either attempt to 
rejoin its route or to otherwise achieve the end goal. 
Being “lost” carries with it the idea of some kind of failure in the entity’s mental 
map, either in its structure, in its content, in its registration/correlation with ground 
truth, or in some combination of all of these faults.  The types and degrees of such 
failure are examples of poor SA/SU, and the extent to which they affect the entity’s 
ability to achieve its end goal provides a measure of the value of SA/SU.   
Actual humans can find their way from one point to another with very rudimentary 
and/or inaccurate maps.  They can frequently function satisfactorily with ambiguous and 
unclear directions. An effective simulation of getting or being “lost” should take into 
account this human resilience with respect to the effects of imperfect SA/SU, and seek 
to delineate between when SA/SU imperfections do and don’t matter.   
Model requirements for a useful simulation of being “lost” include: 
 The capability for an entity’s view of where it is and where it is going to be 
different from ground truth. 




“lostness” within those types; 
 The mechanisms by which an individual achieves different states of being lost; 
and 
 The mechanisms by which an individual recognizes and attempts to correct 
being lost.  
Under the agent-based structures of the model, a single entity is represented by two 
inter-connected agents. The first of these is the ground truth (GT) agent, who moves 
physically in the world of ground truth reality, and the second is the voice-in-head (VIH) 
agent, who represents the entity’s decision-making capabilities and who maintains the 
entity’s perceived view of the world.  
The entity’s world is an arc/node network, but the key to the model is the fact that 
the GT agent operates on the arc/node network that represents the “real” world of the 
entity, while the VIH agent maintains an idiosyncratic view of that network, a “mental 
map” that represents its own particular, generally distorted, view of ground truth 
geography.  
Route planning and route following decisions are made with respect to the VIH 
mental map, while actual movement takes place on the ground truth network. The GT 
agent maneuvers around the GT network and reports to the VIH agent the 
characteristics of the GT network as the GT agent experiences them. The VIH agent 
monitors the GT agent’s progress, and compares the state of the VIH mental map to the 
GT network characteristics reported by the VIH agent.  The VIH agent can use these data 
to update the mental map, but the agent and its map are always subject to possible 
misperception and/or misinterpretation of the GT data.  The underlying philosophy is 
very much in keeping with Endsley’s phase of SA as discussed above in Chapter 4.   
2. FUTURE WORK: SIMULATION OF MISPERCEPTION 
The model at present can represent the entity’s inability to reconcile ground 
truth information with its mental map, but there is no explicit representation 
of the entity’s perceptual processes or capabilities and hence no explicit 




by previous states of the mental map. In the real world an individual’s 
capability to perceive the environment is very much a function of both the 
psycho-physiological state of that individual and the amount of “noise” 
present in the environment.  There is a good body of research in human 
factors upon which to base future work incorporating perceptual capabilities 
and agent knowledge states into the model.  For example , The 
attention/situation awareness model in Figure 8-1 The attention/situation 
awareness model from(McCarley, Wickens et al. 2002)   shows “a sequence of 
events (upper left) are attended (center) to a degree that is degraded by 
workload. Attended events provide evidence for the belief module (box at 
lower right) a belief that decays over time. The SA belief then contributes to a 
choice, at the bottom.” 
 
Figure 8-1 The attention/situation awareness model 
8.1 Decision-making 
The VIH agent makes decisions at multiple levels.  The first level can be 
characterized as deciding whether to employ a global or a local strategy. Following a 




 Route Planning, finding a sequence of nodes and connecting arcs that will take 
the agent from its start point to its end goal, and 
 Route Following – recognizing the elements of the planned sequence and 
adhering to them to achieve the goal. 
Local strategies are characterized by Way-Finding, parsing a global route into a 
sequence of one or more choices that will ultimately lead the agent to its goal.  Typically 
the agent will attempt global routing as a first option and adopt way-finding behaviors 
when faced with a failure in either of the planning or following elements of the global 
route.  There are several different way-finding strategies available to the agent, 
dependent on how the agent became lost and what information is available and 
credible. Among them are: 
 Returning to a previous known node in the global route; 
 Seeking an unvisited node in the global route; 
 Seeking a landmark;  
 Moving in what is believed to be the general direction of the goal; and 
 Random movement. 
Earlier chapters identified the need to define software constructs that describe how 
agents go about “knowing what’s going on” and “figuring out what to do”.  
Implementation of cognitive architectures in terms of specific data structures and 
inference processes provides the ability to study the implications different theories of 
cognition and perception may have with respect to an individual’s worldview, the 
inferences that individual makes with respect to perceived ground truth, and the 
decisions that result.   
The simulation model’s data structures and inference capabilities are designed to 
accommodate a wide variety of cognitive architectures, as long as those architectures 
can support three basic decision elements of movement strategies: 
 Where am I?   
The simulation process most often used to answer this question occurs when 




VIH map to find the one most closely matching the GT Node.   
 Where do I want to go next? 
Ideally the agent will have a “next node” goal in a planned route sequence.  
Failing that, the agent may be able to aim for an intermediate goal - a landmark, 
unvisited node in the global route, or other predefined waypoint.  At present, such 
intermediate goals are limited to nodes on the agent’s VIH map; MOBIL represents 
only point features and arcs between them. Future extensions of the simulation 
could provide linear features, or area features, e.g., roads, rivers or other bodies of 
water, as well as other geographic or geo-political regions and their associated 
boundaries. 
An important component of “where do I want to go next” decisions is one or 
more measures of progress towards the ultimate goal.  Currently the simulation 
focuses primarily on the degree of confidence the agent has that it is following the 
global route.  Various other measures are collected as experimental outputs and 
can be explored for use by the agent in selecting or changing its movement 
strategy. 
 How do I get there? 
When this decision is made in the context of an agent at a node in ground truth, 
it becomes the question of selecting which ground truth arc connection most 
closely matches the VIH map arc leading to the node that is the result of its “where 
do I want to go next” decision.  In this instance, the agent’s candidates will be the 
set of ground truth arcs available at its current ground truth location and it will 
select the one that most closely matches its VIH choice. 
8.2 Model Environment 
As described above, the environment in which the simulated entity operates 
consists of two different views of an arc/node network. First is the ground truth view, 
which is the true state of all the objects in the environment. Ground truth represents 




the entity’s worldview, the VIH, which defines the state of the environment and objects 
in it as the entity perceives them.   This worldview is the basis for the entity’s cognitive 
behaviors, wherein it decides what to do next.   
The first step in setting up a simulation experiment is the selection of these two 
views, and the first step to that is selecting the ground truth arc/node network that will 
be the entity’s operational environment.     
The simulated arc/node networks can be characterized by three different sets of 
features: 
 spatial – such as positional data expressed on an xy-coordinate system; 
 topological – the spatially invariant features of the network describing node 
connectivity; and  
 semantic – non-spatial features that aid in distinguishing nodes and arcs  from 
each other, represented in the simulation as line types and widths and/or 
colors. 
All of these features can be distorted, either individually or in combination to 
provide the entity with its idiosyncratic VIH world-view that differs from ground truth.  
Furthermore, these distortions can be randomly allocated to individual nodes and/or 
arcs, or applied in some sort of systematic fashion, and/or assigned some degree of 
uncertainty or “fuzziness”.   The entity’s VIH arc/node network can also differ from the 
GT arc/node network simply in the amount of information provided, from a sparse 
sketch of the network map to a very detailed, albeit incorrect, network map.   
For each experiment, the entity’s VIH map, its mental image of ground truth, is 
created by distorting the ground truth map through a series of Monte Carlo processes.  
Selected nodes can have their location changed by random perturbations in their X and 
Y coordinates.  Actual nodes from the GT network may be missing in the VIH network.   
  Initial experiments assume a completely connected arc/node network for both 
Ground truth and mental maps.  This connectivity means the entity can use Dijkstra’s 
algorithm to generate a route plan according to its mental map.   Should an agent 




switch to search tactics to either attempt to rejoin its route or to achieve the end goal. 
Later experiments will allow missing nodes to disconnect the mental map network, 
meaning a planned route cannot always be found, requiring different goal seeking 
strategies from the simulation start.  
Each experimental run is deemed a success if the entity finds its way to the goal and 
a failure otherwise.  Critical aspects of the state of the entity when failure occurs are 
recorded to allow a more detailed study of failures. 
8.3 Arc/Node Network Map Structure 
The knowledge structure used to represent the simulation arc/node networks is 
based on the format of OpenStreetMaps88.  There are three major data types in this 
structure: 
 Nodes – map locations, defined by (x,y) coordinates; 
 Ways – a series of sequentially linked nodes – arc links between nodes are 
defined as way segments; and 
 Relations – groups of nodes and/or ways that are related some way, sharing 
some set of common attributes. 
Each instance of these types has a unique reference id.  Each of them may or may 
not have additional information provided through a series of tags. OpenStreetMap has a 
currently accepted set of standard tags and associated values, but one can define 
virtually any set of tags and tag values that might be useful.  For example, the node 
characteristics used to compare VIH and GT Nodes as described in Chapter 8.7 below 
are defined as tags for both GT and VIH maps. 
3.  FUTURE WORK: DISTORTION OF OPENSTREETMAP FEATURES:  
Using the OpenStreetMap tag structure supports a much wider degree of 
variation between ground truth and the voice in head map, by altering the 
                                                     
 




tag values of selected nodes, ways or relations on the VIH map, either 
systematically or at random.  In addition, tags can be set to represent 
uncertainty in any node or arc attribute by providing parameter values for a 
stochastic draw. OpenStreetMap is also a source for real-world maps that can 
be used in the simulation to represent ground truth and altered as desired to 
represent the VIH map.   
4. FUTURE WORK: NETWORK COMPOSITION AND COMPLEXITY:  
Network complexity is one of many potential areas for future study, and there 
is an extensive literature on network complexity (see for example (Kaimann 
1974; Hall and Preiser 1984; Bonchev and Buck 2005) on which to base such 
work.  In addition, network representations of real world environments are 
easily adaptable for study, one such network being the roads, paths, and 
tunnel system at Wright State University. 
There is a fairly extensive body of literature of the topic of network 
complexity in a topological sense, see for example, (Mackaness and Beard 
1993; Molenaar 1998; Hayes 2000; Blondel, Gajardo et al. 2004; Bonchev and 
Buck 2005; Zhu and Wilson 2005; Wu 2006).  Topological factors of potential 
importance in assessing movement task complexity include: 
 The number of possible paths from the start goal to the end goal, which 
may be quantified by looking at the minimum, maximum, average 
and/or percentile values across all of the possible start/end goal 
pairings in the network.  These values can be theoretically calculated 
by taking successive powers of the network incidence matrix. For 
larger networks it may be more reasonable to approximate them with 
Monte Carlo methods. 
 The number of paths with the potential for a “dead end’ or a “sink” 
based on a wrong turn or other route following errors. 
 The number and location of “hub” nodes. 
 The degree to which the complexity of a GT graph may differ from that 
of the VIH map as a function of the topological changes made to the 
VIH map. 
    
For simplicity, initial experiments explore variants of three basic networks: a square 
grid, a repeating polygonal shape with various node interconnections, and a grid with a 
number different connectivity features. These three maps shown in Figure 8-2, Figure 





Figure 8-2 Square Grid Map 
 
Figure 8-3 Polygon Map
 
Figure 8-4 Multiple Feature Map 
 
8.4 Map Distortion Process 
The simulation supports two methods of defining the VIH mental map, the first 
being internal to the simulation - the application of random distortions to the arcs and 
nodes of the GT map, and the second being external to the simulation - reading in user-
defined files of distorted networks.   
In either case, the distortions themselves can be the result of:  




node x and y coordinates, with the associated bending and stretching of the 
arcs that connect those nodes, and/or  
2)  topological modifications to the basic network structure by 
 changing the connections between nodes,  
 deleting from the VIH network nodes and/or arcs that are present in the 
GT network, and/or  
 adding VIH nodes and/or arcs that aren’t actually present in the GT 
network.    
Mathematically, the mental map represents a functional transformation from the GT 
network to the VIH network.  Viewed in this way the first type of distortion, spatial 
deformation, results in a one-to-one transformation from the GT network to the VIH 
network that is topologically invariant.  In this case, the GT and VIH networks share the 
same incidence matrix with respect to node connectivity, and there is a direct 
correspondence between each of the arcs and nodes of the GT network and those of 
the VIH network.  In other words, in this initial model of distortion, only the distance 
between nodes and the angles between them, i.e. the bearing of the arcs connecting 
them, are affected.  Network connectivity relationships, as defined by the network 
topology, are unchanged by this spatial distortion of the VIH network. As a result, the 
arc/node elements that comprise routes between any two nodes are the same for both 
the GT and the VIH agents. The distance relationships of those routes may change, 
however, thus affecting the definition of the “shortest” path between those nodes.  In 
such a case, although the entity may have a path that will allow it achieve its goal, it may 
be said to be “lost” in the sense that this route does not correspond precisely to ground 
truth and as a consequent may delay the time otherwise required to achieve that goal. 
The entity’s GT and VIH maps each have their own relative coordinate system.  If the 
entity’s SA/SU is perfect, the location of each node in both the GT and VIH maps is the 
same with respect to its appropriate origin.  When the VIH Map is distorted spatially, 
selected node X and/or Y coordinates are changed in the VIH Map. These changes 




connecting arcs.   Input parameters control the probability of node error, Pr(NE), and 
the extent of the X and Y coordinate errors, X and Y Er Lim.   A Monte Carlo random 
draw determines first if a node is to be distorted, and then separate draws determine 
the extent of the errors in X and Y, which are calculated according to the formulae: 
newX = oldX + XandYEr Lim + (uniform_pos()*(-2.0*(XandYErLim); 
newY = oldY + XandYEr Lim + (uniform_pos()*(-2.0*(XandYErLim). 
where  uniform_pos()  generates a random number uniformly between zero and one. 
The topological nature of the network can also be distorted by omitting ground truth 
nodes from the mental map.  As stated above, initial experiments assume a completely 
connected arc/node network for both ground truth and mental maps, so for these initial 
experiments any node paths that would be disconnected by removed nodes are 
reconnected by joining the removed node’s predecessor and successor nodes in those 
paths. The input parameter Pr(MN) defines the probability of a missing node, i.e, 
determining whether a given GT node is omitted from the VIH map.  
Figure 8-5, Figure 8-6 and Figure 8-7 show examples of distorted VIH maps for each 
of the three maps described above.   
The node labels of the VIH map are the same alphabetic characters as those of the 
corresponding GT network nodes, with a small “v” appended to distinguish them from 
the labels of the “true” nodes. 
Removed nodes are shown colored light pink and corresponding arcs to and from 
those nodes are shown as dashed light pink lines. Arcs used to connect 
predecessor/successor nodes to the removed nodes are shown as dashed green lines.  
The nodes and arcs removed from the VIH map still exist in ground truth and hence can 
be encountered by the agent as it traverses the network.  The new VIH connector arcs 
do not correspond to any actual arcs in ground truth, but the agent may confuse these 
arcs with those ground truth arcs that have been removed from the VIH map.  In such a 
case, the agent would anticipate that those ground truth arcs connect in the 





5. FUTURE WORK: STRUCTURED OR SYSTEMATIC DISTORTION IN VIH MAPS  
In many cases, such as when using real-world maps, it is probably 
appropriate to make more structured distortions than the random 
mechanisms employed in current experiments.  Systematic distortions, 
however, should be accompanied by more complex logic for the agent to 




















8.5 Model Structure 
The model as currently implemented has three principal elements.  The first of these 
is Main, which is the default active object class shared by all AnyLogic programs - it 
handles initial model setup details and some of the model book-keeping functions.  The 
GT arc/node network is initialized in Main.  The other two elements are (1) the active 
object classes for the aspects related to the physical movement of the entity, the GT 
Agent and (2) the decision-making aspect of the entity, the VIH Agent.  
6. FUTURE WORK: ENTITY INTERACTION 
 Under the current model, the GT agent is limited to following directions and 
observing the ground truth environment; it has no other entities with which 
to interact, nor can it affect the environment. Adding other entities is easily 
done in AnyLogic , so, for example the model could be altered to add goals 
for seeking or avoiding other entities to more robustly represent military 
operations.  Entity interactions are also possible through the definition of 
further agent state logics. 
8.5.1 GT Agent 
At any point in the simulation, the GT agent is either: 
1. At a node; 
2. Moving along an arc at a constant speed; or 
3. Stopped at a point along an arc. 





Figure 8-8 GT Agent State Chart 
In AnyLogic  state charts are developed using the GUI state chart menu, which 
provides templates for the state chart elements.  Shown here are simple state blocks 
indicated by the rounded rectangles.  An AnyLogic  state block is essentially a container 
for the model-specific Java code that defines the behavior of the agent while it is in the 
given state.  Color-coding distinguishes between states associated with basic agent 
behaviors (in yellow) and the states that represent the need to communicate with the 
VIH agent (in green).  State transitions (lines with arrows) and decision points 
(diamonds) are additional basic AnyLogic  state diagram elements. They define when 
the agent should enter or leave a state and to which state it will next transition.  These 
also are augmented with Java code to implement specific features of the model.  As the 




triggered by messages received from the VIH agent. 
The states shown here are relatively simple constructs.   AnyLogic also permits the 
definition of compound states and history states, in which the agent “remembers” 
where it was in the compound state, and can resume its prior behavior, as for instance it 
might want to do after leaving the state for an interrupt. 
As shown here, the GT agent begins the simulation by sending a message to the VIH 
agent containing the GT node that is the entity’s start position.   The GT agent then 
follows the directions provided by the VIH agent.  At each movement step the VIH agent 
selects the GT arc along which the GT agent will move, and the GT agent follows that arc 
until it either arrives at a GT node or exceeds the distance that the VIH agent is willing to 
travel looking for that node.  The GT agent then relays where it is and what it observes 
to the VIH agent, initiating the next step in the movement cycle.  
8.5.2 VIH Agent  
The VIH agent state chart is considerably more complex than that of the GT agent, 
and is presented here in two parts.  The initial behavior of the VIH agent is described in 
Figure 8-9, which shows the first components of the AnyLogic  VIH agent state chart.   
The VIH agent receives the GT start/goal node pair from the GT agent and 
establishes its VIH map.  Current experiments create the VIH map by reading in the GT 
map from an input file and then distorting that map as specified by input parameters.   
This procedure supports parametric experiments with respect to the various distortion 
options described in Chapter 8.4.  Alternatively, the model can import an already 
distorted version of the GT map file to explore the use of different movement selection 
logics in a common environment. 
The VIH agent receives the GT start/goal node pair from the GT agent and 
establishes its VIH map.  Current experiments create the VIH map by reading in the GT 
map from an input file and then distorting that map as specified by input parameters.   




options described in Chapter 8.4.  Alternatively, the model can import an already 
distorted version of the GT map file to explore the use of different movement selection 
logics in a common environment. 
 
 
Figure 8-9 Initialization of the VIH Agent  
The VIH agent then seeks to plan its route from the start node to the goal node. The 
default logic for route planning is the use of Dijkstra’s algorithm to find the shortest 
path through the network, as calculated using the arc-node connections and arc lengths 
(inter-node distances) of the VIH mental map.  The simulation tracks both the “true” 
shortest path from start to end goal, as would be calculated from the GT Network, and 
the VIH path, the shortest path based on the VIH mental map.  The divergence between 
these two is one metric for the level of effective distortion in the mental map.  It can 
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then be related in the experiments to the effect of distortion on entity behavior through 
selection of a less than optimal path.   
7. FUTURE WORK:  ROUTE PLANNING OPTIONS  
At present the model uses only Euclidean distance as the Dijkstra algorithm 
cost function but there is no problem incorporating other factors into this 
function.  In particular, the use of OpenStreetMap tags can be used to define 
such arc link characteristics as: speed limits; trafficability constraints; and/ or 
uncertainties/risk factors - stochastic hazards whose presence is based on a 
Monte Carlo draw. 
The simulation allows for abnormal termination in case of fatal errors in the 
arc/node network, as might be caused by corrupted input files.  In the case of none-fatal 
problems with the VIH map, e.g., a disconnected network where the VIH agent cannot 
determine a path to the goal, the agent uses a set of intermediate goals to direct its 
movement.  These intermediate goals can also be useful if the VIH finds itself off of its 
planned route and needs to institute a local search or way finding strategy in lieu of path 
following. 
 Figure 8-10 shows the final components of the AnyLogic  VIH agent state chart, 
which describe the agent’s decision processes in response to the information received 
from the GT agent’s movement.   
Entity movement requires of a sequence of decisions: each time the GT agent 
reaches a node, the VIH agent must interpret its position on the VIH map and make 
decisions about where to go next. i.e., which arc link to take.  If the GT agent travels 
along an arc without reaching a node where one is expected, it must decide whether to 
continue or quit.  These decisions are a function of the entity’s current decision-making 
mode, the amount of distortion in the entity’s mental map, and the threshold 
parameters set by the user to persist in the face of ground truth deviation from the 
conditions anticipated according to that mental map.  Later experiments will introduce a 





As shown in decision block 7, if the VIH agent finds itself to be at a GT node, it can  
identify that node with a corresponding VIH map node, either correctly or incorrectly, or 
fail to recognize the GT node as matching any VIH node.    
 
Figure 8-10 VIH Decision Processes 
Should the GT agent not be located at a GT node, it must be on a GT map arc. If that 
arc is recognized as on the VIH map, it has a movement goal.  The goal is the VIH map 
node in which the given arc terminates. The agent must decide whether to continue on 
the arc searching for that node, return to the start node of the arc and seek another link 
path, or simply quit as being unwilling to search further.    
Block 9 details the conditions under which the entity will terminate the experiment 
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without achieving its goal: 
 dead end – the entity finds itself at a ground truth node from which it has tried 
all possible exit paths; 
 lost no node – the entity travels too far on an arc  without finding a ground 
truth node, reaching a maximum distance set by the user as a threshold 
parameter;  
 wandering too long – the entity has visited too many ground truth nodes, 
exceeding a user-set threshold parameter, without being able to identify itself 
as on its planned path (i.e., the entity’s perceived movement history has not 
agreed with the sequence of VIH nodes it believes leads to its goal);  
 failure to recognize a true goal – the entity finds its way to the goal node in 
ground truth, but fails to recognize it; or  
 accepts a false goal – the entity erroneously identifies a ground truth node as 
its true goal and stops.  
Block 10 shows the decisions the VIH agent must make if it “recognizes” its current 
GT node position as a VIH node.  If that node coincides with a node on the VIH Dijkstra 
path, the agent will attempt to follow the VIH arc link to the next node on the path.  If 
that node does not coincide with a node on the VIH Dijkstra path, it will select the VIH 
arc link whose terminal node it believes best advances it towards its current 
intermediate goal.  In both of these cases, the VIH agent must determine which of the 
available GT arcs most closely corresponds to the chosen VIH arc link. 
The Dijkstra route is the sequence of nodes and arcs leading from the start point to 
the final goal with the shortest total distance.  Each node along the route is linked to the 
next in the sequence by the arc that connects the two.  Each time the GT agent arrives 
at a GT node, the VIH agent seeks to identify the VIH node that most closely 
corresponds to that GT node.  If the entity is successfully following the VIH Dijkstra 
route, that node will be the expected node in the route sequence.  If that node is also 
the end goal, the simulation ends.  Otherwise the VIH agent will then attempt to identify 
the GT arc that most closely corresponds to the VIH arc leading to the next node in the 




another GT arc, or stops at some point along the arc, having exceeded the distance the 
entity is willing to go in searching for such a node.  
If the GT agent’s stopping point is a GT node that does not match the appropriate 
Route node, or if the GT agent was unable to arrive at a GT node, the entity has lost its 
way with respect to the planned route, and must either quit, terminating the simulation 
without successfully meeting its goal, or switch to another movement paradigm.  
The current model provides two movement paradigms in addition to Dijkstra route 
following.  The three basic VIH movement paradigms provide different ways of selecting 
from among the GT node arc choices available at the end of the GT movement.  Should 
the GT agent’s movement stop short of a GT node, the VIH agent must decide to either: 
(1) retreat to the originating node of its current GT arc or to (2) continue forward in 
search of the terminal node of that arc; in either case applying one of the three basic 
paradigms. 
Both of the alternatives to Dijkstra route-following assume the VIH agent can define 
one or more intermediate goal nodes as local search targets.  These intermediate 
targets then take on the role of the Dijkstra sequence “next node” in determining where 
the VIH agent wants to direct the GT agent to go.  At present the Intermediate targets 
may consist of the as yet unreached Dijkstra route nodes and the end goal, but the 
model is designed to also allow the user to identify specific VIH nodes as potential 
intermediate targets.  This capability will, for example, support subdividing the network 
into regions as might represent geographical features such as locales separated by 
natural barriers, political boundaries, or military areas of influence.   
The first alternate paradigm is the best direction selection in which the VIH agent 
finds the intermediate target node perceived to be the closest to the VIH agent’s current 
position, calculates the compass bearing from that position to the selected intermediate 
target, and then chooses the GT arc that best corresponds to the VIH compass bearing.    
In the current version of the model the definition of “closest” intermediate node is 




current position and those of the intermediate target node.  Future versions of the 
model could replace or augment this calculation by taking into account other 
considerations, such as potential movement constraints imposed by geographical 
features such as terrain barriers and trafficability, and/or location of potential threats or 
other elements the entity might want to avoid.  
Similarly, in the current model the calculation of GT arc correspondence with the 
desired VIH bearing is based on the difference between the desired VIH bearing and the 
compass direction of the GT arc. The available arc having the smallest absolute 
difference from the desired bearing is selected for the next movement.  Future versions 
of the model could again replace or augment this calculation by taking into account 
other potential arc characteristics, such as identifying a set of contiguous arcs as 
representing a road or highway, or identifying the arcs as belonging to or connecting 
geographical regions. 
The final movement paradigm in the current model is the random draw; the VIH 
agent picks at random from the GT arc choices available.  While this paradigm can be 
used at any time in the simulation process, its most effective use is as a last resort local 
search for an intermediate target and/or a landmark of some kind.  If the randomly 
moving agent finds itself at an intermediate target, it can attempt to calculate a new 
Dijkstra route, and revert to a more deliberate movement decision process. Block 11 
shows the options the VIH agent has if it does not recognize the current GT node as on 
its VIH map.  It can either select randomly from the arc links available at that GT node, 
or select the one that most closely corresponds to the perceived direction of the VIH 
agent’s next intermediate goal. 
The logic by which the VIH agent determines its next move is summarized in Figure 
8-11, which shows the states described above and the options available to the VIH agent 
in each of those states.   
In all cases the GT arc link selected by the VIH agent and, where known, the 








Figure 8-11 VIH Movement Selection Logic 
8.6 Route Planning and Route Following 
THE FIRST STEP IN THE AGENT’S GOAL SEEKING PROCESS IS ROUTE PLANNING, DEFINING A PATH 
FROM THE START NODE TO THE GOAL NODE.  DIJKSTRA’S ALGORITHM IS USED TO FIND A SEQUENCE OF 
CONNECTED NODES CONSTITUTING THE “SHORTEST”89 PATH FROM THE START NODE TO THE GOAL 
NODE. THE YELLOW-HIGHLIGHTED NODES IN Figure 8-12 SHOW THE GROUND TRUTH MAP PATH 
                                                     
 
89 Here the shortest path is defined to minimize path Euclidean distance, but the algorithm is easily modified to consider 




FROM NODE AV TO NODE A, AND THE ORANGE-HIGHLIGHTED NODES ON THE VIH MAP FOR THE 
ASSOCIATED VIH NODES VAV AND VA. THE DECISION-MAKING ELEMENT OF THE ENTITY, THE VIH 
AGENT, HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE GROUND TRUTH DIJKSTRA PATH. THAT PATH IS ONLY AVAILABLE 
TO THE ANALYST, AND IS PROVIDED TO SUPPORT ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE AGENT DOES USING 
THE VIH MAP AS ITS MOVEMENT GUIDE.  
 
Figure 8-12 GT and VIH Dijkstra Routes 
In the case shown here, the VIH map is missing GT node AS, which is on the true 
shortest path to the goal.  As seen in Figure 8-13, when the agent arrives at GT Node 
AR, it has two possible choices for continuing, the arcs linking AR to AS or to B.  The 
agent tries to follow its VIH path which includes the arc it believes links vAR to vBM, 
but this link has no ground truth analogue.  
GT Map VIH Map
GT_Dijkstra 9 nodes  AV B AR AS AT F G C A





Figure 8-13 Arc Link Options at Node AR 
 In the current situation the agent arrives at AR from B, but the link back to B 
most closely corresponds to its VIH target, linking vAR to vBM, so it returns to B and 
ends up eventually in a dead-end situation.  A contributing factor to the agent’s 
failure may well be the nature of the arc node network, which in this case provides 
very limited link options for the agent at certain nodes, such as AR.  One could 
speculate that the agent might have had more success if this problem occurred on 
the regular square grid map of Figure 8-2, which provides more options for 
movement at each node. As will be seen in later experimental results, there is some 
evidence for this premise. When all other factors are equal, the agent generally has 
better goal achievement statistics for the square grid map than for either the 
polygon or the multi-factor maps. 
8. Future Work Backtracking Logic  
This particular failure of the agent to reach the goal could be corrected 
adding by logic to avoid back-tracking to previously visited nodes, but 
such logic should then also consider those occasions when backtracking is 
in fact desirable. For example, should the agent stray from its optimal 
path by taking a wrong turn (i.e.; choosing the incorrect node link), its 






8.7 Node Recognition  
As the agent moves through the ground truth arc/node network, it attempts to 
follow its VIH path plan and reconcile its VIH Map view of its position with its ground 
truth observations.  A primary component of the reconciliation process occurs when the 
agent arrives at a GT node, and tries to match that GT node with a corresponding VIH 
node.  There are several steps to this process. 
First, the agent ascertains, which, if any, VIH Map nodes are candidate matches for 
the GT node by finding all of the VIH nodes within a given distance of the currently 
perceived VIH agent location.  This distance is controlled by an input parameter that 
should generally be set to an amount at least as great as the potential distortion in VIH 
node X and Y coordinates (if it is known to the agent!). Setting the parameter too small 
might lead to failure to consider the actual Gt-VIH match, setting it too large could lead 
to confusing another candidate with the actual match.   
Figure 8-14 shows the candidate nodes for an agent at GT node B in the above 
example.  For scale purposes, the map considers each integer change along the X and Y 
axis as a single unit, for example nodes AV and B are 100 units apart.  The distance 
parameter in this instance is set at 125 units, yielding candidate VIH nodes: vAv, vB, vBk, 
vK, and vJ as potentially matching GT node B. 
 
Figure 8-14 Candidate Nodes 





The candidates are compared to the true GT node based on several characteristics: 
 Offset distance: the distance in the VIH coordinate system of the candidate 
node from the VIH location corresponding to the true GT Node position. 
 Expectation: a binary value set to one if the VIH node corresponds to the node 
the agent expects to find at the end of the link taken and zero otherwise.  
 Arcs/Links Comparison: difference between the number of links per quadrant 
of the GT Node and the candidate node 
 Color 1 and Color 2 Comparison: each node has two color characteristics 
designed to represent generic factors. The difference between the GT Node 
and the candidate node for each color is calculated by comparing RGB values 
(integers between 0 and 255) for each. 
Each of these characteristics is quantified according to the measures in the value 
based hierarchy shown in Figure 8-15.  The resulting values are aggregated into a single 
overall GT- VIH correspondence value.  The best value is then tested against a 
confidence limit threshold.  If it passes, the agent “recognizes” it as its VIH node 
location, which it assumes to be the same as its GT node position.  If it fails, the agent 
does not associate a VIH node with its current position.  
The value hierarchy approach used at AFIT defines single decomposition value 
functions (SDVFs) for each of the measures in the hierarchy.  These functions convert 
the range of possible input values for each measure to outputs on a unit-less zero to one 
scale.  SDVFs can take virtually any functional form desired, for example:  
 constant returns to scale – linear  functions;   
 decreasing returns to scale – concave functions; 
 increasing returns to scale – convex functions; 
 combinations of the above – “S” shaped functions; 
 categorical functions – discrete value step function; 
 conditional functions – classical  “if then else” statements; or 




fuzzy set theory. 
 
Figure 8-15 Node Recognition Value Hierarchy 
At present the model uses relatively simple functional forms, each of which are 
discussed below. 
8.7.1 Distance Match 
Construction of the arc/node map in the VIH coordinate system begins with 
replicating the GT map with a linear offset from the GT coordinate system. Thus there is 
a translation of the GT origin to a VIH origin with all of the distance relationships 
between the objects in the two system remaining the same, as measured from their 
respective origins. Distortion of the elements in the VIH system changes their 
relationship to the VIH origin and to each other. The extent of this distortion is 
measured by calculating the distance from distorted VIH element positions to their 
original offset from the GT coordinate system.  Comparing the relative position of a 
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 where the calcPointToPointDistance function calculates the Euclidean distance 
between the two points. When this distance is zero, the position of the two nodes is a 
perfect match, as would be the case if the VIH node is a non-distorted copy of the GT 
node.  The model divides the distance by an upper limit parameter to linearly convert 
the distance variation to a fraction between zero and one, where one is the maximum 
possible distortion value, and distances that are greater than or equal to the upper limit 
parameter are assumed equal to one.  This distance fraction value is used as the 
abscissa for the S- shape curve shown in Figure 8-16.  The curve could, of course, have 
been constructed using the actual distance values as the abscissa, but separating the 
two calculations allows reuse of the same standard curve table for other measures. 
 
Figure 8-16 S-Shaped Value Curve 
8.7.2 Expectation Match 
There is an extensive literature on the role of expectation in situation awareness and 
how individual expectations bias a variety of human decision processes.  The candidate 
selection value hierarchy includes a measure to account for expectation bias.  This 
measure allows favoring a candidate node in selection of a GT node match if it is the 




a binary measure, taking on only the values zero and one.  It provides a simple example 
of the categorical measures supported by the value hierarchy methodology, which 
supports multiple categories, requiring only that the sum of their values is equal to one. 
 
 Figure 8-17 Binary Expectation Measure 
8.7.3 Links Match 
  A key characteristic of any node is the number of arcs that lead from it or into it, as 
well as the directions those arcs take in linking the node to other nodes.  Comparison of 
two nodes with respect to arc links is based on the number of links in each quadrant of a 
coordinate system with its origin at the node.  As shown in Figure 8-18, Anylogic 
coordinate systems are oriented with the positive Y-axis below the X-axis as opposed to 
the Western tradition of placing it above the X-axis.  As also shown in the figure, bearing 
angles are calculated as the counter-clockwise offset from the positive Y-axis. 
I use a fuzzy quadrant membership correspondence in order to not over-exaggerate 
direction differences of links that may be only slightly distorted, but which might cross 
quadrant boundaries, i.e., links that are close to the boundary of two quadrants are 
considered to be partially in each of those two quadrants.  Each arc link is associated 
with the angle, α, it makes with the initial quadrant boundary, as defined by the 
counter-clockwise initial limit of the quadrant and calculated as the remainder in integer 




reference angles used for standard trigonometric functions, can thus be oriented to 
either the X or Y-axis as appropriate. 
 
Figure 8-18 Calcuation of Bearing and Quadrant Membership Angles on the AnyLogic 
Coordinate System 
Given the angle α, quadrant membership is calculated as shown in Figure 8-19.  In 
this implementation of the membership function, angles between 20o and 70 o are 
assumed to be fully in the quadrant, i.e., quadrant membership equal to one. Angles 
from 0o to 20o are assumed to take on linearly increasing membership in the given 
quadrant from 0.5 to 1.0 and linearly decreasing membership in the previous quadrant 
from 0.5 to 0.0.  Similarly angles between 70o and 90o are assumed to take on linearly 
decreasing membership from 1.0 to 0.5 in the given quadrant and increasing 
membership in the next quadrant from 0.0 to 0.5.  Experimentation with minor 
modifications of the membership function has shown that the model results and 
conclusions are not sensitive to its exact form. 
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Figure 8-19 Quadrant Membership Calculation 
 The resultant fractional membership values for all node links are added by 
quadrant and stored as the number of links per quadrant.   Comparison of nodes by link 
matches calculates the difference in the fractional membership values by quadrant for 
the two nodes, with the total difference over all four quadrants representing the links 
difference between the two nodes.  This difference value is used as the x-axis value for 
the value hierarchy measure shown in Figure 8-20 . 
Here the measure is implemented as a piece-wise linear function with the upper 
limit set to 1.0 after the links difference exceeds 3.0.  This function could, of course, 
have been implemented using the two-step procedure from the distance difference 
match measure.  The use of the piece-wise linear function is primarily to illustrate that 
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form of measure, and again, in this instance the specific form has little or no effect on 
results and conclusions. 
 
Figure 8-20 Links Difference Match Measure 
A more comprehensive implementation of the links match measure would look at a 
number of other potentially distinguishing features.  To name just a few: 
  is the link part of a specific road, highway or other wayfare;  
 does the link have specific terrain attributes affecting trafficability;  
 is it possessed of, or does it border, visually distinguishing features? 
9. FUTURE WORK: LINKS FEATURES 
 Exploration of such features is a potentially rich source of research, with 
respect to all aspects of agent movement: route planning, route following, 
node recognition and way finding.  
8.7.4 Color Match 
There are a potentially infinite number of features with continuous or semi-
continuous membership measures that could characterize nodes: degree of urban/rural 
qualities; population; extent of risk from adversary action or natural causes; availability 
of desired resources; trafficability constraints, and so on.  Any or all of such features 
could be distorted in the VIH map, and might be considered while attempting to match 
VIH candidate nodes to GT nodes.  Rather than selecting specific instances of these, two 




These characteristics are designated as Color 1 and Color 2 attributes of each node 
and can take default values as the line and fill color of the node’s AnyLogic presentation 
object.  Each color attribute actually specifies three separate values, the description of 
the color according to its RGB components. In RGB format, the red, blue, and green 
components of a color are given as an integer from 0 to 255, where 0 indicates no 
contribution from this primary color,  and 255 indicates that it is present in its maximum 
intensity. As with the links difference, for each node being compared, the differences in 
each component for a color attribute are calculated and summed.  As with the distance 
match component, this sum is normalized by dividing by the maximum possible 
difference, which for any two colors is 765, and the result used as the x-axis value for 
the measure illustrated in Figure 8-16. 
8.7.5 Candidate Node Selection 
For each tier of the value hierarchy branch, values are calculated as a weighted sum 
of the values from the immediately preceding branch elements.  Weights are 
established as model input parameters and are subject to the constraint that for all the 
branches connecting at that tier the weights must sum to one. Thus at each tier, each 
branch of the value hierarchy contributes a normalized and weighted value to the tier 
above.  For the value hierarchy of Figure 8-15, the individual normalized measures for 
the two color attributes are weighted and summed to a single value between zero and 
one, and that value weighted and summed with all the normalized measure values of 
the other attributes.     
Table 8-1 Candidate Node Comparison 
 
For the example of Figure 8-14,  


















vB 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
vK 0.04 0.65 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.54 0.46
B vBK 0.75 0.65 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.48 0.52
vAV 0.04 0.25 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.46 0.54




correspondence of the candidate nodes.   
In this instance, VIH node vB, with no distortion from the ground truth map in any 
way, has a perfect match value of 1.0. Hence vB will be selected as the VIH node 
matching the current GT node.  Since this node is on the VIH path to the goal, the agent 
will next choose the link it believes leads to the next node on the route.  As noted 
above, for this particular example, the agent fails to find the correct link when it reaches 
the next node in its path and instead backtracks.  The complete node history for this 
example is: AV, B, AR, B, AV; the entity ends up back at its start node and dead ends.  At 
that point the GT agent has no untaken links left to try.  In this particular case, the VIH 
agent’s node recognition was perfect, it recognized all of the nodes it encountered, but 
the entity still failed to reach its goal.  
8.7.6 Recognition Results 
For post-simulation analysis the model classifies recognition results in several 
categories: 
 True Positive – the recognized node corresponds to the GT node; 
 True Negative – none of the candidate nodes correspond to the GT node; 
 False Positive – the recognized node does not actually correspond to the GT 
node; 
 False Negative – the agent does not recognize a VIH node candidate when one 
actually corresponds to the GT node; 
 Recognition Fail – sum of the results for false negative, true negative, and 
rejection of a true positive based on a Monte Carlo draw against an input 
parameter to simulate random errors in recognition.  
The number and relative frequency of node recognition decisions resulting in each 




9 EXPLORATION OF VIH MAP DISTORTION EXPERIMENTS 
This set of simulation experiments explores the effects of mental map distortion on 
agent movement.  The simulation DOE was designed to emphasize variation in spatial 
distortion, both with respect to the number of nodes whose position in modified on the 
VIH Map and with respect to extent of x and y coordinate shifts.  
 Some topological distortion is introduced by removing randomly selected nodes 
from the mental map, but nodes to which they connect are reconnected to each other 
to maintain overall network connectivity.     
It is possible to represent distortion in node color characteristics as well, but this 
capability was not used for this set of experiments. 
9.1 Experimental Setup 
Simulation trials were executed for each map, varying all of the parameters listed in 
Table 9-1, with each combination of parameter values run for fifty trials.  
The simulation experiments used the three basic ground truth maps shown in Figure 
8-2, Figure 8-3 and Figure 8-4. The first three parameters listed in the table were used to 
construct the different VIH maps for each trial, specifying the amount and extent of 
distortion of the given GT map as described above in Chapter 8.4.  The next two values 
given identify the node match weights and the resulting match weight coefficients in the 
node recognition value hierarchy as described above in Chapter 8.7.   Finally, the last 
row provides the three values used for GT-VIH Threshold confidence limit as described 
in that chapter. 
Each of the 36 different combinations of distortion parameters was run against each 
of the three threshold confidence limit values, with 150 trials for each case, resulting in 





 Table 9-1 Experiment 1 Parameter Values 
Parameter Parameter Values 
Pr(NE):  Probability node location (X and Y values) is distorted, i.e., 
probability node X and Y values will vary from Ground Truth on the 
mental map 
0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 
X and Y Er Lim: maximum amount of distortion in X and Y 25, 75, 125 
Pr(MN): Probability of missing nodes i.e., probability that a selected 
node will be removed from the mental map 




All Match Coefficients 0.2 
GT-VIH Correspondence Threshold 0.65, 0.75, 0.85 
9.2 Results: Assessment of Normal vs. Abnormal Termination 
The first question of interest for each trial is whether the entity succeeds in finding 
its goal.  As shown in Figure 9-1, the entity’s overall success rate is 61%. 
 
Figure 9-1 Frequency of Normal and Abnormal Termination Over All Trials 
                                                     
 
90 The match weight values are used to determine match coefficients, the match coefficients for each criteria equals the match 
weight of that criterion divided by the total of all match weights.  As shown here, with  all the match weights are set  to 1, all the 




9.2.1 Statistical Significance91 
It is important to begin a discussion of the statistical treatment of these simulation 
experiments by reiterating the over-all goal of the human-centric approach, which is not 
to predict human behavior but to study it.  Model fit techniques are employed primarily 
to provide insight into the nature of the results, and are used to determine when and 
how input parameters affect those results.  In cases where models are fit to nominal or 
categorical results, the concern is less with the degree of predictive classification 
provided by those models than with the explanatory insights supported.  
For categorical data, JMP calculates a Logistic Fit Model instead of the standard least 
squares fit for numerical data. Logistic regression fits nominal Y responses to a linear 
model of X terms.  The standard JMP model for nominal or categorical data uses   
logistic regression based on maximum-likelihood estimation, selecting the set of X 
coefficients, 𝞫i, that maximize the probability of the model output matching the Yj 
values actually observed in the experimental results.  
For binary response levels, the function is: 
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OR EQUIVALENTLY: 
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In the case where  r>2, i.e, more than two nominal responses, JMP fits r-1 sets of 
linear model parameters of the following form: 
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As stated above, the fitting principal of maximum likelihood means that the βs are 
chosen to maximize the joint probability attributed by the model to the responses that 
did occur. This fitting principal is equivalent to minimizing the negative log-likelihood:  
               ∑     (   (   
 
   
                          ))  
JMP provides several tests to compare the fit of the specified model with subset or 
superset models, as illustrated in Figure 9-2. 
 
Figure 9-2 Relationship of Statistical Tables92 
If a test shows significance, then the higher order model is justified: 
  Whole model tests: if the specified model is significantly better than a 
reduced model without any effects except the intercepts. 
  Lack of Fit tests: if a saturated model is significantly better than the 
specified model. 
                                                     
 





  Effect tests: if the specified model is significantly better than a model 
without a given effect. 
For the complete model fit of all 16,200 trials considering all two-way interactions 
between the five variables (Map Type, Pr(NE), XandY Error Limit, Pr(MN), and 
Confidence Threshold Limit) that were varied for this experiment. The logistic fit model 
converged in gradient in five iterations, with the results shown in Table 9-2. 
Table 9-2 Whole Model Test 
 
The Whole Model Table tests the null hypothesis that all of the 𝞫is are zero; it 
compares the whole-model fit to the model that omits all the regressor effects except 
the intercept parameters. The test is analogous to the Analysis of Variance table for 
continuous responses. The negative log-likelihood corresponds to the sums of squares, 
and the Chi-square test corresponds to the F test. 
The JMP Whole Model Table uses the terminology shown in Table 9-2: 
Model  -LogLikelihood DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq









Generalized RSquare 0.4212 (1-(L(0)/L(model))^(2/n))/(1-L(0)^(2/n))
Mean -Log p 0.4827
RMSE 0.3982
Mean Abs Dev 0.3165
Misclassification Rate 0.2358
N 48600
∑      ρ[j] / 
√ ∑ y[j] ρ[j] ²/ 
∑ |y[j] ρ[j]|/ 
n
∑  ρ[j]≠ρ    / 
Whole Model Test
Nominal Logistic Fit for Binary Termination






 Difference - the difference between the Reduced and Full models. It measures 
the significance of the regressors as a whole to the fit. 
 Full - the negative log-likelihood for the complete model. 
 Reduced - the negative log-likelihood that results from a model with only 
intercept parameters. Here the –LogLikelihood for the reduced model that 
includes only the intercepts is 32498.024. 
 DF - associated degrees of freedom (DF) for the Difference between the Full 
and Reduced model. Here, there two-way factorial design of the fit considers 
the possible one-way and two-way combinations of variables, which is 15, but 
since the map type is a categorical values with 3 possible values, it contributes 
two degrees of freedom for each of the 5 combinations in which it is 
considered, yielding a total of 20 degrees of freedom. 
 Chi-Square - Likelihood-ratio Chi-square test for the hypothesis that all 
regression parameters are zero. It is computed by taking twice the difference 
in negative log-likelihoods between the fitted model and the reduced model 
that has only intercepts. 
 Prob>ChiSq - probability of obtaining a greater Chi-square value by chance 
alone if the specified model fits no better than the model that includes only 
intercepts. Here the value is far less than 0.001 indicating a very high degree 
of significance to the contributions of the full model. 
 RSquare (U) -  the R2 value, which is the ratio of the Difference to the Reduced 
negative log-likelihood values. It is sometimes referred to as U, the 
uncertainty coefficient. RSquare ranges from zero for no improvement to 1 
for a perfect fit. As in this case, a Nominal model rarely has a high Rsquare, 
and it has a Rsquare of 1 only when all the probabilities of the events that 
occur are 1. 
 Measure - gives several measures of fit to assess model accuracy.   
Of these measures provide, probably the most useful is the Misclassification Rate,   the rate 
for which the response category with the highest fitted probability is not the observed category.  
In this instance, the misclassification rate of 0.2358 of the fitted model can be compared to the 
misclassification rate of 0.3898, which would be obtained in one simply guessed that the result on 




be Abnormal Termination, which occurs approximately 61% of the time.  Table 9-3 shows the 
confusion matrix for the Logistic Regression Fit Model calculated here. 
Table 9-3 Confusion Matrix 
 
As similar view of the effectiveness of the model is provided by the Receiver 
Operating Curve (ROC), shown for the current model in Figure 9-3.  In this instance, the 
area under the curve (AUC)  is  0.83838. This value shows that the model provides a fair 
amount of predictive capability, but still allows for further refinement through the 
consideration of other factors. 
 
Figure 9-3 Logistic Fit Model ROC Curve 
Actual/Predicted Abnormal Termination Normal Termination
Abnormal Termination 11469 7478





The model’s capability can be further quantified through provides a Lack of Fit test, 
sometimes called a Goodness of Fit test. JMP calculates lack of fit using a pure-error 
negative log-likelihood, constructing categories for every combination of the regressor 
values in the data (the Saturated line in the Lack Of Fit table), and it testing whether this 
log-likelihood is significantly better than the Fitted model.  JMP results are shown in 
Table 9-4. 
Table 9-4 Lack Of Fit 
 
Here there are 323 Saturated degrees of freedom, which is one less than the 
number of unique populations sampled in the experiment, i.e., 16200/50 -1. The Fitted 
degrees of freedom value is the number of parameters not including the intercept, 
which again in this case is 20.  The Lack of Fit DF is the difference between the Saturated 
and Fitted models, in this case 323 -20 = 303. 
The Lack of Fit table lists the negative log-likelihood for error due to Lack of Fit, error 
in a Saturated model (pure error), and the total error in the Fitted model, and again uses  
Chi-square statistics test for lack of fit.  For the fitted logistic model, the lack of fit Chi-
square is highly significant (Prob>ChiSq < 0.001) and supports the conclusion that more 
complex terms need to be added to the model. 
Finally, it is also desirable to test the value each variable provides to the model fit. 
The JMP Effect Likelihood tests, for the 𝞫i corresponding to each model term, the null 
hypothesis that 𝞫i , is equal to zero.   If the p value for a given coefficient 𝞫i is small, the 
null hypothesis should be rejected, implying that the variable Xi does influence the 
probability that Yi will be predicted correctly. The Likelihood-ratio Chi-square tests are 
calculated as twice the difference of the log-likelihoods between the full model and the 
model constrained by the hypothesis to be tested (the model without the effect). 
Source DF  -LogLikelihood ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq







Table 9-5 lists the model terms and shows them all to be significant at the 95 % 
confidence level and all but one to be significant at the 99.9% confidence level. 
Table 9-5 Effect Likelihood Tests 
 
9.2.2 Analysis of Parameter Effects 
Having established the significance of the distortion model parameters, it is next 
appropriate to examine the nature of their effects and their possible interactions. 
Figure 9-4 shows a breakdown of the normal termination probability observed in 
Figure 9-1 , now calculated as the observed frequency of normal terminations for each 
of the combinations of distortion error parameters.  As one would expect, as the 
amount of total distortion increases, the fraction of normal terminations decreases.  
Given that each entry in the Figure 9-4 represents more than 1000 model trials, and 
given the size of frequency differences shown, one can conclude the differences are 
significant in both a statistical and a practical sense. 
Further insight into the parameter effects is obtained by looking at the individual logistic 
fits of binary termination conditions by each of the distortion factors applied. Figure 9-5 
Source Nparm DF L-R ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
Map 2 2 993.756 <.0001
Pr(NE) 1 1 3885.475 <.0001
XEr Lim 1 1 10354.970 <.0001
Pr(MN) 1 1 216.407 <.0001
 GT-VIH Corspnd Thrshd 1 1 1295.929 <.0001
Map*Pr(NE) 2 2 7.706 0.0212
Map*XEr Lim 2 2 84.468 <.0001
Map*Pr(MN) 2 2 20.762 <.0001
Map* GT-VIH Corspnd Thrshd 2 2 50.613 <.0001
Pr(NE)*XEr Lim 1 1 945.211 <.0001
Pr(NE)*Pr(MN) 1 1 32.135 <.0001
Pr(NE)* GT-VIH Corspnd Thrshd 1 1 102.186 <.0001
XEr Lim*Pr(MN) 1 1 173.145 <.0001
XEr Lim* GT-VIH Corspnd Thrshd 1 1 337.804 <.0001
Pr(MN)* GT-VIH Corspnd Thrshd 1 1 20.324 <.0001




shows the results of these individual fits, which indicate that for the cases observed, 
variation in the spatial distortion factors appears to translate to greater variation in 
termination condition than does variation in distorting the topology by removing nodes 
but leaving the network connected. Topological variation is revisited in Chapter 12, 
where the possibility of a disconnected VIH network is explored. 
 
Figure 9-4 Probability of Normal Termination 
 
Figure 9-5 Separate Logistic Fit of Y by X for Binary Termination by Pr(NE), X and Y 
Error Limit, and Pr(MN) 
Probability of 
Missing Nodes
Amount of X 
and Y Error 0.15 0.3 0.5 0.7
Row 
Average
25 0.984 0.963 0.951 0.950 0.962
75 0.830 0.624 0.459 0.361 0.568
125 0.747 0.443 0.259 0.140 0.397
25 0.920 0.904 0.884 0.841 0.887
75 0.776 0.600 0.466 0.378 0.555
125 0.701 0.421 0.247 0.131 0.375
25 0.853 0.849 0.823 0.800 0.831
75 0.770 0.594 0.464 0.340 0.542
125 0.662 0.429 0.251 0.151 0.373
0.805 0.647 0.534 0.455 0.610
All Maps                                          
Equal Match Coefficients                    










In the cases shown here, the VIH agent had the ability to use all five of the GT-VIH 
match factors in determining whether any candidate VIH node passed the GT- VIH 
correspondence threshold.  The experiments did look at one key recognition process 
parameter, altering the threshold limit for accepting a VIH Node as match to a GT Node. 
As shown in Figure 9-6, there is little variation between the threshold at 0 .60 and 
that at 0.75, but considerable difference when the threshold moves to 0.90.  While it is 
premature to make any specific conclusions at this point, it is worth noting that with all 
of the match coefficients set to 0.20, complete failure in one of them, as for example 
the binary-valued expectation coefficient, would result in a match failure at the 0.90 
level but would not at the other two. Later experiments explore the effects of the match 
coefficients and threshold values in more detail. 
 
Figure 9-6 Normal Termination by GT-VIH Correspondence Thresholds 
Normal Termination GT-VIH Correspondence Threshold = 0.6
Normal Termination GT-VIH Correspondence Threshold = 0.9




9.2.3 Normal Termination by Map 
The three GT maps used in the experiment were constructed so as to offer different 
degrees of challenge to the entity moving on them, Figure 9-7 shows that this goal was 
achieved with respect to the square grid map, on which normal termination occurred 
significantly more often than on the other two.  In this instance the polygonal map  had 
fewer normal terminations than the multi-feature map with 95% significance, but only 
barely so, as the confidence intervals for the two values fail to overlap by 0.57747 (the 
lower confidence interval limit for the multi-factor map)  – 0.56340 (the upper 
confidence interval value for the polygonal map) = 0.01407.   
 
Figure 9-7 Termination Condition by Map 




contingency analysis in Figure 9-8. 
 





9.2.4 Regression Tree Analysis 
JMP also supports the use of partitioning and regression tree analysis to fit a model 
to experimental data.  In partition analysis classes of the dependent variable, in this case 
binary termination mode, are divided according to their probability of occurrence given 
different values of the independent variables from the design of experiments as per 
Table 9-1.  
This process begins with the construction of contingency tables based on the 
observed frequency of dependent variable responses compared to the expected 
frequency under the null hypothesis that response rates are independent of the various 
parameter values.  JMP® software implements this process by iteratively exploring all of 
the possible two factor contingency tables for combinations of the parameter levels and 
response possibilities. For each possible contingency table JMP® calculates the G2 
statistic: 
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where μij is approximated by 
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 The formula finds the expected number in each cell by multiplying the proportion of 
the col contributions to the overall sum times the row size. When partitioning data, the 
G2 is exploring evidence for the null hypothesis that the row and col variables are 
statistically independent, the larger the statistic, the greater the evidence they are 
dependent.  The ideal situation would be to partition the data so that the column data, 
which represent the response variables or different experimental outcomes, are 
completely determined by the values of the row data, which are the factors of the 
experimental design.   The degrees of freedom in a test of independence are equal to 
(number of rows)−1 × (number of columns)−1 




iteration.  Figure 9-9 shows how this process works.  
 
Figure 9-9 First Steps in the Regression Tree Partition Process  
At step 1 G2 values are calculated for all possible splits among the values of the eight 
variables under consideration. In this case the X and Y Error Limit produces the largest 
G2 value.  As recalled from Table 9-1, the possible X and Y Error Limit values are 25, 75, 
and 125, and JMP determines the best split partitions the data into two classes, class 1 
where the Error Limit is <75, i.e., equal to 25, and class 2 where the error limit is =>75, 
i.e., = to either 75 or 125.  The process is repeated for each of the two new classes.  The 
best splits are found to be: 







Multi-Factor Maps together and isolates the Square Map by itself; and 
 Class 2 on Pr(NE) – which will end up differentiating between values less than 
0.5, i.e., 0.1 and 0.3 and values greater than or equal to 0.5, i.e., 0.5 and 0.7. 
Here the split of class 2 provides the best result for the next partition. 
Figure 9-10 shows the regression tree after ten splits.  As one can see, there is no 
requirement for symmetry in the partition tree; at any split any class which has not yet 
been partitioned is considered for the next partition.  
Figure 9-11 provides a different graphical view of the partition tree after the same ten 
splits, while Table 9-6 provides a breakdown of the leaf structure of the tree.  This table 
provides an in-depth view of the nature of the splits and the relative contributions of 
each parameter to the tree. 





















Both views of the tree further show the interaction between the GT-VIH 
correspondence threshold and the spatial distortion parameters.  As one would expect 
from the previous analysis, correspondence threshold splits first pair 0.6 and 0.75 in one 
group and 0.9 in another.  
It is easy to see the effects of the partitioning process in Figure 9-11, where each 
successive partition reflects the degree to which the results differ from class to class.  
The width of the columns in the figure also highlight the relative proportion of the 
experimental results covered in each partition class. 
9.3 Refinement of Abnormal Termination Results 
The previous chapters looked at a binary breakdown of simulation experiment 
outcomes as either normal termination, i.e., the entity successfully arrived at its goal 
node, or abnormal termination, i.e., the entity failed to reach its goal.  As discussed 
above in Chapter 8.5.2, there are a total of five different ways the entity can fail to reach 
its goal: dead end; lost no; lost no goal; failure to recognize a true goal; or accepts a 
false goal.  Figure 9-12 shows the relative occurrences of each of these categories for 
the 18947 trials (39.0 of the total) that resulted in abnormal termination. 
 
Figure 9-12 Frequencies of Abnormal Termination 
A prime rationale for the investigation of these results is to seek out the conditions 




or minimize any or all of the types of failure. To further that end, the simulation model 
provides output data to support examination of the details of entity behavior with 
respect to any of these failure categories.  For example, the most prevalent category, 
Lost No Node, indicates that the entity found itself to traveling on an arc and failing to 
find a node where it expected one. This condition occurs when: 
  the spatial distortion moves a node so the VIH map considers that node 
to be much closer to the arc link’s terminal node than it is in ground 
truth; 
 the entity has failed to recognize a VIH node corresponding to its actual 
ground truth position, and takes an arc link, while not knowing the 
distance to that arc link’s terminal node; 
   the entity knows where it is on both the GT Map and the VIH, but spatial 
and/or topological distortion in the VIH map cause it to makes an 
incorrect arc link choice, i.e., failing to recognize the ground truth arc link 
that actually corresponds to its desired VIH path choice. 
The entity’s physical movement element, the GT agent moves in response to the 
directions provide it by the entity’s cognitive component, the VIH agent.  If the GT agent 
is at a GT node, these directions consist of specifying the bearing of the GT arc link 
chosen by the VIH agent, and a distance to travel along that arc.  Two input parameters 
control the distance value given.  
The first of these values is a multiplier applied to the VIH distance to the arc link’s 
expected terminal node, if this node is known.  This multiplier establishes a stopping 
threshold as a fraction of the expected VIH distance the VIH agent is willing to exceed, 
the idea being that the greater the expected distance, the more tolerant the agent will 
be of error.   For the current experiment this value is set to 1.2, indicating the agent has 
a 20% error tolerance. 
 The second value is specified by the Keep Searching Distance parameter and is at 




exploration with some preliminary experiments, and obviously can be further explored 
through other parametric experiments.   
10. FUTURE WORK MOVEMENT CONSTRAINT THRESHOLDS AND RISK TOLERANCE:  
These two distance parameters are accompanied by other movement constraint 
thresholds whose effects can be studied in conjunction with varying the effects of the 
entity’s risk tolerance.   Thorough exploration of such factors requires model 
modifications to introduce uncertainty factors in node and arc link recognition factors 
and other characteristics.  The simulation model is designed to accommodate such 
features, but new code and additional input data features are required to implement 
them. 
The GT agent travels along the chosen arc link until it either encounters a GT node or 
exceeds the distance set by the VIH agent.  In either instance, it stops and requests 
further direction from the VIH agent, following the logic shown in Figure 8-10 above. If 
the GT agent is at a GT node, the VIH agent executes the code in block 7 of that figure, 
which requires a node recognition decision by the VIH agent.  If the GT agent is stopped 
along an arc the VIH agent enters the state “notAtGroundTruthNodeLogic”, which 
requires an intra-Path decision.  The simulation model tracks the number of times each 
of these decision states occurs.  Node recognition decisions have a number of possible 
outcomes, as detailed in Chapter 8.7.6, and the frequency of each of these outcomes is 
provided as output.  At present, the intra-path decision can have only two outcomes: if 
it has exceeded its distance thresholds declare a Lost No Node condition and quit, or 
else keep going until does exceeds those thresholds or encounters a GT node, whichever 
comes first. 
As would be expected, there is a significant correlation between the number of 
intra-path decisions and abnormal termination in general (shown in Figure 9-13), and in 





Figure 9-13 Frequency of Intra-Path Decisions by Normal and Abnormal Termination 
Conditions 
 
Figure 9-14 Logistic Fit of Abnormal Termination Categories by number of Intra-Path 
Decisions 









respect to the parameters of the simulation DOE, again reveals high significance with 
respect to the whole model test (Table 9-7) and most of the two-way interactions (Table 
9-9).  Again, however, the lack of fit test, Table 9-9, shows there are significant effects 
not accounted for in the logistic fit model. 
Table 9-7 Abnormal Termination Categories JMP Nominal Logistic Fit 
 
Table 9-8 Abnormal Termination Categories Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests 
 
Table 9-9 Abnormal Termination Categories Fit Lack of Fit 
Model  -LogLikelihood DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq








Nominal Logistic Fit for Abnormal Termination
Converged in Gradient, 7 iterations
Source Nparm DF L-R ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
Map 8 8 652.321 <.0001
Pr(NE) 4 4 25.700 <.0001
XEr Lim 4 4 410.606 <.0001
Pr(MN) 4 4 136.758 <.0001
 GT-VIH Corspnd Thrshd 4 4 1303.300 <.0001
Map*Pr(NE) 8 8 43.762 <.0001
Map*XEr Lim 8 8 42.964 <.0001
Map*Pr(MN) 8 8 8.152 0.4187
Map* GT-VIH Corspnd Thrshd 8 8 133.318 <.0001
Pr(NE)*XEr Lim 4 4 40.370 <.0001
Pr(NE)*Pr(MN) 4 4 6.026 0.1972
Pr(NE)* GT-VIH Corspnd Thrshd 4 4 342.320 <.0001
XEr Lim*Pr(MN) 4 4 33.937 <.0001
XEr Lim* GT-VIH Corspnd Thrshd 4 4 550.605 <.0001
Pr(MN)* GT-VIH Corspnd Thrshd 4 4 38.468 <.0001





Figure 9-15 Abnormal Termination Categories JMP Logistic Fit Lack of Fit 
Further evidence of this lack of fit is given by the confusion matrix, Table 9-10 as one 
sees the model vastly over predicts the most frequently occurring category (Lost No 
Node) and under predicts everything else. 
Table 9-10 Abnormal Termination Categories Logistic Fit Confusion Matrix 
 
For more insight, one can again turn to a partition tree graph, as shown in Figure 9-16.  
The most dominant effect seen in this tree is the split on the GT-VIH Correspondence 
Threshold.  When this threshold is equal to 0.9, there are virtually no false positives in 
recognizing the simulation goal, while they are observed when this threshold is relaxed. 
More false positives are also seen of the Square Grid Map, which is not surprising as the 
map’s regularity increases the similarity between nodes.   
The relative contributions of each combination of parameter values used to determine 
these first splits is shown in Figure 9-17, which shows the partition tree leaf report. 
Source DF  -LogLikelihood ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq



















Goal 83 127 681 116 48 1055
Dead End 16 945 2521 203 672 4357
No Node 79 789 4646 214 660 6388
Unrecognized 
Real Goal 31 424 1687 284 729 3155
Wandering Too 
Long 10 620 2155 193 1014 3992
Column Totals  















9.4 Assessment of Normal Termination 
While the simulation model does not explicitly determine separate categories for 
normal termination, it does provide sufficient output detail to assess different degrees 
of successful outcomes.  The most obvious of these distinctions is the comparison of the 
actual distance traveled compared to the optimum distance, as measured by the 
shortest possible ground truth path. Figure 9-18 divides normal termination into 
categories:  
 Zero deviation from optimum ; 
 0 < deviation from optimum <= 0.01; 
 0.01 < deviation from optimum <= 0.1; and 
 0.10 < deviation from optimum. 
 




The figure shows the relative occurrences of each of these categories for the 29653 
trials (61% of the total) that resulted in normal termination.  The whole model fit test 
for a JMP nominal logistic fit again is statistically significant at the 99.9% confidence 
level, but with a misclassification rate of 0.371, the model essentially predicts that all of 
the outcomes will fall in the zero deviation from optimum category. The two-way factor 
effects likelihood tests are similarly all statistically significant with only one exception.  
The most obvious rationale for this outcome is simply that frequently the GT path 
and the VIH path consist of the same nodes, and as long as the entity stays on its path, it 
will travel the ground truth distance.  Some evidence to support this hypothesis is given 
by examination of the model output for how often the entity strayed from its intended 
path.  For each trial the model output gives the number of times the VIH Agent recorded 
it was at a node not on its path. Figure 9-19 shows this count plotted against the normal 
outcome alternatives.   
While the vast majority of the time true optimality coincides with zero nodes off 
path, there is not a strict one-to-one relationship between these two model outcomes. 
An interesting element in Figure 9-19 is the number of times the entity was never off its 
path and still failed to achieve its optimal outcome, as well as the number of times it left 
its path yet did meet the optimum.  
 




The first explanation for both of these phenomena lies in the fact that the Off Path 
Count refers to the entity’s VIH path, while the achievement of path optimality is 
calculated by comparing the true distance travelled to the true optimum, length of the 
ground truth shortest distance path.  
Figure 6-20 shows the results from Figure 9-19 broken down into those cases where 
the GT-VIH Optimums are the same and those where they differ.  As expected, if the 
two paths distances are the same, meaning they are most probably the same path, then 
a zero Off Path Count ensures an optimal termination result.   
 
Figure 9-20 Comparison of Node Off Path Counts by GT-VIH Path Match Criterion 
It is still possible in both cases to stray from the path and still have an optimal result.   
During interactive trials of the simulation model two circumstances where this condition 
can occur have been observed.  In the first the VIH and GT paths don’t match, but the 
entity mistakenly (but fortuitously) moves along the actual ground truth shortest path.  
In the second, the entity happens on a portion of the arc/node network where regularity 
provides one or more equidistant path segments, each leading to the goal. 
The dominance of the zero deviation from optimum category can be seen again in 
Figure 9-21, which shows a partition tree for the normal outcomes as affected by the 
various input parameters.  Figure 9-22 provides a small tree view for explanation of the 
partitions that cannot be read in the previous figure. One has to split the regression tree 
more than 20 times to get columns in which that category is not the most likely.  














A final insight into the interaction between the entity and its environment can be 
gleaned by looking at a contingency analysis of the normal termination alternatives 
explored in this chapter, as is shown in Table 9-11.   







As before, there is a significant difference between the Square Map and the other 
two maps, but here one can also notice that the Square Map is much more prone to 
moderate deviations from the optimal route.  In other words, the Square Map appears 
to be more “forgiving” of entities that stray somewhat from there chosen path.  A 
similar breakdown by Map of the Off Path Node Analysis of Figure 9-19 is shown in 
Figure 9-23 also shows this moderate tolerance for leaving the VIH planned route. 
 








9.5 Measuring Progress Towards the Goal 
The final question for this set of experiments is whether they can contribute to 
modification/construction of entity strategies based on measures of progress towards 
the goal.  The previous chapters looked at the ways in which an entity could fail and 
ways in which the “goodness” of its success could be measured.  The question now is 
whether indications of potential failure or sub-optimal performance are available to the 
entity during the simulation.  Most of the statistics examined in the previous chapters 
are not part of the VIH agent’s knowledge; all it “knows” it what it surmises ground 
truth to be. 
 It may be possible to develop rule sets, fuzzy cognitive maps, and other inference 
schemes so that over time an entity can build up a knowledge base supporting 
modification of its mental map. At present, however, the VIH agent is limited to tracking 
its position relative to its starting point and updating the map characteristics (primarily 
position) of the nodes it recognizes.  The entity begins its movement without even any 
idea of the extent to which its map may be distorted, so any of the previously observed 
correlations between distortion parameters and probability of success are not useful to 
the VIH agent. 
The only measures currently available to that VIH agent are based tracking the 
decisions it makes and on the degree of confidence it has in those decisions.  At present 
confidence values are only calculated for node recognition decisions, but similar VFT 
hierarchies could be set up for selection of inter-node links and making intra-link 
decisions as to whether to keep going on a currently selected link.  
The model tracks a running average of entity confidence over a user-selected 
number of previous decisions. This value is currently available to model user during 
interactive simulation experiments as shown in Figure 9-24. The graph in the upper left 
corner of the figure tracks a number of statistics on node confidence including the value 




acceptance or rejection of the best fit value for the current node. 
 
Figure 9-24 Interactive Model Data Outputs 
Beneath that graph is one showing the node recognition values associated with the 
current best candidate.  The right side of the figure shows two graphs, one of which 
provides information to the user on the ground truth nature of the decisions made by 
the VIH agent, and therefor information that is not accessible to the VIH agent.   
The other graph on the right does, however, provide information that might be 
useful to the VIH agent.  Each time the VIH agent makes a node recognition decision, the 
model checks to see if other node candidates have a GT-VIH correspondence level 
within a user-selected delta of the best candidate node.   In effect, the agent is tracking 
the number of “good” alternatives it has to choose from, the idea being that the 
potential for error increases when the agent must select between nearly equal 
candidates.  While not used by the agent at present, these kinds of decision history data 
could be employed by a “lost” agent to determine when and where it might have made 




11. FUTURE WORK: “ EARNING” FROM PAST MISTAKES -  APPLICATION OF MULTI-CRITERIA DECISION 
METHODOLOGIES TO SUPPORT ADAPTIVE ENTITY BEHAVIORS 
It is important that any agent-based entity used to represent human behavior 
displays the ability to “learn” from its environment – to adapt its cognitive 
behaviors as well as its physical ones to changes in that environment.  The 
VFT approach taken herein can support such adaptation through dynamic 
SDVFs and VFT hierarchy match weights. Giving the agent the capability to 
asses the quality of its previous decisions, or any other behaviors, suggests 
the capability to possibly correct mistakes, e.g., backtracking to the node 
where it made a “wrong turn” by selecting an inappropriate link, or simply 
calculating a new “best” path.  The potential exists, however, to go beyond 
simple error correction and use evaluation of historical data modify its 
behaviors.  In this case such modification would consist of updating its mental 
map, and/or altering elements in its VFT decision process – the SDVFs and/or 
weight coefficients that define decision outcomes. 
 Another graph provides on/off path statistics, which as noted earlier on based on 
the VIH agent’s perception of whether it is on the VIH map, and hence is information 
available to the agent in making strategy decisions.  Unfortunately, as also discussed 
earlier, this information may or may not correlate to whether the agent is making 
optimal progress to its goal. 
The same is true for average node recognition confidence, while it correlates highly 





Figure 9-25 Logistic Fit Binary Termination by Average Recognition Confidence 
The potential for information available to the VIH agent to assist in evaluating its 
chances for success is shown by looking at a logistic fit to binary termination outcomes.  
The values used are: 
 Average Node Recognition Confidence; 
 Number of Off Path Nodes Observed; 
 Number of Intra-Path Decisions Made; 
 GT-VIH Correspondence Threshold; and  
 Map (under the belief that the agent can define some measure of map 
complexity or difficulty. 
The results suggest strongly that these values can support prediction of success the 
resultant model has: 
 a misclassification rate of 0.1345; 
  an AUC for the ROC curve equal to 0.92; 
 a lack of fit probability > chi-square equal to 1.0; and  
 high significance for all of the factors and two-way factor interactions. 
A note of caution is in order; the values used to fit this model were obtained only 
after the simulation ended, so the extent to which they can be correlated against 




12. FUTURE WORK: ASSESSMENT OF INCREMENTAL PROGRESS 
 Further experiments are needed to explore how dynamic the incremental 
progress measures suggested above are: 
 Do they reflect slow, steady declines in overall performance, or do 
they define abrupt discontinuities in the probability of success, and 
how robust are any strategy-changing thresholds? 
 What are the levels of interaction between the discrete and 
continuous measures? 
 Do they help distinguish between high-risk high-reward and more 
cautious strategies? 
Fit model techniques can suggest when progress may or may not be at acceptable 
levels.  For example, a regression tree partition analysis on the potential interim 
progress metrics listed above is shown in Figure 9-26, Figure 9-27, and Figure 9-28.  
Figure 9-26 shows the clear delineation the partition splits make with respect to 
probabilities of normal termination or entity “success”.  Figure 9-27 details the 
quantitative values for each split and Figure 9-28 isolates on the middle portion of the 
graph to show how these split sequences can be easily translated into if-then-else rules 
with respect to the probability of success.  The VIH agent could use such rules to 
determine if and when it might re-evaluate and/or change its goal-seeking strategy. 
Continuous variable data such as that provide by average node recognition 
confidence seem to be well adapted to the definition of fuzzy set membership criteria, 
which could then be applied to fuzzy if-then-else rules or/and fuzzy cognitive maps.  
Whichever inference scheme one chooses to apply, the result could be matched to an 
appropriate strategy.  For example, the entity could abandon a fruitless path-following 
behavior and search for a local intermediate goal such as a landmark.     
Given a number of course of action to choose from, one could also apply the VFT 
methodology to select the best candidate.   In this case, the measures of intermediate 




While at present the simulation model has only a limited number of such strategies,   
these experimental results do suggest the methodology employed herein.  It can be 
applied to evaluate current strategies, to seek to adapt them to new circumstances, or 
assist in the development and employment of new strategies all together. 
13. FUTURE WORK: FURTHER INVESTIGATION INTO INCREMENTAL MEASURES OF PROGRESS 
There are certainly other measures that could be calculated during the 
simulation as measures of incremental progress. They include: comparison of 
distance travelled against expected path distance, indications of the extent 
and degree of distortion in expected path attributes; and evidence of systemic 
distortion in expected map features.  Quantifying these elements would allow 















  Figure 9-28 If-Then-Else Rules Suggested by Partition Tree Analysis
If ANRC => 0.54
then Pr(NT) = 0.80
If 0.5423 < ANRC< 0.9780
then Pr(NT) = 0.6740
If ANRC < 0.54
then Pr(NT) = 0.11
If ANRC=> 0.98
then Pr(NT) = 0.996
If 0.5423 < ANRC < 0.98
and NIPD < 2
then Pr(NT) = 0.79
If 0.5423 < ANRC < 0.9780
and NIPD => 2
then Pr(NT) = 0.3339
If 0.7438 < ANRC< 0. 0.9780
and NIPD < 2  then PR(NT) = 0.8609
     ……
ANRC: Ave Node Recognition Confidence 







9.6 Summary of Distortion Experiment Findings  
The simulation model can produce data sufficient to discriminate between output 
classes based on model parameter values as indicated by the preponderance of 
statistically significant effects found in various fit models.  This capability to determine 
parameter and parameter interaction effects supports the search for explanatory 
hypotheses as to the causes of entity behavior.  The use of interactive simulations in 
combination with parametric experiments both supports the development of such 
hypotheses and provides evidence as to their validity. 
This set of experiments shows the expected trends entity success/failure rates as 
functions of the extent and degree of VIH map distortion – more errors in the mental 
map decrease the probability that the entity will reach its goal. 
It is useful to go beyond binary classification of success and failure to explore entity 
behavior and the model provides adequate mechanisms for breaking down these 
classes into sub-classes that support explanatory investigation into such behavior. Of 
particular interest are the trials where the entity does not achieve the success optimum, 
the minimal distance ground truth path.  These trials represent the instances where 
changes to the agent’s mental map and movement strategies could potentially improve 
performance.  They represent the fertile ground for improving SA/SU. 
Data produced by the model can support incremental assessment of entity progress 
towards goals and has the potential to support adaptive goal-seeking strategies based 
on such assessment. 
The model can accommodate any map structure that can be expressed as a planar 
arc/node network, and shows the ability to investigate the effects of network 




10 EXPLORATION OF NODE RECOGNITION FACTORS 
This set of simulation experiments takes an in depth look at the VIH agent’s ability to 
recognize ground truth nodes in terms of their correspondence with nodes on its VIH 
map. 
10.1 Experimental Setup 
Simulation trials were executed for each map, varying all of the parameters listed in 
Table 10-1, with each combination of parameter values run for 40 trials. 
Table 10-1 Experiment Parameter Values 
 
The first two parameter boxes listed in the table were used to construct the 
different VIH maps for each trial, specifying the amount and extent of distortion of the 










3  X   2  X  16 = 96
DM Coef EM Coef LM Coef CA Coef
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0.33 0.67
0 0 1 0
0 0.25 0.25 0.5
0 0.33 0 0.67
0 0.5 0.5 0
0 1 0 0
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4
0.25 0 0.25 0.5
0.25 0.25 0 0.5
0.33 0 0 0.67
0.33 0.33 0.33 0
0.5 0 0.5 0
0.5 0.5 0 0




coefficients used in the node recognition value hierarchy, and provides the variation in 
node recognition capabilities that is the subject of this experiment. All other parameter 
values were held constant, with Pr(MN) = 0.1, GT-VIH threshold confidence limit =  0.75, 
the good fit delta = 0.15, the VIH Candidate distance = 100, and the keep searching 
upper limit = 50. 
Each of the 96 different parameter combinations in Table 10-1  was run for each of 
the three maps.  The simulation experiments used the same three basic ground truth 
maps as before, in this case producing a total of 11,520 simulation runs. 
10.2 Results: Assessment of  Binary Termination Conditions 
As before, the first question of interest for each trial is whether the entity succeeds 
in finding its goal.  As shown in Figure 10-1, the entity’s overall success rate is 52%, 
considerably lower than the 61% rate in seen in the distortion experiments of Chapter 9. 
 
Figure 10-1 Normal vs. Abnormal Termination All Trials 
In the instance where all of the match coefficient weights in the VFT node 
recognition hierarchy were zero (720 of the 11520 trial), it was impossible for the entity 
to succeed – even if the entity managed to reach its goal, it wouldn’t recognize it.  Those 




in entity performance rates from the experiments of Chapter 9. 
 
Figure 10-2 Termination Results for All Node Recognition Coefficients Equal  
 shows the most direct contrast with the “all coefficients zero” or “no recognition 
case”- the 720 trials where no match coefficient is zero. For this condition to hold, all of 
the coefficients must be equal, as they were in the experiments of the previous chapter.  
In this “no zero coefficients” case the success rate is approximately 65%, an 
improvement over the 52% rate of the over-all data set that includes the “no 
recognition” case, and an indication of the importance of the VIH agent’s ability to 
recognize nodes.  
If the “all node recognition match coefficients zero” trials are ignored, the overall 
success rate in these experiments is the 55.6% listed in Figure 10-2, which can also be 
compared to the 61% success rate observed in Chapter 9. The DOE matrix for those 
experiments included higher probabilities of node distortion than are present in these 
current simulations, but it also included cases with smaller limits in the size of changes 
in X and Y coordinate values, and cases in which there was no topological distortion, so 






Figure 10-2 Termination Results for All Node Recognition Coefficients Equal  
 
Figure 10-3 Termination Results Excluding the All Coefficients Zero Trials 
Given evidence that node recognition capability does affect performance, the 
experiments of this chapter are designed to investigate whether some of the 
recognition capabilities are more important than others, and if so, which and to what 
degree.  
Examination of outcomes for each of the four node recognition match coefficients93, 
                                                     
 
93 There are actually five such coefficients in the current VFT node recognition hierarchy, but for convenience the two color 




as shown the JMP Y by X Contingency Analysis of Binary Termination in Figure 10-4, 
indicates that the “all node recognition coefficients equal” cases result in the highest 
probability of success. This case also shows that relying only on the distance match or 
color attribute measures does not appreciably differ from the all trials composite result 
and in fact is a little worse. 
Interpreting Figure 10-4 is not straightforward, as the different cases shown are not 
independent of one another.  More clarity is possible by looking at JMP Nominal Logistic 
Fit and JMP Regression Tree Analyses. 
 
Figure 10-4 Fit of Binary Termination by Node Recognition Match Coefficients 
Table 10-2 shows the JMP Whole Model Fit is statistically significant. The model has 
a misclassification rate of 29%, an improvement of almost 20% over just selecting the 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
Match, Expectation Match, and Link Match, which occupy the same level of the hierarchy.  As a result the single color coefficient 




























most common outcome, normal termination.  The confusion matrix in Table 10-3 shows 
the Logistic Regression Model over-predicts the most likely result, success/normal 
termination, and under-predicts the less likely result, failure/ abnormal termination. 
Table 10-2 Whole Model Test: Binary Termination of Node Recognition Match 
Coefficient Experiments
 
Table 10-3 Nominal Logistic Model Confusion Matrix: Binary Termination of Node 
Recognition Match Coefficient Experiments
 
The model does show statistical evidence of Lack of Fit, as provided in Table 10-4. 
 
 
Model  -LogLikelihood DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq








Nominal Logistic Fit for Binary Termination











Table 10-4 Lack of Fit Test: Binary Termination of Node Recognition Match Coefficient 
Experiments
 
The Effect Likelihood Ratio Test results are provided in Table 10-5.  They show that all of 
the match coefficient parameters have significant main factor effects and most of them 
have significant two-way interactions as well. 
Table 10-5 Chapter  Experiments Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests 
 
The spatial distortion parameters represented do not have significant main factor 
Source DF  -LogLikelihood ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq




Source Nparm DF L-R ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
Map 2 2 0.000 1
Pr(NE) 1 1 0.000 0.9988
X and Y Error Limit 1 1 0.000 0.9967
DM Coef 1 1 386.026 <.0001
EM Coef 1 1 562.030 <.0001
LM Coef 1 1 687.249 <.0001
CA Coef 1 1 1021.729 <.0001
Map*Pr(NE) 2 2 4.558 0.1024
Map*X and Y Error Limit 2 2 0.986 0.6106
Map*DM Coef 2 2 0.000 1
Map*EM Coef 2 2 0.000 1
Map*LM Coef 2 2 0.000 1
Map*CA Coef 2 2 0.000 1
Pr(NE)*X and Y Error Limit 1 1 13.199 0.0003
Pr(NE)*DM Coef 1 1 0.000 0.9998
Pr(NE)*EM Coef 1 1 0.000 0.9998
Pr(NE)*LM Coef 1 1 0.000 0.9999
Pr(NE)*CA Coef 1 1 0.000 0.9999
X and Y Error Limit*DM Coef 1 1 0.000 1
X and Y Error Limit*EM Coef 1 1 0.000 0.9999
X and Y Error Limit*LM Coef 1 1 0.000 0.9999
X and Y Error Limit*CA Coef 1 1 0.000 0.9999
DM Coef*EM Coef 1 1 54.446 <.0001
DM Coef*LM Coef 1 1 5.579 0.0182
DM Coef*CA Coef 1 1 59.965 <.0001
EM Coef*LM Coef 1 1 6.336 0.0118
EM Coef*CA Coef 1 1 71.959 <.0001




effects, but they do show significant effects when interacting with each other.  They are, 
in fact, the first values on which the regression tree splits, as seen in Figure 10-5 and 
Figure 10-6.  These splits are then followed by a variety of partitions on node 
recognition match criteria values, which do not appear to follow any consistent pattern 















10.3 Refinement of Abnormal Termination Results 
For the set of experiments in this chapter, the breakdown of the abnormal 
termination into the five “categories of failure” is illustrated in Figure 10-7. 
 
Figure 10-7 Node Recognition Match Coefficients: Abnormal Termination Breakdown 
The unrecognized goal condition occurs almost 10% of the time. It represents the 
success rate if the VIH agent has some, but very limited, node recognition capability, i.e., 
restricted to only recognizing its goal. 
These values do not differ dramatically from those in Chapter 9.   The probability of 
unrecognized real goals  and the probability of accepted false goals both increase by 




the planned path) decreases by almost 5% and the probability of no node (lost in 
between nodes) decreases by around 2%.  
Table 10-6 Abnormal Output Comparison 
 
One would expect that the 720 trials (6.25% of the total) in which no recognition is 
possible should lead to an increase in unrecognized real goals.  
In 450 (.93%) of the Chapter 9 trials the probability of missing nodes, Pr(MN), was zero, 
which should have contributed to higher probabilities of success in those trials, as all of 
the cases in this current experiment had a constant Pr(MN) =0.01.  On the other hand, 
the current experiments do not consider the highest probabilities of node error, Pr(NE) 
and missing nodes (0.7 and 0.3 respectively), which combined represent almost 2% of 
the Chapter Error! Reference source not found. results, and one would presume these 









Goal 511 9.27% 1055 5.57% 3.70%
Dead End 1232 22.35% 4357 23.00% -0.65%
No Node 1735 31.47% 6388 33.72% -2.24%
Unrecognized Real 
Goal 1110 20.13% 3155 16.65% 3.48%
Wandering Too 
Long 925 16.78% 3992 21.07% -4.29%
Total Abnormal 5513 100.00% 18947 100.00%
Abnormal Percent 
of All Trials 47.86% 38.90% 8.96%
Total Normal 6007 29653
Normal Percent of 








show how Pr(NE) and Pr(MN) affect the different categories of abnormal termination in 
the Chapter 9 experiments.   
 
Figure 10-8 Chapter 9 Distortion Experiments: Fit Abnormal Termination Conditions by 
Pr(MN)  
As the Pr(MN) increases so does the frequency of wandering too long, which helps 
explain the decrease in that category seen in the current Chapter’s results.  Similarly the 
greater number of no node results at Pr(MN) = 0 appears to overcome the decrease 
seen at Pr(MN) =0.3, which would result in the slight increase in no node responses of 
Chapter101010 results over those of Chapter 9.   
On the other hand, varying Pr(NE) shows little effect in the kinds of abnormal 
termination even though it has strong effect on the aggregate results. 
 




Table 10-7 compares the abnormal results of Chapter 10and Chapter 9. 
Table 10-7 Chapter 10 and Chapter 9 Abnormal Results Comparison 
 
The table demonstrates the capability of the model to focus on specific characteristics 
of the simulated ground truth and perceived environments, and on how they affect 
decision-making behaviors. 
14.  FUTURE WORK: SENSITIVITY ANALYSES OF NODE RECOGNITION DECISIONS 
AFIT provides an Excel add-in VFT tool that can be used to replicate specific 
node recognition decisions, evaluating the candidate VIH nodes for their 
correspondence with a given GT node. For example, the tool can explore 
shifting relative hierarchy branch weights to determine when relative ranking 
of alternatives would change. This tool would allow an in-depth sensitivity 









Goal 511 9.27% 1055 5.57% 3.70%
Dead End 1232 22.35% 4357 23.00% -0.65%
No Node 1735 31.47% 6388 33.72% -2.24%
Unrecognized Real 
Goal 1110 20.13% 3155 16.65% 3.48%
Wandering Too 
Long 925 16.78% 3992 21.07% -4.29%
Total Abnormal 5513 100.00% 18947 100.00%
Abnormal Percent 
of All Trials 47.86% 38.90% 8.96%
Total Normal 6007 29653
Normal Percent of 








coefficients and SDVF measure parameters, but it is only practical to run the 
tool off-line from the simulation model.  Using the tool to conduct sensitivity 
analysis would therefor require modifying the simulation to record relevant 
data for use in such an analysis.  The simulation currently flags node 
recognition errors, i.e., false positives, false negatives, and situations where 
no candidate passes recognition threshold values, but at present it only 
maintains a record of the number of occurrences of these conditions. The 
capability to export the relevant Gt and VIH candidate node characteristics 
could easily be added to the model.  Automatically identifying the most 
“interesting” decision errors for analysis out of thousands of trials is not so 
straightforward, which simply means that such data would be best gathered 
operating the simulation in its interactive mode.   
10.4 Assessment of Normal Termination 
Figure 10-10 shows results for normal termination using the categories developed in 
Chapter 9. The results for the current node recognition factor experiments are very 
similar to those of the spatial distortion experiments of Chapter 9. The frequencies for 
each category differ by around one to two percent between the two sets of 
experiments. 
 





Figure 10-11 provides another view of how normal termination categories are 
affected by the node recognition match coefficients. 
 
Figure 10-11  Fit of Normal Termination Categories by Node Recognition 
Coefficients 
Figure 10-12 shows the partition tree graph of a logistic regression tree for the 
current series of experiments.  The tree shows much the same structure as the binary 










In this instance, the expected node match coefficient is noticeably more prominent 
in the early splits than the other match coefficients, which may be evidence of the 
importance of staying on the planned best route.   Further evidence is provided by 
Figure 10-13, which shows the effects on optimal performance of both straying from the 
VIH path, and the VIH agent’s confidence in having recognized GT nodes on its VIH map. 
 
Figure 10-13 Percent Optimal Performance as a Function Nodes Off Path Count and 
Average Node Recognition Confidence 
Figure 10-14 shows that the Square Map is more prone to tolerate moderate deviations 
from the optimal route, a similar result to that seen in Chapter  9.  A breakdown by map 
of the off path node analysis of Figure 10-13 is similar to that provided in Figure 9-23. It 
shows essentially the same map interaction effect with nodes off path counts seen in 





Figure 10-14 Contingency Analysis of Normal Termination Alternatives 
10.5 Measuring Progress Towards the Goal 
As in Chapter 9, the potential for information available to the VIH agent to assist in 
evaluating its chances for success is shown by looking at a logistic fit to binary 
termination outcomes.  The values used are94: 
 Average Node Recognition Confidence; 
 Number of Off Path Nodes Observed; 
 Number of Intra-Path Decisions Made; and  
 Map (under the belief that the agent can define some measure of map 
complexity or difficulty. 
The results again suggest strongly that a regression model fit to these values can 
support prediction of success in MOBIL. Table 10-8 gives the results for nominal logistic 
fit models, both for all trials in the experiment and for those trials excluding the 
outcomes for the case in which all node recognition coefficients were set to zero. The 
only substantial change from the results of Chapter 9 is that here there is strong 
                                                     
 
94  GT-VIH Correspondence Threshold was not included in this analysis, as it was in the analysis performed Chapter 9 because 




evidence of model lack of fit, indicating that there is significant probability of model 
improvement through the consideration of additional factors. 
Table 10-8 Nominal Logistic Fit: Binary Termination Outcomes by Information 
Available to the VIH Agent 
 
Table 10-9 gives the significance of the individual factors and their two-way 
interaction.  The two instances where there is no evidence of significant interaction 
between the type of map and the information factors used suggest the need for further 
investigation with maps that show more difference in some of the node recognition 
characteristics.  For example, it would be interesting to explore maps that had different 
degrees of color coding for nodes and arcs. 








Misclassification Rate 0.1839 0.1921
ROC AUC 0.8192 0.9047










Map 2 2 28.762 <.0001 33.235 <.0001
Nodes Off Path Count 1 1 18.673 <.0001 29.221 <.0001
Ave Node Rec Conf 1 1 2939.245 <.0001 2371.290 <.0001
Num Intra Path Decisions 1 1 791.137 <.0001 761.565 <.0001
Map*                                 
Nodes Off Path Count 2 2 9.531 0.009 7.936 0.019
Map*                                      
Ave Node Rec Conf 2 2 0.536 0.765 0.070 0.966
Map*                                          
Num Intra Path Decisions 2 2 7.823 0.020 9.605 0.008
Nodes Off Path Count*       
Ave Node Rec Conf 1 1 27.719 <.0001 25.888 <.0001
Nodes Off Path Count* 
Num Intra Path Decisions 1 1 1.193 0.275 0.124 0.725
Ave Node Rec Conf*        
Num Intra Path Decisions 1 1 151.311 <.0001 205.116 <.0001
Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests




10.6 Summary of Node Recognition Experiment Findings  
Again the simulation model has demonstrated it can produce data sufficient to 
discriminate between output classes based on model input parameter values, 
supporting the search for explanatory hypotheses as to the causes of entity behavior.   
The entity success/failure rate trends of this set of experiments show the 
importance of node recognition factors in the probability that the entity will reach its 
goal. There are, however, only a few instances where they distinguish between the 
value of different node recognition characteristics, the most notable of these instances 
being the observations with respect to expectation matches.   
15.  FUTURE WORK : ARC/LINK RECOGNITION FACTORS 
As discussed above in Chapter in the current model the calculation of GT arc 
correspondence with VIH arc/link candidates is based only the bearing is based on the 
match between desired VIH path elements and the compass direction of available GT 
arc. VIH arc/link decisions concern both the desired VIH arc/link, i.e., the link most likely 
to lead to the next intermediate node goal, and the ability to match that arc/link to the 
choices available at the current GT node. The model could first augment decision-
making capability by providing a larger set of potential arc characteristics, such as 
identifying a set of contiguous arcs as representing a road or highway, or identifying the 
arcs as belonging to or connecting geographical regions.  The model’s incorporation of 
the OpenStreetMap structures discussed in Appendix A would facilitate these kinds of 
improvements and also allow more substantive consideration of real world 
environments.  A second, and more substantial, set of model improvement would 
require the model to apply these augmented arc/link capabilities in the use of both 
types of arc/link decisions, and would require more sophisticated logic with respect to 




11 FACTOR INTERACTION EXPERIMENTS 
The previous two chapters each provided details on effects of MOBIL’s spatial 
distortion and node recognition parameters.  This chapter briefly looks at a massive set 
of trial runs designed to provide more specifics on the interaction between these two 
sets of parameters. 
11.1 Experimental Setup 
These trials were restricted to the use of the multi-factor map, and varied the 
parameters shown in Figure 11-1. 
 
Figure 11-1 Factor Inter-Action DOE 
Again the first three boxes on the left give the parameter used to distort the VIH 
map, as does the box labeled CA Standard Deviation, whose values are used to distort 
the color attributes of nodes.  The larger matrix identifies the combinations of match 
weight coefficients used in the node recognition value hierarchy, and the GT-VIH 
Correspondence Threshold box gives the values for acceptance or rejection of the best 
candidate node. As the figure indicates, there were 3,240 distinct cases, each of which 
was executed for 50 trials resulting in a total of 162,000 MOBIL trials. Figure 11-2 shows 
the fraction of normal and abnormal outcomes observed.  There results are statistically 
significant, but don’t appear to represent any practical distinction between the two 
types of outcomes. 



























XX X X X
DM Coef Em Coef LM Coef CA Coef
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.33 0.67
0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
0.00 0.25 0.25 0.50
0.00 0.33 0.00 0.67
0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00
0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
0.20 0.20 0.20 0.40




11.2 Results: Assessment of Binary Termination Outcomes 
 
Figure 11-2 Factor Inter-Action Experiments: Binary Termination 
The breakdown of normal termination results based on the amount of spatial and 
topological distortion of the VIH map in Table 11-1 confirms the trends seen in Chapters 
10 and 9, as distortion increases the probability for success decreases.  
Table 11-2 provides a similar breakdown for the cases varying node recognition 
factors, the VFT hierarchy match coefficients and the recognition acceptance thresholds. 
The all match coefficients case again provides no capability for the entity to successfully 
achieve its goal.  For these cases at least, the expectation factor and the match in 
number of arc/links by quadrant provide by far the best that node recognition 





Table 11-1 Probability of Normal Termination as a Function of VIH Map Distortion 
 
Interestingly, in these cases the recognition threshold does not appear to by an 
important factor. 






Amount of X 
and Y Error 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7
25 0.846 0.806 0.771 0.742
75 0.746 0.548 0.419 0.313
125 0.649 0.348 0.192 0.109
25 0.756 0.719 0.681 0.655
75 0.687 0.518 0.404 0.305
125 0.578 0.335 0.189 0.105
25 0.687 0.652 0.620 0.614
75 0.627 0.474 0.369 0.294
125 0.538 0.324 0.186 0.108
MF Map                                                                         
All Trials                                                 








Figure 11-3 Fit of Binary Termination by Node Recognition VFT Coefficients 
Table 11-3 shows the statistics for the JMP nominal regression fit of binary outcomes 
by the experimental factors.  
Table 11-3  Whole Model Test: Binary Termination of Factor Interaction Experiments 
by All Case Factors 
 
Considering all of the factors produces a fit that improves the classification rate from 
about 50% for selection of the most probable outcome to better than 75%. Further 
evidence of the degree of fit model efficacy is given by the 0.84 area under the ROC 
Source DF  -LogLikelihoodChiSquare Prob>ChiSq




Model  -LogLikelihood DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq













The confusion matrix in Table 11-4shows the Logistic Regression Model over-
predicts success/normal termination, and under-predicts failure/ abnormal termination. 
Table 11-4 Nominal Logistic Model Confusion Matrix: Binary Termination Factor 
Interaction Experiments by All Case Factors 
 
Table 11-5 list all of the significant factor interactions for the JMP fit model. The 
probability of missing nodes and the node recognition confidence threshold do not 
appear on the list anywhere, while all four of the node recognition match factors appear 
as main effects. 
Shown in Figure 11-4 and Figure 11-5 is a regression tree partition of the Factor 
Interaction Experiments by all the case factor with more than 30 splits. It provides an 
eclectic mix of partition split factors, which again do not appear to follow any consistent 








Row Sums          
(Actual Observed)
Abnormal 
Termination 59512 21876 81388
Normal 
Termination 17238 63374 80612
Column Totals  












Table 11-5 Nominal Logistic Model Significant Factor Interactions: Binary Termination 
Factor Interaction Experiments by All Case Factors 
 
  
Source Nparm DF L-R ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq
DM Coef 1 1 386.026 <.0001
EM Coef 1 1 562.030 <.0001
LM Coef 1 1 687.249 <.0001
CA Coef 1 1 1021.729 <.0001
Pr(NE)*X and Y Error Limit 1 1 13.199 0.0003
DM Coef*LM Coef 1 1 5.579 0.0182
DM Coef*CA Coef 1 1 59.965 <.0001
EM Coef*LM Coef 1 1 6.336 0.0118
EM Coef*CA Coef 1 1 71.959 <.0001
LM Coef*CA Coef 1 1 56.110 <.0001
















11.3 Refinement of Abnormal and Normal Termination Results 
As in the two previous chapters, both abnormal and normal termination results can 
be further broken down into categories of failure and categories of success. Results are 
shown in Figure 11-4 and Figure 11-5. 
 





Figure 11-7 Factor Interaction Experiments: Contingency Analysis of Normal 
Termination Alternatives 
11.4 Summary of Factor Interaction Experiments 
These experiments essentially confirmed the characteristics and trends of the two 










Table 11-6 Three Chapter Comparison of Abnormal Termination Conditions 
 












Goal 511 9.27% 1055 5.57% 8712 10.70%
Dead End 1232 22.35% 4357 23.00% 22952 28.20%
No Node 1735 31.47% 6388 33.72% 24522 30.13%
Unrecognized Real 
Goal 1110 20.13% 3155 16.65% 11229 13.80%
Wandering Too 
Long 925 16.78% 3992 21.07% 13973 17.17%
Total Abnormal 5513 100.00% 18947 100.00% 81388 100.00%
Abnormal Percent 
of All Trials 47.86% 38.90% 50.24%
Total Normal 6007 29653 80612
Normal Percent of 
















0 Dev from Opt 3637 60.55% 18433 62.16% 49471 61.37%
1% Max Dev from 
Opt 510 8.49% 2788 9.40% 1246 1.55%
10% Max Dev from 
Opt 238 3.96% 1092 3.68% 5388 6.68%
10% Plus Dev from 
Opt 1622 27.00% 7340 24.75% 24507 30.40%
Total Normal 6007 100.00% 29653 100.00% 80612
Normal Percent of 
All Trials 52.14% 61.10% 49.76%
Total Abnormal 5513 18947 81388
Abnormal Percent 










12 META-ROUTE EXPERIMENTS 
The set of experiments discussed in this chapter explore the use of the most recent 
update to MOBIL, a capability referred to as meta-routes. The term “meta” is used here 
to denote an abstraction of a concept, hence meta-routes refers to a more abstract 
route concept than the explicit routes that MOBIL calculates using Dijkstra’s algorithm 
on the arc/node structures representing GT and VIH maps.  Meta-routes define a set of 
intermediate goals to support entity goal-seeking when a complete route is not 
available.   
12.1 Meta-Routes 
 Prior experiments with the model have made the assumption that the arc node 
network of the entity’s VIH map is connected, i.e., that the VIH could plan its route using 
Dijkstra’s algorithm to find the shortest path to its goal. The meta-route concept relaxes 
that assumption and allows the entity to plan a route using potentially disconnected 
landmarks to fill “holes” in its VIH map.  






Figure 12-1Example Landmarks for the Multi-Feature Map 
If a random draw on Pr(MN) divides the map’s arc node network into disconnected 
subsets, such that the entity’s start node and end goal are in different subsets, the VIH 
agent will plan a meta-route between the disconnected elements of the map using the 
landmarks.  GT nodes that are designated landmarks have two features that support the 
meta-route concept: 
 The landmarks are assumed to be present on the VIH map, i.e., they are not 
candidates for removal based on the result of the Monte Carlo draw for 
selection of missing nodes and must be present as nodes on the VIH map. 
 The landmarks are assumed to be recognizable by the VIH agent, i.e., the node 
recognition VFT value for the landmark as a candidate VIH node is set to 1.0 
when the entity is at the landmark’s GT node location.   
If the start node and end goal are disconnected, the entity picks the landmarks 















ending at the end goal via those landmarks.   
MOBIL uses a landmark adjacency matrix to define what can be referred to as meta-
connections.  Meta-connections are not associated with actual arcs on the GT or VIH 
maps; they are more correctly understood as a “next neighbor” relationship. The 
landmark adjacency matrix is used by a meta-route specific Dijkstra algorithm to find a 
series of landmarks as intermediate goals from the start node to the goal node.  After 
these intermediate goals are established, the standard Dijkstra function is applied to 
determine if there is an actual VIH node/link path between any two of the landmarks.  If 
such a path exists it is integrated into the meta-route.  
A formal mathematical description of the meta-route consists of a sequence of 
elements of the form pi  = (si,n1i… nji… ei, null) where s1 is the start node of the element 
p1, e1 is the closest landmark node to s1 , and si+1 = ei.  The nji are a sequence of VIH 
nodes connecting si and ei , if such a sequence exists or a null other wise.  The presence 
of a null anywhere in the sequence indicates that the VIH agent must go into local 
search mode to find the next landmark in the sequence. The last ei is the end node.   In 
this way the meta-route allows the agent construct a route between connected and 
unconnected elements of the VIH map, with local search between the unconnected 
nodes. 
   The concept allows considerable flexibility in defining potential goal-seeking 
strategies for the VIH agent, in that the landmarks are not assumed to be inter-
connected.  For example, the nodes may be assumed to be connected to one another as 
shown in Figure 12-2, where they form the endpoints of a polygon.  In this case, si, ei 
elements of the meta-node elements must be neighboring polygon boundary endpoints.   
It is important to note once again, that the meta-route links (highlighted as bold red 
lines) are not necessarily associated with actual GT or VIH arc/links (although such 
arc/links may or may not exist), they only indicate the meta-connections of the 





Figure 12-2 Landmarks Connected as Polygonal Endpoints 
12.2 Simulation experiments using landmarks 
MOBIL was run for a series of experiments using the Multi-Factor Map, the nodes 
shown in Figure 12-1 and three different landmark connection schemes:  
1) The one illustrated in Figure 12-2, which is referred to as 2x2 links; 
2) One in which none of the landmarks were assumed to be connected to one 
another, i.e., every entry in the landmark adjacency matrix is zero.  This lack of 
connectivity means the VIH agent was in local search mode from the start node 
to the end node with none of landmarks as potential meta-route si, ei element 
nodes.  This map is referred to as start-end (SE) only.   
3) One which all of the landmarks are assumed connected to each other, i.e., every 
entry in the landmark adjacency matrix is one. This degree of connectivity results 

















the start node and end goal are disconnected on the VIH map. 
For these experiments the Pr(NE) was given three values : 0.25; 0.50; and 0.75. 
The X and Y error limit was held constant at 100. 
The Pr(MN) was given three values: 0.3; 0.45; and 0.6. 
The GT-VI correspondence threshold was set to either 0.75 or 0.9. 
All of the node recognition match coefficients were held constant at equal weights 
for each factor. 
12.3 Results: Binary Termination Outcomes 
Since missing nodes, start nodes, and goal nodes are selected at random, the 
disconnection of the VIH Map with respect to paths from the start node to the goal 
node is also random.  Figure 12-3 shows the experimental results across all the cases, 
and separates out those cases where the VIH map was disconnected, i.e., those cases 
where the VIH agent had to rely on a Meta-route strategy to attempt to find its goal.
 
Figure 12-3 Binary Termination Results for the Meta-Routes Experiments 
The disconnected cases are approximately 56% of the total.  Figure 12-4 shows the 
effects of the three different landmark link schemes used in this set of experiments, and 




Figure 12-5 shows the effects of the input parameter levels on these results. 
 
Figure 12-4 Meta-Route Results as a Function of Landmark Link Cases 
 





















0.25 0.30 0.75 25 21.19% 12 29% 10 26% 3 8%
0.25 0.30 0.90 29 23.20% 11 30% 8 17% 10 24%
0.25 0.45 0.75 33 18.75% 14 23% 8 14% 11 19%
0.25 0.45 0.90 49 30.82% 19 38% 11 22% 19 32%
0.25 0.60 0.75 65 28.63% 24 32% 19 27% 22 27%
0.25 0.60 0.90 62 29.25% 27 39% 20 26% 15 22%
0.50 0.30 0.75 14 14.00% 8 27% 3 7% 3 11%
0.50 0.30 0.90 27 21.60% 10 24% 8 18% 9 23%
0.50 0.45 0.75 29 16.57% 14 25% 7 12% 8 13%
0.50 0.45 0.90 38 20.54% 13 22% 15 25% 10 16%
0.50 0.60 0.75 55 24.89% 22 30% 18 24% 15 21%
0.50 0.60 0.90 56 27.05% 23 32% 21 28% 12 20%
0.75 0.30 0.75 16 13.79% 5 13% 4 10% 7 19%
0.75 0.30 0.90 16 13.01% 8 16% 5 16% 3 7%
0.75 0.45 0.75 33 18.13% 13 20% 10 18% 10 17%
0.75 0.45 0.90 23 0.14 10 20% 8 14% 5 9%
0.75 0.60 0.75 41 19.71% 19 26% 14 21% 8 12%
0.75 0.60 0.90 40 19.14% 13 18% 10 16% 17 23%
All Cases
All Landmarks           
Inter-Connected
Landmarks Linked 2 
by 2
SE Only No 
Landmark Links





Table 12-1 shows the JMP Whole model fit to these parameters 
Table 12-1 Whole Model Fit Results 
 
The landmark link scheme, Pr(NE), and Pr(MN) are significant factors, with the 
landmark link scheme differentiating between the case where all the landmarks are 
RSquare 0.862005
RSquare Adj 0.738795
Root Mean Square Error 3.052668
Mean of Response 12.05556
Observations 54
Summary of Fit 
Disconnected Meta-Routes Only
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio Prob > F
Model 25 1629.9074 65.1963 6.9962 <.0001
Error 28 260.9259 9.3188
C. Total 53 1890.8333
Analysis of Variance
Source Nparm DF Sum of Squares F Ratio Prob > F
case id 2 2 196 10.5164 0.0004
Pr(NE) 2 2 245.7778 13.1872 <.0001
Pr(MN) 2 2 1036 55.5867 <.0001
GT-VIH CT 1 1 15.5741 1.6713 0.2067
case id*Pr(NE) 4 4 23.8889 0.6409 0.6378
case id*Pr(MN) 4 4 25.3333 0.6796 0.6119
case id*GT-VIH CT 2 2 3.7037 0.1987 0.8209
Pr(NE)*Pr(MN) 4 4 33.5556 0.9002 0.4771
Pr(NE)*GT-VIH CT 2 2 36.5926 1.9634 0.1592
Pr(MN)*GT-VIH CT 2 2 13.4815 0.7233 0.494
Effect Tests
Level   Least Sq Mean
all landmarks Interconnected A  14.722222
landmarks 2x2  B 11.055556
SE only no links  B 10.388889




inter connected  and the other two cases, which are not significantly different.  The all 
landmarks interconnected case had a higher normal termination rate than the other two 
cases. 
12.4 Summary of Meta-Route Experiments 
These experiments show a significant, but limited, value of landmarks as 
intermediate goals.  In the current cases, recognition factors play a larger part in the 
ultimate success of the goal-seeking entity, but much more research needs to be done 
with respect to landmarks that might divide the global map into recognizable subsets.  
In such a case it is likely that the landmarks would provide more information as to the 
nature of map locales, and thus greater guidance for entity movement. 
Ultimately, the meta-route concept is designed to serve as the foundation for 
dividing the VIH map into zones that allow the VIH agent to use the zone boundaries as 
navigation aids, e.g, follow the river until you come to a bridge, or to navigate from one 
zone to another.  The  distance metric associated with meta-route specific Dijkstra 
algorithm can be as simple as Euclidean distance (as determined in VIH coordinate 
system) or it can be modified to incorporate point, line, or area characteristics that may 
be associated with individual landmarks to make them more desirable meta-route 
choices.   For example, a landmark in an area where the VIH map provides a better guide 
to local movement (e.g., more detail in VIH node/link relationships, and more reliable 
data) may be a more desirable intermediate goal than a landmark where the VIH map 
data are sparse.    In similar fashion they could reflect areas that might be attractive/ 






13 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Robert Frost poem on page 1 of this dissertation captures the essence of our 
need for SA/SU.  When two roads diverge, we look down each one as far as we can, we 
make a choice, and we live with the consequences. 
While this dissertation focuses on imperfect SA/SU, at its core it is about decisions, 
the information upon which those decisions are based, and the consequences of having 
made them.  It provides a methodological framework to quantify and analyze elements 
of the decision process.  For such a methodology to be useful in determining how  to 
support decision makers by improving SA/SU, it must address the multiple facets of the 
question, “What makes a decision hard?”  The list is long, and includes: 
 Problem complexity 
- Does the decision-maker have to make a number of inter-related 
choices? 
- Are there large numbers of alternatives for each choice? 
- Is it difficult to distinguish between the alternatives? 
- Can very similar appearing alternatives have vastly different outcomes? 
- Are the characteristics of the alternatives highly dynamic? 
- Are there multiple alternatives that can lead to “good” outcomes? 
- Are there “robust” alternatives? 
 Information Support 
- What is the quality of the decision-maker’s initial SA/SU and what is the 




- Does the decision-maker have sufficient information to support making 
“good” choices? 
- How difficult is it to extract data from the environment? 
- Can relevant data be distinguished/filtered from irrelevant data? 
- How difficult is to understand the data that can be extracted, i.e. how 
hard is it to turn “data” into “information”? 
- To what degree are the available data reliable and how well can the 
decision-maker assess that degree of reliability? 
- Does the decision-maker have timely feedback from previous decisions?  
 Risk/Reward Factors 
- Are there high-risk/high-reward alternatives? 
- Are risk/reward factors well known? 
- What kind of uncertainty does the decision-maker face? 
This dissertation has balanced dealing with both sufficient breadth and depth of 
these questions to show that they are consonant with, and can be incorporated within, 
the methodological framework developed herein. 
In so doing, the goals set forth in Chapter 0 have all been met.  The human-centric 
paradigm has been articulated, both within the context of military MS&A and with 
respect to its potential for operations research outside the bounds of military 
application. 
The software developed for the dissertation, MOBIL has shown its ability to support 
investigation of SA/SU issues, and the associated experiments demonstrate how it might 
be used to develop goal-seeking strategies based on the risk-taking levels of the goal-
seeker. 
Certainly, there is much left to pursue and this research addresses only a very small 
part of the potential of the human-centric paradigm, as should be clear from the depth 
and breadth of the Future Work items listed throughout the dissertation and 
enumerated in Appendix B below.  




dimensions, the first of which addresses the complexity of the movement task facing an 
entity on an arc-node network, and the second which characterizes the quality of the 
information upon which that entity bases its movement decisions.  The node 
recognition process and the degrees of VIH map distortion serve as a surrogate here for 
an individual’s SA/SU.  
As used herein the quality of information encompasses the dynamic nature of the 
VIH agent’s world view and is consistent with Endsley’s three phases of SA  
 While the entity represented in the present version of MOBIL has only  a limited 
number of movement decision strategies, ultimately I would like partition the problem 
space according to the effectiveness of different strategies.  Figure 13-1 shows a 
conceptual view of how such partitioning might work.  In general the critical tradeoff 
between strategies is the degree to which their effectiveness is task and context 
specific, and their robustness.  The first of these characterizes the extent to which the 
strategy provides the optimal course of action for dealing with the exact set of 
circumstances of performing the specific task in the given environment.  The robustness 
criteria, on the other hand, captures the extent to which the strategy is adaptable and 
agile, able to find a course of action that may not be the most efficient way to perform 
the specific task under current conditions, but is less likely to fail if those conditions are 






Figure 13-1 Partitioning the Problem Space 
Meeting this ultimate goal requires development of a set of metrics s: 
 Measures of task complexity; 
 Measures of information quality; 
 Measures of task performance as a function of the strategies employed. 
The complexity of the movement task is a function of a number of different factors, 
including: 
 The nature of the arc/node network; 
 The dimensions of the task – the number and nature of the criteria that have 
to be considered in optimizing task performance; and  
 The agility and adaptability required to deal with any dynamic features of 
either the environment or the task goals. 
At present MOBIL supports only one measure of task complexity, the number of 




and MOBIL measure of task outcomes for the experiments in Chapter12, but this is 
another area in need of future work. 
 
Figure 13-2 Path Difficulty as a Measure of Task Complexity 
MOBIL does a better job of addressing information quality and task performance, as 
evidenced by the analysis of the simulation experiments in chapters 9,10,,11, and 12. 
Of course, as suggested in the Future Work paragraphs, there is much work to be 
done in these areas as well. 




only if one can demonstrate a correspondence between the actions of simulated 
entities and real world behaviors, and more importantly, if the simulation can provide 
insight into those behaviors that supports improvement in SA/SU for real world 
operations. 
The current version of MOBIL simulates a single entity interacting with a static 
environment.  The true potential of the agent-based approach used in MOBIL can only 
be realized in a dynamic environment, with multiple entities, where agent interaction 
provide the possibility of the emergent behavior characteristic of complex adaptive 
systems.     
Although MOBIL is still be limited to a significantly restricted area of the overall 
“human-centric” approach, it shows the viability of the human-centric paradigm and 
articulates the value of its application in supporting the use of modeling, simulation and 




APPENDIX  A:  MOBILE OVERVIEW 
MOBILE has three principal elements: Main, GT Agent Object, and VIH Agent Object Class.   
Main 
The first of these is Main, which is the default active object class shared by all AnyLogic 
programs - it handles initial model setup details and some of the model book-keeping functions.   
The GT arc/node network map is initialized in Main.  MOBILE has a utility function derived from 
an earlier version of the model that supports construction of the map using the AnyLogic  
graphical user interface.  In such a case the utility writes the map out to a file in a format 
consistent with OpenStreetMaps95.  
Figure A1 shows a portion of the Excel file sheet that provides the map nodes information.  
The numbers in the header row define the x axis extent of the map, these values support 
MOBILE calculation of the x-axis offset for presentation of the VIH Map alongside the GT Map 
when running MOBILE in interactive presentation Mode.  The subsequent numbers in these two 
columns represent node X and Y coordinates.   
Figure A2 shows a corresponding Excel sheet for map arc/link data, which are defined in 
terms of OpenStreetMaps Ways. The nodes belonging to each way must be defined in the Excel 
node sheet. 
                                                     
 





Figure A1 Sample Node Input Data 
 
Figure A2 Sample Arc/LInke Input Data 
  
 
header row 350 -350
<node 0 -150 -250
 <tag k= color1r v= 255
 <tag k= color1g v= 255
 <tag k= color1b v= 255
 <tag k= color2r v= 0
 <tag k= color2g v= 0
 <tag k= color2b v= 0
 <tag k= label v= A
 <tag k= style v= 0
 <tag k= width v= 1
 <tag k= radius v= 10
</node>
<node 1 -250 250
 <tag k= color1r v= 255
 <tag k= color1g v= 255
 <tag k= color1b v= 255
 <tag k= color2r v= 0
 <tag k= color2g v= 0
 <tag k= color2b v= 0
 <tag k= label v= B
 <tag k= style v= 0
 <tag k= width v= 1
 <tag k= radius v= 10
</node>
<node 2 -150 -150
 <tag k= color1r v= 192
 <tag k= color1g v= 192
 <tag k= color1b v= 192
 <tag k= color2r v= 218





 <tag k= colorR v= 0
 <tag k= colorG v= 0
<tag k= colorB v= 0
 <tag k= style v= 0





 <tag k= colorR v= 0
 <tag k= colorG v= 0
 <tag k= colorB v= 0
 <tag k= style v= 0





 <tag k= colorR v= 0
 <tag k= colorG v= 0
 <tag k= colorB v= 0
 <tag k= style v= 0





GT Agent Object Class  
Figure A3 shows the logic for the GT Agent class, which is defined in detail above in Chapter 
8.5.1. 
 
Figure A3 GT Agent Logic 
VIH Agent Object Class 
Figures A4 and A5 show the logic for the VIH agent, which is described in more detail above 





Figure A4 Initialization of the VIH Agent 
 
Figure A5 VIH Agent Decision Logic 
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Model Output for interactive simulation runs is described above in Chapter 9.5. 
Table A1 Principle Input Parameters 
Map Identifier 
Probability of Node Error 
X Error Limit 
 Y Error Limit 
Direction Logic 
Nodes  Without a Goal Limit 
Node Recognition Error Probability 
VIH Candidate Distance 
Keep Searching Upper Limit 
Probability of Missing Nodes 
Color Standard Deviation (for distortion calculations) 
 Color Distortion Upper Limit 
Location Distance Upper Limit 
Distance Match  Coefficient  
Expectation Match  Coefficient 
Links Match  Coefficient 
Color Attribute 1 Match  Coefficient 
Color Attribute2 Match  Coefficient 
 GT-VIH Correspondence Threshold 
Update VIH Map Threshold 
Auto Update Node Logic Flag 













Table A2 Principal Model Outputs (for Multiple Trial Parameter Experiments) 
Observed Termination Condition 
MA Start Node 
MA End Goal 
run statistics 
Number of Nodes in  GT Dijkstra Path 
Number of Nodes in VIH Dijkstra Path 
Meta Route Used Flag 
Number of  GT Nodes Visited 
Number of VIH Nodes Visited 
GT Dijkstra Path Length 
VIH Dijskstra Path Length 
Delta VIH Dijkstra - GT Dijkstra 
Total Distance travelled 
Delta Distance From True Optimum (GT Dijkstra Path Length) 
Fractional Delta Distance From Optimum 
Delta Distance From VIH Optimum (VIH Dijkstra Path Length) 
Fractional Delta Distance From VIH Optimum 
Nodes On VIH Path Count 
Nodes Off VIH Path Count 
Maximum Off VIH Path Streak 
Number of False Path Links (due to reconnections for missing nodes) 
Node Recognition Decision Counter 
Average Node Recognition Confidence 
Number of Node Recognition Failures 
Number of True Positive Node Recognitions 
Number Recognition Decisions for which there is No Node Choice 
Number of False Positive Node Recognitions 
Number of False Negative Node Recognitions 
Number of True Negative Node Recognitions 
Percent  of Node Recognition Failures 
Percent  of True Positive Node Recognitions 
Percent of False Positive Node Recognitions 
Number of  Correctly Rejected Updates 
Number of Intra-Path Decisions 
Landmarks On Flag 
 





APPENDIX B: AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Throughout this document a number of areas for future research have been identified.  This 
appendix  provides a list of those areas and the pages on which they may be found. 
1. Future Work: Expanded use of AnyLogic capabilities: ..................................................... 137 
2. Future Work: Simulation of Misperception ......................................................................... 139 
3. Future Work: Distortion of OpenStreetMap Features: ....................................................... 144 
4. Future Work: Network Composition and Complexity: ........................................................ 145 
5. Future Work: Structured or Systematic Distortion in VIH Maps ......................................... 149 
6. Future Work: Entity Interaction ........................................................................................... 153 
7. Future Work:  Route Planning Options ................................................................................ 157 
8. Future Work Backtracking Logic ........................................................................................ 164 
9. Future Work: Links Features ................................................................................................ 172 
10. Future Work Movement Constraint Thresholds and Risk Tolerance: ................................ 195 
11. Future Work: “Learning” from Past Mistakes -  Application of Multi-Criteria Decision 
Methodologies to Support Adaptive Entity Behaviors ....................................................... 210 
12. Future Work: Assessment of Incremental progress ........................................................... 212 
13. Future Work: Further Investigation into Incremental Measures of Progress .................... 213 
14. Future Work: Sensitivity Analyses of Node Recognition Decisions .................................... 231 
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